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STATE OF IDAHO 
JOSE AGUILAR, individually, as the 
Personal Representative of the Estate of 
Maria A. Aguilar, deceased, and as the 
natural father and guardian of 
GUADALUPE MARIA AGUILAR, 
ALEJANDRO AGUILAR, and LORENA 
AGUILAR, minors an\:I JOSE AGUILAR, 
JR., heirs of Maria A. Aguilar, deceased, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
-vs-
NATHAN COONROD and PruMARY 
HEALTH CARE CENTER, an Idaho 
corporation, JOHN and JANE DOES I 
through X, employees of one or more of 
the Defendants, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Appealed from the District of the Third Judicial District 
for the State of Idaho, in and for Canyon County 
Honorable GREGORY M. CULET, District Judge 
Steven K. Tolman 
TOLMAN &BRIZEE, p.e. and 
Steven J. Hippler 
GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP. FILED .. COpy 
Attorneys for Appellants 
David E. Comstock 
and 
APR t·5 2010 
Byron V. Foster 
J I Suprell1ll Court __ Court of ApJ)lla s_f 
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Attorneys for Respondents 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO 
JOSE AGUILAR, individually, as the 
Personal Representative of the Estate of 
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and LORENA AGUILAR, minors and JOSE 
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Supreme Court No. 36980 
Appeal from the Third Judicial District, Canyon County, Idaho. 
HONORABLE GREGORY M. CULET, Presiding 
Steven K. Tolman, TOLMAN & BRIZEE, P.C., P. O. Box 1276, 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1276 
Steven J. Hippler, GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP., P. O. Box 2720, 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Attorneys for Appellants 
David E. Comstock, P. O. Box 2774, Boise, Idaho 83701-2774 
Byron V. Foster, P. O. Box 1584, Boise, Idaho 83701 
Attorneys for Respondents 
T ABLE OF CONTENTS 
Register of Actions 
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, filed 6-2-05 
Voluntary Notice of Dismissal of Defendant Catherin Atup-
Leavitt, M.D., filed 2-28-06 
Answer to Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, filed 3-7-06 
Steven R. Newman, M.D.'s Answer to Complaint and 
Demand for Jury Trial, filed 5-8-06 
Answer and Demand for Jury Trial, filed 9-18-06 
Mercy Medical Center's Answer to Complaint and Demand 
for Jury Trial, filed 9-21-06 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint to More 
Specifically Set for Allegations of Agency, etc., filed 9-27-06 
Affidavit of Byron V. Foster in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion 
For Leave to Amend Complaint, filed 9-27-06 
Notice of Hearing, filed 9-27-06 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 9-29-06 
Amended Notice of Hearing, filed 10-6-06 
Notice of Service, filed 10-30-06 
Mercy Medical Center's Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Leave to Amend Complaint, filed 11-13-06 
West Valley Medical Center's Opposition to Plaintiffs' 
Page No. Vol. No. 
A-O 1 
1 - 17 1 
18 - 20 1 
21- 29 1 
30- 38 
39 -44 1 
45 - 54 1 
55 - 57 1 
58 -77 
78 - 80 
81- 82 1 
83 - 85 1 
86- 89 1 
90 - 151 
Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint, filed 11-13-06 152 - 162 1 
Affidavit of Portia Jenkins in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion 
For Leave to File Amended Complaint, filed 11-13-06 163 - 178 1 
TABLE OF CONTENTS, Continued 
Page No. Vol. No. 
Affidavit of Kathy D. Moore in Opposition to Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint, filed 11-13-06 179-198 1 
Answer of Defendant Mitchell Long, D.O., to Plaintiffs' 
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, filed 11-16-06 199 - 208 2 
Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Leave to Amend Complaint, filed 11-20-06 209- 225 2 
Affidavit of Byron V. Foster in Support of Plaintiffs' Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to Amend 
Complaint, filed 11-20-06 226 - 246 2 
Notice of Vacating Deposition of Lorena Aguilar, 
filed 11-24-06 247 -250 2 
Notice of Telephonic Hearing, filed 11-24-06 251-253 2 
Answer to Plaintiffs' Complaint and Demand for Jury 
Trial, filed 11-29-06 254 -265 2 
Certificate of Service, filed 11-30-06 266 -268 2 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 12-6-06 269 -270 2 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 12-6-06 271 - 272 2 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 12-6-06 273 -274 2 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 12-6-06 275 - 276 2 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 12-6-06 277 - 278 2 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 12-6-06 279 - 280 2 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 12-8-06 281 - 282 2 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 12-8-06 283 - 284 2 
TABLE OF CONTENTS, Continued 
Page No. Vol. No. 
Order Denying Motion to Amend Complaint as to West 
Valley Medical Center and Mercy Medical Center and 
Granting Motion to Amend Complaint as to Primary 
Health Care Center, filed 12-13-06 285 - 288 2 
Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, filed 12-18-06 289 - 306 2 
Answer to Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, 
filed 12-26-06 307 - 317 2 
Answer to Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint and Demand for 
Jury Trial, filed 12-29-06 318 - 329 2 
Defendant Steven R. Newman, M.D.'s Answer to Amended 
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, filed 1-2-07 330 - 339 2 
Notice of Compliance, filed 1-8-07 340 - 342 2 
Notice of Compliance, filed 1-10-07 343 - 345 2 
Notice of Compliance, filed 1-10-07 346 - 348 2 
Notice of Service, filed 1-12-07 349 - 351 2 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 2-27 -07 352 - 353 2 
Request for Trial Setting, filed 3-5-07 354 - 358 2 
Defendant West Valley Medical Center's Response to 
Request for Trial Setting, filed 3-7-07 359 - 364 2 
Defendant Andrew Chai, M.D.'s Response to Plaintiffs' 
Request for Trial Setting, filed 3-7-07 365 - 368 2 
Defendant's Nathan Coonrod, M.D., and Primary Health 
Care Center's Response to Plaintiffs' Request for Trial 
Setting, filed 3-8-07 369 - 372 2 
T ABLE OF CONTENTS, Continued 
Page No. Vol. No. 
Defendant Steven R. Newman, M.D.'s Response to 
Plaintiffs' Request for Trial Setting, filed 3-12-07 373 - 377 2 
Defendant Mitchell Long, D.O.'s Response to Plaintiffs' 
Request for Trial Setting, filed 3-13-07 378-381 2 
Stipulation for Dismissal of Defendant Mercy Medical 
Center, filed 3-16-07 382 - 388 2 
Order Dismissing Defendant Mercy Medical Center, 
filed 3-16-07 389 - 391 2 
Notice of Service, filed 3-22-07 392 - 394 2 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 4-9-07 395 - 396 2 
Notice of Service, filed 4-25-07 397 - 399 2 
Stipulation for Dismissal of Defendant West Valley Medical 
Center with Prejudice, filed 5-24-07 400 - 405 3 
Order Dismissing Defendant West Valley Medical Center 
With Prejudice, filed 5-30-07 406 - 409 3 
Order Setting Case for Trial and Pretrial, filed 6-20-07 410 - 413 3 
Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning, filed 7-6-07 414 - 422 3 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 12-10-07 423 - 424 3 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 12-10-07 425 - 426 3 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 12-10-07 427 - 428 3 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 12-10-07 429 - 430 3 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 12-10-07 431 - 432 3 
Affidavit of Service, filed 12-13-07 433 - 436 3 
Affidavit of Service, filed 12-13-07 437 - 440 3 
TABLE OF CONTENTS, Continued 
Page No. Vol. No. 
Stipulation to Extend Plaintiffs' Expert Disclosure Deadline 
as to Defendant Nathan Coonrod, M.D., filed 12-17-07 441-444 3 
Order Extending Plaintiffs' Expert Disclosure Deadline as to 
Defendant Nathan Coonrod, M.D., filed 12-17-07 445 - 447 3 
Stipulation to Extend Expert Disclosure Deadlines, 
filed 12-24-07 448 - 453 3 
Order Extending Expert Disclosure Deadlines, filed 12-31-07 454 - 456 3 
Notice of Compliance, filed 1-10-08 457 - 458 3 
Notice of Service, filed 1-11-08 459 - 461 3 
Notice of Service, filed 1-11-08 462 - 464 3 
Notice of Service, filed 1-14-08 465 -467 3 
Plaintiffs' Expert Witness Disclosure, filed 1-15-08 468 - 590 3 
Plaintiffs' Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure, 
filed 1-24-08 591 - 594 3 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate and Reschedule Trial Setting, 
filed 2-11-08 595 - 598 3 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Shorten Time Re: Plaintiffs' Motion to 
Vacate and Reschedule Trial Setting, filed 2-13-08 599 - 601 4 
Notice of Telephonic Hearing, filed 2-15-08 602 - 604 4 
Order to Shorten Time Re: Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate and 
Reschedule Trial Setting, filed 2-15-08 605 - 607 4 
Amended Notice of Telephonic Hearing, filed 2-15-08 608 - 610 4 
Notice of Service for Defendant Steven R. Newman, M.D. 's 
Expert Witness Disclosures, filed 2-15-08 611 - 613 4 
TABLE OF CONTENTS, Continued 
Page No. Vol. No. 
Defendant Mitchell Long, D.O.'s Initial Expert Witness 
Disclosure, filed 2-19-08 614 - 648 4 
Plaintiffs' Third Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure, 
filed 2-19-08 649 - 656 4 
Defendant Andrew Chai, M.D.'s Expert Witness Disclosure, 
filed 2-19-08 657 - 679 4 
Amended Order Setting Case for Trial, filed 3-11-08 680 - 687 4 
Plaintiffs' Fourth Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure, 
filed 3-17-08 688 -702 4 
Notice of Deposition Duces Tecum of Daniel D. Brown, M.D., 
filed 4-11-08 703 -706 4 
Plaintiffs' Fifth Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure, 
Filed 4-14-08 707-711 4 
Defendants Nathan Coonrod, M.D. 's and Primary Health 
Care Center's Expert Witness Disclosure, filed 4-22-08 712-721 4 
Notice of Taking Deposition of Dean Lapinel, M.D., (Duces 
Tecum), filed 4-28-08 722 -725 4 
Notice of Taking Deposition of Paul Blaylock, M.D., (Duces 
Tecum), filed 4-28-08 726 -729 4 
Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Thomas M. 
Donndelinger, M.D., filed 5-1-08 730 -734 4 
Notice of Taking Deposition of Richard L. Luhman, M.D., 
(Duces Tecum), filed 5-7-08 735 -738 4 
Amended Notice of Taking Deposition of Richard L. Luhman, 
M.D., (Duces Tecum), filed 5-16-08 739 -742 4 
T ABLE OF CONTENTS, Continued 
Page No. Vol. No. 
Plaintiffs' Sixth Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure, 
filed 6-8-08 743 - 750 4 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 6-9-08 751-752 4 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 6-9-08 753 -754 4 
Affidavit of Service, filed 6-13-09 755 -760 4 
Notice of Substitution of Counsel, filed 6-19-08 761 - 763 4 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 6-23-08 764 -765 4 
Motion for Status Conference, filed 6-24-08 766 -768 4 
Plaintiffs' Response to Motion for Status Conference, 
filed 6-30-08 769 - 771 4 
Notice of Hearing for Status Conference, filed 7-1-08 772 -774 4 
Order Regarding Motion for Status Conference and Pretrial 
Deadlines, filed 7-21-08 775 -777 4 
Amended Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning, 
filed 7-24-08 778 -785 4 
Order Adopting Amended Stipulation for Scheduling and 
Planning, filed 8-1-08 786 - 788 4 
Plaintiffs' Seventh Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure, 
filed 9-2-08 789 -797 4 
Amended Notice of Taking Deposition of Dean Lapinel, M.D., 
(Duces Tecum), filed 9-11-08 798 - 801 5 
Defendant Mitchell Long, D.O. 's Second Expert Witness 
Disclosure, filed 10-15-08 802 - 940 5 
Notice of Service for Defendant Steven R. Newman, M.D.'s 
Second Expert Witness Disclosures, filed 10-16-08 941- 943 5 
TABLE OF CONTENTS, Continued 
Page No. Vol. No. 
Notice of Service for Defendant Steven R. Newman, M.D. 's 
Third Expert Witness Disclosures, filed 10-16-08 944 - 946 5 
Defendants Nathan Coonrod, M.D.'s and Primary Health 
Care Center's Supplemental Disclosure of Expert 
Witnesses, filed 10-17-08 947 - 1068 6 
Defendant Andrew Chai, M.D. 's Supplemental Expert 
Witness Disclosure, filed 10-22-08 1069 - 1086 6 
Plaintiffs' Rebuttal Expert Witness Disclosure, filed 11-17-08 1087 - 1117 6 
Plaintiffs' Eighth Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure, 
filed 11-17-08 1118 - 1123 6 
Defendant Andrew Chai, M.D. 's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, filed 1-30-09 1124 - 1126 6 
Affidavit of Andrew U. Chai, M.D. in Support of Defendant 
Andrew U. Chai, M.D.'s Motion for Summary Judgment, 
filed 1-30-09 1127 - 1130 6 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant Andrew Chai, M.D.'s 
Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 1-30-09 1131-1138 6 
Notice of Hearing, filed 1-30-09 1139 - 1141 6 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 2-2-09 1142 - 1143 6 
Notice of Service, filed 2-3-09 1144 - 1145 6 
Notice of Service, filed 2-3-09 1146 - 1147 6 
Defendant Steven R. Newman, M.D.'s Motion In Limine, 
filed 2-9-09 1148 - 1150 7 
Defendant Steven R. Newman, M.D. 's Memorandum in 
Support of Motion In Limine, filed 2-9-09 1151 - 1165 7 
TABLE OF CONTENTS, Continued 
Page No. Vol. No. 
Affidavit of Julian E. Gabiola in Support of Defendant 
Steven R. Newman, M.D.'s Motion In Limine, filed 2-9-09 1166 - 1224 7 
Notice of Vacating Hearing, filed 2-10-09 1225 - 1227 7 
Notice of Service, filed 2-13-09 1228 - 1229 7 
Stipulation of Parties for Execution and Filing of the Attached 
Qualified Protective Order, filed 2-18-09 1230 - 1244 7 
Qualified Protective Order, filed 2-18-09 1245 - 1255 7 
Plaintiffs Motion for Protective Order, filed 2-19-09 1256 - 1258 7 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Protective 
Order, filed 2-19-09 1259 - 1276 7 
Affidavit of Byron V. Foster in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Protective Order, filed 2-19-09 1277 - 1305 7 
Notice of Service of Discovery Document, filed 2-20-09 1306 - 1308 7 
Notice of Service of Discovery Document, filed 2-20-09 1309-1311 7 
Notice of Hearing, filed 2-23-09 1312-1314 7 
Notice of Hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for Protective Order, 
filed 2-24-09 1315-1317 7 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 2-26-09 1318 - 1319 7 
Notice of Service, filed 2-26-09 1320-1321 7 
Defendants Nathan Coonrod, MD's and Primary Health Care 
Center's Motion In Limine, filed 2-27-09 1322 - 1375 8 
Affidavit of Steven K. Tolman in Support of Defendants 
Nathan Coomod, MD's and Primary Health Care Center's 
Motion In Limine, filed 2-27-09 1376 - 1378 8 
TABLE OF CONTENTS, Continued 
Page No. Vol. No. 
Plaintiffs' First Motion In Limine, filed 2-27-09 1379 - 1383 8 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' First Motion In Limine, 
filed 2-27-09 1384 - 1398 8 
Notice of Hearing on Plaintiffs' First Motion In Limine, 
filed 2-27-09 1399 - 1401 8 
Notice of Service, filed 3-2-09 1402 - 1403 8 
Defendant Steven R. Newman, M.D's Fourth Expert Witness 
Disclosure, filed 3-2-09 1404 - 1419 8 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike, filed 3-2-09 1420 - 1439 8 
Plaintiffs' Supplemental Rebuttal Expert Witness Disclosure, 
filed 3-2-09 1440 - 1446 8 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 3-2-09 1447 - 1448 8 
Notice of Hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike, filed 3-2-09 1449-1451 8 
Notice of Service, filed 3-2-09 1452 - 1454 8 
Notice of Service, filed 3-2-09 1455 - 1457 8 
Notice of Service, filed 3-3-09 1458 - 1459 8 
Notice of Substitution of Counsel, filed 3-4-09 1460 - 1462 8 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 3-4-09 1463 - 1465 8 
Defendant Andrew Chai, M.D.'s Second Supplemental 
Expert Witness Disclosure, filed 3-4-09 1466 - 1485 8 
Notice of Hearing, filed 3-5-09 1486 - 1488 8 
Defendant Steven R. Newman, M.D. 's Second Motion In 
Limine, filed 3-6-09 1489 - 1491 8 
T ABLE OF CONTENTS, Continued 
Page No. Vol. No. 
Defendant Steven R. Newman, M.D.'s Memorandum in 
Support of Second Motion In Limine, etc., filed 3-6-09 1492 - 1500 8 
Defendant Steven R. Newman, M.D.'s Pretrial Statement, 
filed 3-6-09 1501 - 1507 8 
Defendant Steven R. Newman, M.D.'s Fifth Expert Witness 
Disclosure, filed 3-6-09 1508 - 1523 8 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 3-9-09 1524-1526 9 
Defendant Steven R. Newman, M.D.'s Third Motion In 
Limine, filed 3-9-09 1527 - 1529 9 
Defendant Steven R. Newman, M.D.'s Memorandum in 
Support of Third Motion In Limine, filed 3-9-09 1530 - 1540 9 
Affidavit of Julian E. Gabiola in Support of Defendant Steven 
R. Newman, M.D.'s Third Motion In Limine, filed 3-9-09 1541 - 1568 9 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 3-10-09 1569 - 1570 9 
Defendants Nathan Coonrod, MD's and Primary Health Care 
Center's Second Motion In Limine, filed 3-13-09 1571 - 1576 9 
Affidavit of Steven K. Tolman in Support of Defendants 
Nathan Coonrod, MD's and Primary Health Care Center's 
Second Motion In Limine, filed 3-13-09 1577 - 1579 9 
Notice of Hearing, filed 3-13-09 1580-1582 9 
Notice of Hearing, filed 3-16-09 1583 - 1585 9 
Defendant Steven R. Newman, MD's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Fourth Expert 
Witness Disclosure, filed 3-16-09 1586 - 1592 9 
Affidavit of Julian E. Gabiola in Opposition to Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Strike, filed 3-16-09 1593 - 1629 9 
T ABLE OF CONTENTS, Continued 
Page No. Vol. No. 
Defendant Mitchell Long, DO's Joinder in Defendants Nathan 
Coonrod, MD's and Primary Health Care Center's Motion 
In Limine, filed 3-18-09 1630 - 1632 9 
Defendant Mitchell Long, DO's Joinder in Defendant Steven 
R. Newman, MD's Motion In Limine, filed 3-18-09 1633 - 1635 9 
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendant Mitchell Long, 
DO's Motion In Limine, filed 3-18-09 1636-1656 9 
Defendant Mitchell Long, DO's Memorandum in Support of 
Motion In Limine, filed 3-18-09 1657 - 1663 9 
Defendant Mitchell Long, DO's Motion In Limine, 
filed 3-18-09 1664 - 1666 9 
Defendant Mitchell Long, DO's Joinder in Defendant Steven 
R. Newman, MD's Third Motion In Limine, filed 3-18-09 1667 - 1669 9 
Notice of Hearing Re: Defendant Mitchell Long DO's 
Motion In Limine, filed 3-18-09 1670 - 1672 9 
Dr. Long's Joinder in Defendant Dr. Newman's Second Motion 
In Limine and Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Protective Order, filed 3-18-09 1673 - 1685 9 
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Dr. Long's Joinder in 
Defendant Dr. Newman's Second Motion, etc., filed 3-18-09 1686 - 1698 9 
Defendant Andrew Chai, MD's Motion In Limine, filed 3-20-09 1699-1701 9 
Notice of Hearing, filed 3-20-09 1702 - 1704 9 
Joinder in Defendants Nathan Coonrod MD's and Primary 
Health Care Center's Motion In Limine, etc., filed 3-20-09 1705 - 1707 9 
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendant Andrew Chai, 
MD's Motion In Limine, filed 3-20-09 1708 - 1729 10 
TABLE OF CONTENTS, Continued 
Page No. Vol. No. 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant Andrew Chai, MD's 
Motion In Limine, filed 3-20-09 1730 - 1745 10 
Mitchell Long, MD's Pretrial Statement, filed 3-23-09 1746 - 1758 10 
Defendants Nathan Coonrod MD's and Primary Health Care 
Center's Pretrial Statement, filed 3-23-09 1759-1768 10 
Plaintiffs' Witness List, filed 3-23-09 1769 - 1772 10 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit List, filed 3-23-09 1772 - 1776 10 
Plaintiffs' Pretrial/Trial Memorandum, filed 3-23-09 1777 - 1787 10 
Defendant Andrew Chai, MD's Pretrial Statement, filed 3-24-09 1788 - 1796 10 
Defendant Mitchell Long, DO's Supplemental Expert Witness 
Disclosure, filed 3-27-09 1797 - 1808 10 
Notice of Service of Discovery, filed 4-7-09 1809 - 1811 10 
Defendant Steven R. Newman, MD's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion In Limine, filed 4-8-09 1812-1818 10 
Defendant Mitchell Long, DO's Second Supplemental Expert 
Witness Disclosure, filed 4-8-09 1819 -1944 11 
Plaintiffs' Ninth Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure, 
filed 4-9-09 1945-1950 11 
Defendant Steven R. Newman, MD's Trial Brief, filed 4-9-09 1951 - 1959 11 
Defendant Steven R. Newman MD's Proposed Jury 
Instructions, filed 4-9-09 1960 -1984 11 
Jury Instructions, filed 4-9-09 1985 - 2006 11 
Special Verdict Form, filed 4-9-09 2007 - 2011 11 
TABLE OF CONTENTS, Continued 
Page No. Vol. No. 
Affidavit of Byron V. Foster in Opposition to Defendant 
Steven Newman, MD's Motion In Limine, filed 4-13-09 2012 - 2246 12 
Defendant Steven R. Newman, MD's Objection to Plaintiffs' 
Ninth Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure, filed 4-13-09 2247 - 2253 13 
Affidavit of C. Clayton Gill in Support of Defendant Steven 
R. Newman, MD's Objection to Plaintiffs Ninth 
Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure, filed 4-13-09 2254 - 2262 13 
Affidavit of Kenneth J. Bramwell, MD., filed 4-13-09 2263 - 2267 13 
Affidavit of Byron V. Foster in Support of Plaintiffs' 
Memorandum in Opposition to Andrew Chai, MD's 
Motion In Limine, filed 4-13-09 2268 - 2317 13 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Andrew 
Chai, MD' s Motion In Limine, filed 4-13-09 2318 - 2334 13 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Nathan 
Coonrod's and Primary Health Care Center's Second Motion 
In Limine, filed 4-13-09 2335 - 2337 13 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Long's 
Joinder in Defendant Dr. Newman's Second Motion In 
Limine, etc., filed 4-13-09 2338 - 2340 13 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Nathan Coonrod, 
MD's and Primary Health Center's Motion In Limine, 
filed 4-13-09 2341 - 2346 13 
Affidavit of Byron V. Foster in Opposition to Defendant 
Mitchell Long, DO's Motion In Limine, filed 4-13-09 2347 - 2359 13 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Mitchell 
Long, DO's Motion In Limine, filed 4-13-09 2360 - 2365 13 
T ABLE OF CONTENTS, Continued 
Page No. Vol. No. 
Affidavit of Byron V. Foster in Opposition to Defendant 
Steven Newman, MD's Third Motion In Limine, 
filed 4-13-09 2366 - 2384 13 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Steven 
Newman, MD's Third Motion In Limine, filed 4-13-09 2385 - 2395 13 
Affidavit of Byron V. Foster in Opposition to Defendant 
Steven R. Newman, MD's Second Motion In Limine, 
filed 4-13-09 2396 - 2471 14 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Steven 
R. Newman, MD's Second Motion In Limine, filed 4-13-09 2472 - 2492 14 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Steven 
Newman, MD's Motion In Limine, filed 4-13-09 2493 - 2497 14 
Plaintiffs' Proposed Jury Instructions, filed 4-13-09 2498 - 2576 14 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Shorten Time Re: Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Protective Order, filed 4-13-09 2577 - 2579 14 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Protective Order, filed 4-13-09 2580 - 2584 14 
Affidavit of Byron V. Foster in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Protective Order, filed 4-13-09 2585 - 2589 14 
Defendant Andrew Chai, MD's Requested Jury Instructions, 
filed 4-14-09 2590 - 2593 15 
Jury Instructions, filed 4-14-09 2594 - 2640 15 
Jury Instructions, filed 4-14-09 2641 - 2686 15 
Special Verdict Form, filed 4-14-09 2687 - 2691 15 
Defendants Nathan Coonrod, MD and Primary Health Care 
Center's Proposed Jury Instructions, filed 4-14-09 2692 - 2694 15 
TABLE OF CONTENTS, Continued 
Page No. Vol. No. 
Defendant Steven R. Newman, MD's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Protective Order 
Re: Dr. Blahd, filed 4-14-09 2695 - 2698 15 
Order to Shorten Time Re: Plaintiffs' Motion for Protective 2698A -
Order, filed 4-14-09 2698B 15 
Defendant Andrew Chai, MD's Joinder in Defendant Michael 
Long, DO's Motion In Limine, filed 4-15-09 2699 - 2701 15 
Defendant Andrew Chai, MD's Response to Plaintiffs' 
First Motion In Limine, filed 4-15-09 2702 - 2710 15 
Defendants Nathan Coonrod, MD and Primary Health Care 
Center's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion 
In Limine, filed 4-16-09 2711 - 2719 15 
Affidavit of Byron V Foster in Support of Plaintiffs' Reply to 
Defendant Steven R Newman, MD's Opposition to 
Plaintiffs' Motion In Limine, filed 4-17 -09 2720 - 2727 15 
Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendant Andrew Chai MD's Response 
To Plaintiffs' First Motion In Limine, filed 4-17-09 2728 - 2731 15 
Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendant Steven R Newman's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion In 
Limine, filed 4-17 -09 2732 - 2737 15 
Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendant Nathan Coonrod MD and 
Primary Health Care Center's Memorandum in Opposition 
To Plaintiffs' Motion In Limine, filed 4-17-09 2738 - 2741 15 
Defendant Steven R Newman MD's Reply Memorandum in 
Support of First Second and Third Motions In Limine, 
filed 4-20-09 2742 - 2759 15 
Defendants Nathan Coonrod MD's and Primary Health Care 
Center's Joinder in Defendant Steven R Newman MD's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Protective Order, filed 4-20-09 2760 - 2761 15 
T ABLE OF CONTENTS, Continued 
Page No. Vol. No. 
Defendants Nathan Coonrod MD's and Primary Health Care 
Center's Supplemental Proposed Jury Instruction and 
Amended Special Verdict Form, filed 4-20-09 2762 - 2773 15 
Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendant Steven R Newman MD's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Protective Order, etc., filed 4-20-09 2774 - 2783 15 
Defendants Nathan Coonrod MD's and Primary Health Care 
Center's Second Supplemental Disclosure of Expert 
Witnesses, filed 4-20-09 2784 - 2795 16 
Defendants Nathan Coonrod MD and Primary Health Care 
Center's Reply in Support of Motion In Limine, filed 4-21-09 2796 - 2800 16 
Defendants Nathan Coonrod MD and Primary Health Care 
Center's Reply in Support of Second Motion In Limine, 
filed 4-21-09 2801- 2804 16 
Reply to Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant 
Andrew Chai MD's Motion In Limine, filed 4-21-09 2805 - 2810 16 
Affidavit of Counsel in Reply to Plaintiffs' Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant Andrew Chai MD's Motion In 
Limine, filed 4-21-09 2811- 2826 16 
Plaintiffs' Amended Exhibit List, filed 4-21-09 2827 - 2830 16 
Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Protective Order Re: 
Kenneth Bramwell MD, filed 4-21-09 2831 - 2833 16 
Defendants Nathan Coonrod MD and Primary Health Care 
Centers Trial Brief, filed 4-22-09 2834 - 2862 16 
Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants Nathan Coonrod MD and 
Primary Health Care Centers Trial Brief, filed 4-23-09 2863 - 2865 16 
Notice of Taking Deposition of William Blahd MD (Duces 
Tecum), filed 4-23-09 2866 - 2868 16 
TABLE OF CONTENTS, Continued 
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Exhibit List, filed 4-23-09 
Affidavit of Service, filed 4-24-09 
Defendant Steven R Newman MD's Objection to Plaintiffs' 
Third Amended Exhibit List, filed 4-24-09 
Joinder in Defendant Steven R Newman MD's Objection to 
Plaintiffs' Third Amended Exhibit List, filed 4-24-09 
Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants Nathan Coonrod MD and 
Primary Health Care Centers Reservation of Right to 
Challenge Qualifications, etc., filed 4-24-09 
Defendants Nathan Coonrod MD and Primary Health Care 
Centers Supplemental Trial Brief, filed 4-27-09 
Plaintiffs' Bench Brief Re: Defendants Undisclosed Expert 
Witness Testimony at Trial, filed 4-27-09 
Plaintiffs' Bench BriefRe: Character/Impeachment of 
Defendant Newman, filed 4-28-09 
Plaintiffs' Response Bench BriefRe: Defendant Coonrod's 
Supplemental Trial Brief, filed 4-29-09 
Affidavit of Byron V Foster, filed 4-29-09 
Plaintiffs' Bench BriefRe: Dr Lebaron and the Local 
Standard of Care, filed 5-4-09 
Defendant Steven R Newman MD's Objections to Plaintiffs' 
Proposed Jury Instructions, filed 5-8-09 
Objection to Plaintiffs' Proposed Jury Instructions, filed 5-8-09 
Plaintiffs' Objections to the Defendants' Proposed Jury 
Instructions, filed 5-11-09 
Page No. Vol. No. 
2869 - 2872 16 
2873 16 
2874 - 2876 16 
2877 - 2879 16 
2880 - 2883 16 
2884 - 2891 16 
2892 - 2897 16 
2898 - 2905 16 
2906 - 2912 16 
2913-2961 16 
2962 - 3143 17 
3144- 3147 17 
3148 - 3155 17 
3156-3168 18 
TABLE OF CONTENTS, Continued 
Page No. Vol. No. 
Plaintiffs' Proposed Supplemental Jury Instructions, 
filed 5-11-09 3169 - 3171C 18 
Plaintiffs' Final Rebuttal Disclosure, filed 5-11-09 3172A- 3173 18 
Special Verdict Form, filed 5-13-09 3174-3178 18 
Judgment Upon Special Verdict, filed 5-20-09 3179 - 3184 18 
Judgment Re: Steven R Newman, M.D., filed 5-20-09 3185 - 3187 18 
Defendants Nathan Coonrod MD and Primary Health Care 
Centers Motion for New Trial, etc., filed 5-28-09 3188 - 3190 18 
Defendants Nathan Coonrod MD and Primary Health Care 
Centers Memorandum in Support of their Motion for 
New Trial, etc., filed 5-28-09 3191 - 3227 18 
Defendant Nathan Coonrod MD and Primary Health Care 
Centers Objection to the Judgment Upon the Verdict, etc., 
filed 5-28-09 3228 - 3230 18 
Affidavit in Support of Defendants Nathan Coonrod and 
Primary Health Care Centers Motion for New Trial, etc., 
filed 5-28-09 3231-3241 18 
Defendants Nathan Coonrod MD and Primary Health Care 
Centers Memorandum in Support of their Objection to the 
Judgment Upon the Verdict, etc., filed 5-28-09 3242 - 3258 18 
Notice of Hearing, filed 5-28-09 3259 - 3261 18 
Stipulation for Dismissal With Prejudice as to Defendant 
Andrew Chai MD, filed 5-29-09 3262 - 3263 18 
Order of Dismissal with Prejudice as to Defendant Andrew 
Chai, MD, filed 6-2-09 3264 - 3266 18 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Request for Award of 
Discretionary Costs, filed 6-3-09 3267 - 3299 18 
TABLE OF CONTENTS, Continued 
Page No. Vol. No. 
Plaintiffs' Verified Memorandum of Cost, filed 6-3-09 3300 - 3308 18 
Stipulation for Dismissal with Prejudice as to Defendant 
Mitchell Long, D.O., only, filed 6-12-09 3309 - 3310 18 
Order of Dismissal with Prejudice as to Defendant Mitchell 
Long, D.O., only, filed 6-15-09 3311-3314 18 
Plaintiffs' Objections to Defendant Steven R Newman MD's 
Memorandum of Costs and Affidavit of Julien E. Gabiola 
In Support of the Same, filed 6-15-09 3315 - 3322 18 
Defendants Nathan Coonrod MD and Primary Health Care 
Centers Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' 
Memorandum of Costs and Fees, filed 6-17-09 3323 - 3369 19 
Defendants Nathan Coonrod MD and Primary Health Care 
Centers Motion to Disallow Costs, filed 6-17-09 3370 - 3371 19 
Affidavit of Byron V Foster, filed 6-18-09 3372 - 3529 19 
Notice of Hearing, filed 6-18-09 3530 - 3531 20 
Notice of Hearing, filed 6-18-09 3532 - 3533 20 
Defendant Steven R Newman MD's Response to Plaintiffs' 
Objection to Defendant Steven R Newman MD's 
Memorandum of Costs, filed 6-22-09 3534 - 3541 20 
Second Affidavit of Julian E Gabiola in Support of Defendant 
Steven R Newman MD's Memorandum of Costs, 
filed 6-22-09 3542 - 3578 20 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Nathan 
Coonrod MD and Primary Health Care Centers Memorandum 
In Support of their Objection to the Judgment upon the 
Verdict, etc., filed 6-24-09 3579 - 3604 20 
TABLE OF CONTENTS, Continued· 
Page No. Vol. No. 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Nathan 
Coonrod MD and Primary Health Care Centers Motion for 
New Trial, etc., filed 6-24-09 3605 - 3626 20 
Stipulation for Dismissal with Prejudice, filed 6-26-09 3627 - 3628 20 
Order of Dismissal with Prejudice, filed 6-26-09 3629 - 3631 20 
Defendants Nathan Coonrod MD and Primary Health Care 
Centers Reply Memorandum in Support of their Objection 
To the Judgment Upon the Verdict, etc., filed 6-29-09 3632 - 3653 20 
Defendants Nathan Coonrod MD and Primary Health Care 
Centers Reply Memorandum in Support of their Motion for 
New Trial, etc., filed 6-29-09 3654 - 3693 20 
Affidavit of Steven K Tolman, filed 6-30-09 3694 - 3896 21 
Notice of Telephonic Hearing Re: Court Rulings on Post 
Trial Motions, filed 8-24-09 3897 - 3898 22 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Post Trial Motions, etc., 
filed 8-25-09 3899 - 3923 22 
Notice of Appearance, filed 8-26-09 3924 - 3926 22 
Objection to Plaintiffs' Proposed Amended Judgment, 
filed 9-2-09 3927 - 3929 22 
Response to Defendants' Objection to Plaintiffs' Proposed 
Amended Judgment, filed 9-9-09 3930 - 3934 22 
Affidavit of Steven J Hippler, filed 9-11-09 3935 - 4028 22 
Order on Plaintiffs' Verified Memorandum of Costs, 
filed 9-15-09 4029 - 4033 22 
Amended Judgment, filed 9-15-09 4034 - 4037 22 
Notice of Appeal, filed 9-29-09 4038 - 4062 22 
TABLE OF CONTENTS, Continued 
Amended Notice of Appeal, filed 10-29-09 
Certificate of Exhibits 
Certificate of Clerk 
Certificate of Service 
Page No. Vol. No. 
4063 - 4089 22 




Page No. Vol. No. 
Affidavit in Support of Defendants Nathan Coonrod and 
Primary Health Care Centers Motion for New Trial, etc., 
filed 5-28-09 3231 - 3241 18 
Affidavit of Andrew U. Chai, M.D. in Support of Defendant 
Andrew U. Chai, M.D.'s Motion for Summary Judgment, 
filed 1-30-09 ll27 - 1130 6 
Affidavit of Byron V Foster in Support of Plaintiffs' Reply to 
Defendant Steven R Newman, MD's Opposition to 
Plaintiffs' Motion In Limine, filed 4-17 -09 2720 - 2727 15 
Affidavit of Byron V Foster, filed 4-29-09 2913 - 2961 16 
Affidavit of Byron V Foster, filed 6-18-09 3372 - 3529 19 
Affidavit of Byron V. Foster in Opposition to Defendant 
Steven Newman, MD's Motion In Limine, filed 4-l3-09 2012 - 2246 12 
Affidavit of Byron V. Foster in Opposition to Defendant 
Mitchell Long, DO's Motion In Limine, filed 4-l3-09 2347 - 2359 l3 
Affidavit of Byron V. Foster in Opposition to Defendant 
Steven Newman, MD's Third Motion In Limine, 
filed 4-13-09 2366 - 2384 13 
Affidavit of Byron V. Foster in Opposition to Defendant 
Steven R. Newman, MD's Second Motion In Limine, 
filed 4-13-09 2396 - 2471 14 
Affidavit of Byron V. Foster in Support of Plaintiffs' 
Memorandum in Opposition to Andrew Chai, MD's 
Motion In Limine, filed 4-13-09 2268 - 2317 l3 
Affidavit of Byron V. Foster in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion 
For Leave to Amend Complaint, filed 9-27-06 58 -77 1 
Affidavit of Byron V. Foster in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Protective Order, filed 2-19-09 1277 - 1305 7 
INDEX, Continued 
Page No. Vol. No. 
Affidavit of Byron V. Foster in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Protective Order, filed 4-13-09 2585 - 2589 14 
Affidavit of Byron V. Foster in Support of Plaintiffs' Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to Amend 
Complaint, filed 11-20-06 226'- 246 2 
Affidavit of C. Clayton Gill in Support of Defendant Steven 
R. Newman, MD's Objection to Plaintiff's Ninth 
Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure, filed 4-13-09 2254 - 2262 13 
Affidavit of Counsel in Reply to Plaintiffs' Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant Andrew Chai MD's Motion In 
Limine, fil ed 4-21-09 2811 - 2826 16 
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendant Andrew Chai, 
MD's Motion In Limine, filed 3-20-09 1708 -1729 10 
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendant Mitchell Long, 
DO's Motion In Limine, filed 3-18-09 1636 - 1656 9 
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Dr. Long's Joinder in 
Defendant Dr. Newman's Second Motion, etc., filed 3-18-09 1686-1698 9 
Affidavit of Julian E. Gabiola in Opposition to Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Strike, filed 3-16-09 1593 - 1629 9 
Affidavit of Julian E. Gabiola in Support of Defendant 
Steven R. Newman, M.D.'s Motion In Limine, filed 2-9-09 1166 - 1224 7 
Affidavit of Julian E. Gabiola in Support of Defendant Steven 
R. Newman, M.D. 's Third Motion In Limine, filed 3-9-09 1541 - 1568 9 
Affidavit of Kathy D. Moore in Opposition to Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint, filed 11-13-06 179 - 198 1 
Affidavit of Kenneth J. Bramwell, MD., filed 4-13-09 2263 - 2267 13 
Affidavit of Portia Jenkins in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion 
For Leave to File Amended Complaint, filed 11-13-06 163 - 178 1 
INDEX, Continued 
Page No. Vol. No. 
Affidavit of Service, filed 12-13-07 433 - 436 3 
Affidavit of Service, filed 12-l3-07 437 - 440 3 
Affidavit of Service, filed 4-24-09 2873 16 
Affidavit of Service, filed 6-13-09 755 - 760 4 
Affidavit of Steven J Hippler, filed 9-11-09 3935 - 4028 22 
Affidavit of Steven K Tolman, filed 6-30-09 3694 - 3896 21 
Affidavit of Steven K. Tolman in Support of Defendants 
Nathan Coonrod, MD's and Primary Health Care Center's 
Motion In Limine, filed 2-27-09 l376 - 1378 8 
Affidavit of Steven K. Tolman in Support of Defendants 
Nathan Coonrod, MD's and Primary Health Care Center's 
Second Motion In Limine, filed 3-13-09 1577 - 1579 9 
Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, filed 12-18-06 289 - 306 2 
Amended Judgment, filed 9-15-09 4034 - 4037 22 
Amended Notice of Appeal, filed 10-29-09 4063 - 4089 22 
Amended Notice of Hearing, filed 10-6-06 83 - 85 1 
Amended Notice of Taking Deposition of Dean Lapinel, M.D., 
(Duces Tecum), filed 9-11-08 798 - 801 5 
Amended Notice of Taking Deposition of Richard L. Lubman, 
M.D., (Duces Tecum), filed 5-16-08 739 -742 4 
Amended Notice of Telephonic Hearing, filed 2-15-08 608 - 610 4 
Amended Order Setting Case for Trial, filed 3-11-08 680 - 687 4 
Amended Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning, 
filed 7-24-08 778 -785 4 
INDEX, Continued 
Page No. Vol. No. 
Answer and Demand for Jury Trial, filed 9-18-06 39-44 1 
Answer of Defendant Mitchell Long, D.O., to Plaintiffs' 
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, filed 11-16-06 199 - 208 2 
Answer to Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, 
filed 12-26-06 307 - 317 2 
Answer to Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, filed 3-7-06 21- 29 1 
Answer to Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint and Demand for 
Jury Trial, filed 12-29-06 318-329 2 
Answer to Plaintiffs' Complaint and Demand for Jury 
Trial, filed 11-29-06 254 - 265 2 
Certificate of Clerk 4092 22 
Certificate of Exhibits 4090 - 4091 22 
Certificate of Service 4093 22 
Certificate of Service, filed 11-30-06 266 - 268 2 
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, filed 6-2-05 1- 17 1 
Defendant Andrew Chai, M.D.'s Expert Witness Disclosure, 
filed 2-19-08 657 - 679 4 
Defendant Andrew Chai, M.D. 's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, filed 1-30-09 1124 -1126 6 
Defendant Andrew Chai, M.D. 's Response to Plaintiffs' 
Request for Trial Setting, filed 3-7 -07 365 - 368 2 
Defendant Andrew Chai, M.D.'s Second Supplemental 
Expert Witness Disclosure, filed 3-4-09 1466 - 1485 8 
Defendant Andrew Chai, M.D.'s Supplemental Expert 
Witness Disclosure, filed 10-22-08 1069-1086 6 
IND EX, Continued 
Page No. Vol. No. 
Defendant Andrew Chai, MD's Joinder in Defendant Michael 
Long, DO's Motion In Limine, filed 4-15-09 2699 - 2701 15 
Defendant Andrew Chai, MD's Motion In Limine, filed 3-20-09 1699 - 1701 9 
Defendant Andrew Chai, MD's Pretrial Statement, filed 3-24-09 1788 -1796 10 
Defendant Andrew Chai, MD's Requested Jury Instructions, 
filed 4-14-09 2590 - 2593 15 
Defendant Andrew Chai, MD's Response to Plaintiffs' 
First Motion In Limine, filed 4-15-09 2702 - 2710 15 
Defendant Mitchell Long, D.O. 's Initial Expert Witness 
Disclosure, filed 2-19-08 614 - 648 4 
Defendant Mitchell Long, D.O.'s Response to Plaintiffs' 
Request for Trial Setting, filed 3-13-07 378 - 381 2 
Defendant Mitchell Long, D.O.'s Second Expert Witness 
Disclosure, filed 10-15-08 802 - 940 5 
Defendant Mitchell Long, DO's Joinder in Defendant Steven 
R. Newman, MD's Motion In Limine, filed 3-18-09 1633 - 1635 9 
Defendant Mitchell Long, DO's Joinder in Defendant Steven 
R. Newman, MD's Third Motion In Limine, filed 3-18-09 1667 - 1669 9 
Defendant Mitchell Long, DO's Joinder in Defendants Nathan 
Coonrod, MD's and Primary Health Care Center's Motion 
In Limine, filed 3-18-09 1630 - 1632 9 
Defendant Mitchell Long, DO's Memorandum in Support of 
Motion In Limine, filed 3-18-09 1657 - 1663 9 
Defendant Mitchell Long, DO's Motion In Limine, 
filed 3-18-09 1664 - 1666 9 
Defendant Mitchell Long, DO's Second Supplemental Expert 
Witness Disclosure, filed 4-8-09 1819 - 1944 11 
INDEX, Continued 
Page No. Vol. No. 
Defendant Mitchell Long, DO's Supplemental Expert Witness 
Disclosure, filed 3-27-09 1797 - 1808 10 
Defendant Nathan Coonrod MD and Primary Health Care 
Centers Objection to the Judgment Upon the Verdict, etc., 
filed 5-28-09 3228 - 3230 18 
Defendant Steven R Newman MD's Objection to Plaintiffs' 
Third Amended Exhibit List, filed 4-24-09 2874 - 2876 16 
Defendant Steven R Newman MD's Objections to Plaintiffs' 
Proposed Jury Instructions, filed 5-8-09 3144 - 3147 17 
Defendant Steven R Newman MD's Reply Memorandum in 
Support of First Second and Third Motions In Limine, 
filed 4-20-09 2742 - 2759 15 
Defendant Steven R Newman MD's Response to Plaintiffs' 
Objection to Defendant Steven R Newman MD's 
Memorandum of Costs, filed 6-22-09 3534 - 3541 20 
Defendant Steven R. Newman MD's Proposed Jury 
Instructions, filed 4-9-09 1960 - 1984 11 
Defendant Steven R. Newman, M.D.' s Answer to Amended 
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, filed 1-2-07 330 - 339 2 
Defendant Steven R. Newman, M.D. 's Fifth Expert Witness 
Disclosure, filed 3-6-09 1508 - 1523 8 
Defendant Steven R. Newman, M.D.'s Memorandum in 
Support of Motion In Limine, filed 2-9-09 1151-1165 7 
Defendant Steven R. Newman, M.D.'s Memorandum in 
Support of Second Motion In Limine, etc., filed 3-6-09 1492-1500 8 
Defendant Steven R. Newman, M.D.'s Memorandum in 
Support of Third Motion In Limine, filed 3-9-09 1530 - 1540 9 
Defendant Steven R. Newman, M.D.'s Motion In Limine, 
filed 2-9-09 1148-1150 7 
INDEX, Continued 
Defendant Steven R. Newman, M.D.'s Pretrial Statement, 
filed 3-6-09 
Defendant Steven R. Newman, M.D.'s Response to 
Plaintiffs' Request for Trial Setting, filed 3-12-07 
Defendant Steven R. Newman, M.D.'s Second Motion In 
Limine, filed 3-6-09 
Defendant Steven R. Newman, M.D.'s Third Motion In 
Limine, filed 3-9-09 
Defendant Steven R. Newman, M.D's Fourth Expert Witness 
Disclosure, filed 3-2-09 
Defendant Steven R. Newman, MD's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Fourth Expert 
Witness Disclosure, filed 3-16-09 
Defendant Steven R. Newman, MD's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion In Limine, filed 4-8-09 
Defendant Steven R. Newman, MD's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Protective Order 
Re: Dr. Blahd, filed 4-14-09 
Defendant Steven R. Newman, MD's Objection to Plaintiffs' 
Ninth Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure, filed 4-13-09 
Defendant Steven R. Newman, MD's Trial Brief, filed 4-9-09 
Defendant West Valley Medical Center's Response to 
Request for Trial Setting, filed 3-7-07 
Defendant's Nathan Coonrod, M.D., and Primary Health 
Care Center's Response to Plaintiffs' Request for Trial 
Setting, filed 3-8-07 
Defendants Nathan Coonrod MD and Primary Health Care 
Center's Reply in Support of Motion In Limine, filed 4-21-09 
Page No. Vol. No. 
1501 - 1507 8 
373 - 377 2 
1489 - 1491 8 
1527 - 1529 9 
1404 - 1419 8 
1586-1592 9 
1812 - 1818 10 
2695 - 2698 15 
2247 - 2253 13 
1951-1959 11 
359 - 364 2 
369 - 372 2 
2796 - 2800 16 
INDEX, Continued 
Page No. Vol. No. 
Defendants Nathan Coonrod MD and Primary Health Care 
Center's Reply in Support of Second Motion In Limine, 
filed 4-21-09 2801 - 2804 16 
Defendants Nathan Coonrod MD and Primary Health Care 
Centers Trial Brief, filed 4-22-09 2834 - 2862 16 
Defendants Nathan Coonrod MD and Primary Health Care 
Centers Supplemental Trial Brief, filed 4-27-09 2884 - 2891 16 
Defendants Nathan Coonrod MD and Primary Health Care 
Centers Motion for New Trial, etc., filed 5-28-09 3188-3190 18 
Defendants Nathan Coonrod MD and Primary Health Care 
Centers Memorandum in Support of their Motion for 
New Trial, etc., filed 5-28-09 3191-3227 18 
Defendants Nathan Coonrod MD and Primary Health Care 
Centers Memorandum in Support of their Objection to the 
Judgment Upon the Verdict, etc., filed 5-28-09 3242 - 3258 18 
Defendants Nathan Coonrod MD and Primary Health Care 
Centers Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' 
Memorandum of Costs and Fees, filed 6-17-09 3323 - 3369 19 
Defendants Nathan Coonrod MD and Primary Health Care 
Centers Motion to Disallow Costs, filed 6-17-09 3370 - 3371 19 
Defendants Nathan Coonrod MD and Primary Health Care 
Centers Reply Memorandum in Support of their Objection 
To the Judgment Upon the Verdict, etc., filed 6-29-09 3632 - 3653 20 
Defendants Nathan Coonrod MD and Primary Health Care 
Centers Reply Memorandum in Support of their Motion for 
New Trial, etc., filed 6-29-09 3654 - 3693 20 
Defendants Nathan Coonrod MD's and Primary Health Care 
Center's Pretrial Statement, filed 3-23-09 1759 - 1768 10 
INDEX, Continued 
Page No. Vol. No. 
Defendants Nathan Coonrod MD's and Primary Health Care 
Center's Joinder in Defendant Steven R Newman MD's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Protective Order, filed 4-20-09 2760 - 2761 15 
Defendants Nathan Coonrod MD's and Primary Health Care 
Center's Supplemental Proposed Jury Instruction and 
Amended Special Verdict Form, filed 4-20-09 2762 - 2773 15 
Defendants Nathan Coonrod MD's and Primary Health Care 
Center's Second Supplemental Disclosure of Expert 
Witnesses, filed 4-20-09 2784 - 2795 16 
Defendants Nathan Coonrod, M.D.'s and Primary Health 
Care Center's Expert Witness Disclosure, filed 4-22-08 712-721 4 
Defendants Nathan Coonrod, M.D.'s and Primary Health 
Care Center's Supplemental Disclosure of Expert 
Witnesses, filed 10-17-08 947 - 1068 6 
Defendants Nathan Coonrod, MD and Primary Health Care 
Center's Proposed Jury Instructions, filed 4-14-09 2692 - 2694 15 
Defendants Nathan Coonrod, MD and Primary Health Care 
Center's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion 
In Limine, filed 4-16-09 2711-2719 15 
Defendants Nathan Coonrod, MD's and Primary Health Care 
Center's Motion In Limine, filed 2-27-09 1322 - 1375 8 
Defendants Nathan Coonrod, MD's and Primary Health Care 
Center's Second Motion In Limine, filed 3-13-09 1571 - 1576 9 
Dr. Long's Joinder in Defendant Dr. Newman's Second Motion 
In Limine and Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Protective Order, filed 3-18-09 1673 - 1685 9 
Joinder in Defendant Steven R Newman MD's Objection to 
Plaintiffs' Third Amended Exhibit List, filed 4-24-09 2877 - 2879 16 
INDEX, Continued 
Page No. Vol. No. 
Joinder in Defendants Nathan Coomod MD's and Primary 
Health Care Center's Motion In Limine, etc., filed 3-20-09 1705 - 1707 9 
Judgment Re: Steven R Newman, M.D., filed 5-20-09 3185-3187 18 
Judgment Upon Special Verdict, filed 5-20-09 3179-3184 18 
Jury Instructions, filed 4-14-09 2594 - 2640 15 
Jury Instructions, filed 4-14-09 2641 - 2686 15 
Jury Instructions, filed 4-9-09 1985 - 2006 11 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Post Trial Motions, etc., 
filed 8-25-09 3899 - 3923 22 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant Andrew Chai, M.D.'s 
Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 1-30-09 1131-1138 6 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant Andrew Chai, MD's 
Motion In Limine, filed 3-20-09 1730-1745 10 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Protective 
Order, filed 2-19-09 1259 - 1276 7 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' First Motion In Limine, 
filed 2-27-09 1384 - 1398 8 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Request for Award of 
Discretionary Costs, filed 6-3-09 3267 - 3299 18 
Mercy Medical Center's Answer to Complaint and Demand 
for Jury Trial, filed 9-21-06 45 - 54 1 
Mercy Medical Center's Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Leave to Amend Complaint, filed 11-13-06 90 - 151 1 
Mitchell Long, MD's Pretrial Statement, filed 3-23-09 1746 - 1758 10 
Motion for Status Conference, filed 6-24-08 766 -768 4 
INDEX, Continued 
Page No. Vol. No. 
Notice of Appeal, filed 9-29-09 4038 - 4062 22 
Notice of Appearance, filed 8-26-09 3924 - 3926 22 
Notice of Compliance, filed 1-10-07 343 - 345 2 
Notice of Compliance, filed 1-10-07 346 - 348 2 
Notice of Compliance, filed 1-10-08 457 - 458 3 
Notice of Compliance, filed 1-8-07 340 - 342 2 
Notice of Deposition Duces Tecum of Daniel D. Brown, M.D., 
filed 4-11-08 703 -706 4 
Notice of Hearing for Status Conference, filed 7-1-08 772 -774 4 
Notice of Hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for Protective Order, 
filed 2-24-09 1315-1317 7 
Notice of Hearing on Plaintiffs' First Motion In Limine, 
filed 2-27-09 1399 - 1401 8 
Notice of Hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike, filed 3-2-09 1449-1451 8 
Notice of Hearing Re: Defendant Mitchell Long DO's 
Motion In Limine, filed 3-18-09 1670 - 1672 9 
Notice of Hearing, filed 1-30-09 1139 - 1141 6 
Notice of Hearing, filed 2-23-09 1312-1314 7 
Notice of Hearing, filed 3-13-09 1580 - 1582 9 
Notice of Hearing, filed 3-16-09 1583 - 1585 9 
Notice of Hearing, filed 3-20-09 1702 - 1704 9 
Notice of Hearing, filed 3-5-09 1486 - 1488 8 
Notice of Hearing, filed 5-28-09 3259 - 3261 18 
INDEX, Continued 
Page No. Vol. No. 
Notice of Hearing, filed 6-18-09 3530 - 3531 20 
Notice of Hearing, filed 6-18-09 3532 - 3533 20 
Notice of Hearing, filed 9-27-06 78 - 80 1 
Notice of Service for Defendant Steven R. Newman, M.D.'s 
Expert Witness Disclosures, filed 2-15-08 611 - 613 4 
Notice of Service for Defendant Steven R. Newman, M.D.'s 
Second Expert Witness Disclosures, filed 10-16-08 941 - 943 5 
Notice of Service for Defendant Steven R. Newman, M.D.'s 
Third Expert Witness Disclosures, filed 10-16-08 944- 946 5 
Notice of Service of Discovery Document, filed 2-20-09 1306 - 1308 7 
Notice of Service of Discovery Document, filed 2-20-09 1309-1311 7 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 12-10-07 423 - 424 3 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 12-10-07 425 - 426 3 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 12-10-07 427 - 428 3 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 12-10-07 429 - 430 3 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 12-10-07 431 - 432 3 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 12-6-06 269 - 270 2 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 12-6-06 271 - 272 2 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 12-6-06 273 - 274 2 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 12-6-06 275 - 276 2 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 12-6-06 277 - 278 2 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 12-6-06 279 - 280 2 
INDEX, Continued 
Page No. Vol. No. 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 12-8-06 281 - 282 2 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 12-8-06 283 - 284 2 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 2-2-09 1142 - 1143 6 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 2-26-09 1318-1319 7 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 2-27-07 352 - 353 2 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 3-10-09 1569 - 1570 9 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 3-2-09 1447 - 1448 8 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 3-4-09 1463 - 1465 8 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 3-9-09 1524-1526 9 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 4-9-07 395 - 396 2 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 6-23-08 764 -765 4 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 6-9-08 751-752 4 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 6-9-08 753 -754 4 
Notice of Service of Discovery Documents, filed 9-29-06 81- 82 1 
Notice of Service of Discovery, filed 4-7-09 1809 - 1811 10 
Notice of Service, filed 10-30-06 86 - 89 1 
Notice of Service, filed 1-11-08 459 - 461 3 
Notice of Service, filed 1-11-08 462 - 464 3 
Notice of Service, filed 1-12-07 349-351 2 
Notice of Service, filed 1-14-08 465 - 467 3 
Notice of Service, filed 2-13-09 1228 - 1229 7 
INDEX, Continued 
Page No. Vol. No. 
Notice of Service, filed 2-26-09 1320-1321 7 
Notice of Service, filed 2-3-09 1144 - 1145 6 
Notice of Service, filed 2-3-09 1146 - 1147 6 
Notice of Service, filed 3-2-09 1402 - 1403 8 
Notice of Service, filed 3-2-09 1452 - 1454 8 
Notice of Service, filed 3-2-09 1455 - 1457 8 
Notice of Service, filed 3-22-07 392 - 394 2 
Notice of Service, filed 3-3-09 1458 - 1459 8 
Notice of Service, filed 4-25-07 397 - 399 2 
Notice of Substitution of Counsel, filed 3-4-09 1460 - 1462 8 
Notice of Substitution of Counsel, filed 6-19-08 761 -763 4 
Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Thomas M. 
Donndelinger, M.D., filed 5-1-08 730 -734 4 
Notice of Taking Deposition of Dean Lapinel, M.D., (Duces 
Tecum), filed 4-28-08 722 -725 4 
Notice of Taking Deposition of Paul Blaylock, M.D., (Duces 
Tecum), filed 4-28-08 726 -729 4 
Notice of Taking Deposition of Richard L. Lubman, M.D., 
(Duces Tecum), filed 5-7-08 735 -738 4 
Notice of Taking Deposition of William Blahd MD (Duces 
Tecum), filed 4-23-09 2866 - 2868 16 
Notice of Telephonic Hearing Re: Court Rulings on Post 
Trial Motions, filed 8-24-09 3897 - 3898 22 
Notice of Telephonic Hearing, filed 11-24-06 251-253 2 
INDEX, Continued 
Page No. Vol. No. 
Notice of Telephonic Hearing, filed 2-15-08 602 - 604 4 
Notice of Vacating Deposition of Lorena Aguilar, 
filed 11-24-06 247 - 250 2 
Notice of Vacating Hearing, filed 2-10-09 1225 - 1227 7 
Objection to Plaintiffs' Proposed Amended Judgment, 
filed 9-2-09 3927 - 3929 22 
Objection to Plaintiffs' Proposed Jury Instructions, filed 5-8-09 3148-3155 17 
Order Adopting Amended Stipulation for Scheduling and 
Planning, filed 8-1-08 786 -788 4 
Order Denying Motion to Amend Complaint as to West 
Valley Medical Center and Mercy Medical Center and 
Granting Motion to Amend Complaint as to Primary 
Health Care Center, filed 12-13-06 285 - 288 2 
Order Dismissing Defendant Mercy Medical Center, 
filed 3-16-07 389 - 391 2 
Order Dismissing Defendant West Valley Medical Center 
With Prejudice, filed 5-30-07 406 - 409 3 
Order Extending Expert Disclosure Deadlines, filed 12-31-07 454 - 456 3 
Order Extending Plaintiffs' Expert Disclosure Deadline as to 
Defendant Nathan Coonrod, M.D., filed 12-17-07 445 - 447 3 
Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Protective Order Re: 
Kenneth Bramwell MD, filed 4-21-09 2831 - 2833 16 
Order of Dismissal with Prejudice as to Defendant Andrew 
Chai, MD, filed 6-2-09 3264 - 3266 18 
Order of Dismissal with Prejudice as to Defendant Mitchell 
Long, D.O., only, filed 6-15-09 3311-3314 18 
Order of Dismissal with Prejudice, filed 6-26-09 3629 - 3631 20 
INDEX, Continued 
Page No. Vol. No. 
Order on Plaintiffs' Verified Memorandum of Costs, 
filed 9- 15-09 4029 - 4033 22 
Order Regarding Motion for Status Conference and Pretrial 
Deadlines, filed 7-21-08 775 -777 4 
Order Setting Case for Trial and Pretrial, filed 6-20-07 410-413 3 
Order to Shorten Time Re: Plaintiffs' Motion for Protective 2698A -
Order, filed 4-14-09 2698B 15 
Order to Shorten Time Re: Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate and 
Reschedule Trial Setting, filed 2-15-08 605 - 607 4 
Plaintiffs Motion for Protective Order, filed 2-19-09 1256 - 1258 7 
Plaintiffs' Amended Exhibit List, filed 4-21-09 2827 - 2830 16 
Plaintiffs' Bench BriefRe: Character/Impeachment of 
Defendant Newman, filed 4-28-09 2898 - 2905 16 
Plaintiffs' Bench BriefRe: Defendants Undisclosed Expert 
Witness Testimony at Trial, filed 4-27-09 2892 - 2897 16 
Plaintiffs' Bench BriefRe: Dr Lebaron and the Local 
Standard of Care, filed 5-4-09 2962 - 3143 17 
Plaintiffs' Eighth Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure, 
filed 11-17-08 1118 - 1123 6 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit List, filed 3-23-09 1772 - 1776 10 
Plaintiffs' Expert Witness Disclosure, filed 1-15-08 468 - 590 3 
Plaintiffs' Fifth Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure, 
Filed 4-14-08 707 - 711 4 
Plaintiffs' First Motion In Limine, filed 2-27-09 1379 - 1383 8 
Plaintiffs' Final Rebuttal Disclosure, filed 5- 11-09 3172A-3 I 73 18 
Plaintiffs' Fourth Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure, 
filed 3-17-08 688 - 702 4 
INDEX, Continued 
Page No. Vol. No. 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Andrew 
Chai, MD's Motion In Limine, filed 4-13-09 2318 - 2334 13 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Long's 
Joinder in Defendant Dr. Newman's Second Motion In 
Limine, etc., filed 4-13-09 2338 - 2340 13 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Mitchell 
Long, DO's Motion In Limine, filed 4-13-09 2360 - 2365 13 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Steven 
Newman, MD's Third Motion In Limine, filed 4-13-09 2385 -2395 13 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Steven 
R. Newman, MD's Second Motion In Limine, filed 4-13-09 2472 - 2492 14 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Steven 
Newman, MD's Motion In Limine, filed 4-13-09 2493 - 2497 14 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Nathan 
Coonrod's and Primary Health Care Center's Second Motion 
In Limine, filed 4-13-09 2335 - 2337 13 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Nathan 
Coonrod MD and Primary Health Care Centers Memorandum 
In Support of their Obj ection to the Judgment upon the 
Verdict, etc., filed 6-24-09 3579 - 3604 20 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Nathan 
Coonrod MD and Primary Health Care Centers Motion for 
New Trial, etc., filed 6-24-09 3605 - 3626 20 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Nathan Coonrod, 
MD's and Primary Health Center's Motion In Limine, 
filed 4-13-09 2341 - 2346 13 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint to More 
Specifically Set for Allegations of Agency, etc., filed 9-27-06 55 - 57 1 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Protective Order, filed 4-13-09 2580 - 2584 14 
INDEX, Continued 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Shorten Time Re: Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Protective Order, filed 4-13-09 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Shorten Time Re: Plaintiffs' Motion to 
Vacate and Reschedule Trial Setting, filed 2-13-08 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike, filed 3-2-09 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate and Reschedule Trial Setting, 
filed 2-11-08 
Plaintiffs' Ninth Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure, 
filed 4-9-09 
Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants Nathan Coonrod MD and 
Primary Health Care Centers Trial Brief, filed 4-23-09 
Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants Nathan Coonrod MD and 
Primary Health Care Centers Reservation of Right to 
Challenge Qualifications, etc., filed 4-24-09 
Plaintiffs' Objections to Defendant Steven R Newman MD's 
Memorandum of Costs and Affidavit of Julien E. Gabiola 
In Support of the Same, filed 6-15-09 
Plaintiffs' Objections to the Defendants' Proposed Jury 
Instructions, filed 5-11-09 
Plaintiffs' Pretrial/Trial Memorandum, filed 3-23-09 
Plaintiffs' Proposed Jury Instructions, filed 4-13-09 
Plaintiffs' Proposed Supplemental Jury Instructions, 
filed 5-11-09 
Plaintiffs' Rebuttal Expert Witness Disclosure, filed 11-17-08 
Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Leave to Amend Complaint, filed 11-20-06 
Page No. Vol. No. 
2577 - 2579 14 
599 - 601 4 
1420 - 1439 8 
595 - 598 3 
1945 -1950 11 
2863 - 2865 16 
2880 - 2883 16 
3315 - 3322 18 
3156-3168 18 
1777 - 1787 10 
2498 - 2576 14 
3169-3171C 18 
1087-1117 6 
209 - 225 2 
INDEX, Continued 
Page No. Vol. No. 
Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendant Andrew Chai MD's Response 
To Plaintiffs' First Motion In Limine, filed 4-17-09 2728 - 2731 15 
Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendant Nathan Coonrod MD and 
Primary Health Care Center's Memorandum in Opposition 
To Plaintiffs' Motion In Limine, filed 4-17-09 2738 - 2741 15 
Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendant Steven R Newman MD's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Protective Order, etc., filed 4-20-09 2774 - 2783 15 
Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendant Steven R Newman's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion In 
Limine, filed 4-17-09 2732 - 2737 15 
Plaintiffs' Response Bench BriefRe: Defendant Coonrod's 
Supplemental Trial Brief, filed 4-29-09 2906 - 2912 16 
Plaintiffs' Response to Motion for Status Conference, 
filed 6-30-08 769 -771 4 
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Exhibit List, filed 4-23-09 2869 - 2872 16 
Plaintiffs' Seventh Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure, 
filed 9-2-08 789 -797 4 
Plaintiffs' Sixth Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure, 
filed 6-8-08 743 -750 4 
Plaintiffs' Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure, 
filed 1-24-08 591 - 594 3 
Plaintiffs' Supplemental Rebuttal Expert Witness Disclosure, 
filed 3-2-09 1440 - 1446 8 
Plaintiffs' Third Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure, 
filed 2-19-08 649 - 656 4 
Plaintiffs' Verified Memorandum of Cost, filed 6-3-09 3300 - 3308 18 
Plaintiffs' Witness List, filed 3-23-09 1769 - 1772 10 
INDEX, Continued 
Page No. Vol. No. 
Qualified Protective Order, filed 2-18-09 1245 - 1255 7 
Register of Actions A-O 1 
Reply to Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant 
Andrew Chai MD's Motion In Limine, filed 4-21-09 2805 - 2810 16 
Request for Trial Setting, filed 3-5-07 354 - 358 2 
Response to Defendants' Objection to Plaintiffs' Proposed 
Amended Judgment, filed 9-9-09 3930 - 3934 22 
Second Affidavit of Julian E Gabiola in Support of Defendant 
Steven R Newman MD's Memorandum of Costs, 
filed 6-22-09 3542 - 3578 20 
Special Verdict Form, filed 4-14-09 2687 - 2691 15 
Special Verdict Form, filed 4-9-09 2007 - 2011 11 
Special Verdict Form, filed 5-13-09 3174-3178 18 
Steven R. Newman, M.D.'s Answer to Complaint and 
Demand for Jury Trial, filed 5-8-06 30-38 1 
Stipulation for Dismissal of Defendant Mercy Medical 
Center, filed 3-16-07 382 - 388 2 
Stipulation for Dismissal of Defendant West Valley Medical 
Center with Prejudice, filed 5-24-07 400 - 405 3 
Stipulation for Dismissal With Prejudice as to Defendant 
Andrew Chai MD, filed 5-29-09 3262 - 3263 18 
Stipulation for Dismissal with Prejudice as to Defendant 
Mitchell Long, D.O., only, filed 6-12-09 3309 - 3310 18 
Stipulation for Dismissal with Prejudice, filed 6-26-09 3627 - 3628 20 
Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning, filed 7-6-07 414-422 3 
INDEX, Continued 
Stipulation of Parties for Execution and Filing of the Attached 
Qualified Protective Order, filed 2-18-09 
Stipulation to Extend Expert Disclosure Deadlines, 
filed 12-24-07 
Stipulation to Extend Plaintiffs' Expert Disclosure Deadline 
as to Defendant Nathan Coonrod, M.D., filed 12-17-07 
Voluntary Notice of Dismissal of Defendant Catherin Atup-
Leavitt, M.D., filed 2-28-06 
West Valley Medical Center's Opposition to Plaintiffs' 
Page No. Vol. No. 
1230 - 1244 7 
448 - 453 3 
441 -444 3 
18 - 20 1 
Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint, filed 11-13-06 152 - 162 
Steven K. Tolman (ISB #1769) 
TOLMAN & BRIZEE, P.C. 
132 3Td Avenue East 
P.O. Box 1276 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1276 
Telephone: (208) 733-5566 
~..-\~ 
F \ LEO .,_.~~ ____ ._· .. ~.""i .LI ... 'JQ .. _:..i';,f!· 
JUM 1 7 20~9 
,", , .. ! 
'~ . ' ..... : ........ , '" ~ 
Attorney for Defendant Nathan Coonrod, MD and Primary Health Care Center 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
JOSE AGUILAR, individually, as the 
Personal Representative of the Estate of 
Maria A. Aguilar, deceased, and as the 
natural father and guardian of 
GUADALUPE MARIA AGUILAR, 
ALEJANDRO AGUILAR, and LORENA 
AGUILAR, minors, and JOSE AGUILAR, 
JR., heirs of Maria A. Aguilar, deceased, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ANDREW CHAI, M.D., STEVEN R. 
NEWMAN, M.D., NATHAN COONROD, 
M.D., MITCHELL LONG, D.O., and 
PRIMARY HEALTH CARE CENTER, an 
Idaho corporation. JOHN and JANE 
DOES I through X, employees of one or 
more of the Defendants, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV 05-5781 
DEFENDANTS NATHAN COONROD, 
M.D. AND PRIMARY HEALTH CARE 
CENTER'S MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND FEES 
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COMES NOW the defendants Nathan Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health 
Care Center (hereinafter referred to as lId efendants lT ) by and through their attorney 
of record, Tolman & Brizes, P.C., and respectfully submits this Memorandum in 
Support of their Motion to Disallow Costs. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendants respectfully request, pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
54(d)(1) and 54(d)(6) (hereinafter referred to as "IRCP 54(d){1)" and "IRCP 54(d)(6)," 
respectively), this Court disallow plaintiffs' motion and request for certain costs as a matter 
of right and discretionary costs, file9 with this Court on or about June 3, 2009 on the basis 
the requested costs set forth by plaintiffs do not meet the requirements of Rule 54(d)(1). 
specifically said costs are not necessary. reasonable, exceptional, and such an award of 
costs would not promote the interests of justice. 
1. Costs As A Matter of Right 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d}(1)(C) controls the award of costs as a matter 
of right, and provides: 
(C) Costs as a Matter of Right. When costs are awarded to a party, 
such party shall be entitled to the following costs, actually paid, as a 
matter of right: 
1. Court filing fees. 
2. Actual fees for service of any pleading or document in the action 
whether served by a public officer or other person. 
3. Witness fees of $20.00 per day for each day in which a witness, 
other than a party or expert, testifies at a deposition or in the trial of an 
action. 
4. Travel expenses of witnesses who travel by private transportation, 
other than a party, who testify in the trial of an action, computed at the 
rate of $0.30 per mile, one way, from the place of residence, whether it be 
within or without the state of Idaho; travel expenses of witnesses who 
travel other than by private transportation, other than a party, computed 
as the actual travel expenses of the witness not to exceed $0.30 per mile, 
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one way, from the place of residence of the witness, whether it be within 
or without the state of Idaho. 
5. Expenses or charges of certified copies of documents admitted as 
evidence in a hearing or the trial of an action. 
6. Reasonable costs of the preparation of models, maps. pictures, 
photographs, or other exhibits admitted in evidence as exhibits in a 
hearing or trial of an action, but not to exceed the sum of $500 for all of 
such exhibits of each party. 
7. Cost of all bond premiums. 
8. Reasonable expert witness fees for an expert who testifies at a 
deposition or at a trial of an action not to exceed the sum of $2,000 for 
each expert witness for all appearances. 
9. Charges for reporting and transcribing of a deposition taken in 
preparation for trial of an action, whether or not read into evidence in the 
trial of an action. 
10. Charges for one (1) copy of any deposition taken by any of the 
parties to the action in preparation for trial of the action. 
Notwithstanding the determination that a particular party is entitled to 
costs as a matter of right under this subparagraph (C) in an action, the 
trial court in its sound discretion may, upon proper objection, disallow any 
of the above described costs upon a finding that said costs were not 
reasonably incurred; were incurred for the purpose of harassment; were 
incurred in bad faith; or were incurred for the purpose of increasing the 
costs to any other party. The mere fact that a deposition is not used in the 
trial of an action, either as evidence read into the record or for the 
purposes of impeachment, shall not indicate that the taking of such 
deposition was not reasonable, or that a copy of a deposition was not 
reasonably obtained. or that the cost of the deposition should othelWise 
be disallowed, so long as its taking was reasonable in the preparation for 
trial in the action. 
IRep 54(d)(1 )(C). 
In this matter, defendants do object to some of plaintiffs' claimed costs as a 
matter of right. Defendants have delineated below their objections: 
a. Court Filing Fees. Defendants have no objection to court filing fees. 
b. Fees for Service of any Pleading or Document. Defendants do not object 
to fees for service of any pleading or document. 
c. Travel Expenses for Expert Witnesses. Defendants do not object to the 
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travel expenses incurred for one-way travel, computed at $0.30 per mile for plaintiffs' 
expert witnesses Paul Blaylock, M.D., Samuel LeBaron, M.D., and Richard Lubman, 
M.D. However, defendants do object to duplicate reimbursement to plaintiffs. In addition 
to these costs as a matter of right, plaintiffs have also requested the Court award expert 
witness travel expenses as a discretionary cost. If the Court awards both the requested 
costs as a matter of right and the requested discretionary costs, plaintiffs will have been 
reimbursed twice. 
d. Cost for Preparation of Exhibits. Defendants object to the costs claimed 
for preparation of exhibits in the amount of $436.43 on the basis plaintiffs failed to 
breakdown which costs were actually incurred for exhibits admitted into evidence. The 
applicable rule, IRCP 54(d)(1)(C)(6), specifies an award of costs for photographs or 
other exhibits "admitted into evidence." Plaintiffs have failed to delineate whether the 
costs claimed for preparing exhibits relate to exhibits admitted into evidence as 
opposed to: (1) exhibits designated but not admitted; (2) exhibits offered but not 
admitted into evidence; or (3) exhibits used for illustrative purposes only. 
Moreover, plaintiffs have not provided an itemization showing the cost of each 
exhibit or whether the costs include duplicates of exhibits. Defendants submit that some 
of the plaintiffs' requested costs for preparation of exhibits include duplication because 
these are multiple copies. For instance, plaintiffs have requested costs for color 
photocopies and also black and white photocopies, as well as "a CD of trial exhibits." 
Unless the CD includes exhibits admitted into evidence, defendants assert IRCP 
54(d)(1)(C)(6) does not contemplate both hard exhibits and a CD oftrial exhibits unless 
the CD itself was admitted into evidence. 
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Plaintiffs have not provided invoices or receipts to the Court or the defendants 
detailing the cost per copy, the number of copies, and/or the number of duplicate 
copies. Plaintiffs must provide documentation in the form of invoices or receipts to the 
Court itemizing copying costs and charges pertaining specifically to Nathan Coonrod, 
M.D. and Primary Health Care Center. In addition, plaintfffs have failed to adequately 
explain the need for color photocopies, rather than black and white photocopies or the 
necessity for a CD in preparation for trial. Therefore, defendants object to plaintiffs' 
request for costs for preparation of exhibits because plaintiffs have not shown the costs 
incurred were for exhibits actually admitted into evidence, and have not provided an 
itemized breakdown for what each exhibit cost. Furthermore, these costs appear to be 
duplicative. 
e. Expert Witness Fees. Defendants do not object to the $2,000.00 expert 
witness fees for Paul Blaylock, M.D., Cornelius Hofman, Samuel LeBaron, M.D., and 
Richard Lubman, M.D., as these experts testified, in part, against defendant Nathan 
Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care Center, if it can be SUbstantiated that plaintiffs 
were actually charged this much or more by these experts. Plaintiffs have not provided 
invoices or bills detailing the costs incurred for expert witness fees and must provide 
documentation of such fees prior to an award for these costs as a matter of right. 
Defendants do object to the claimed cost of $2,000 for Dean Lapinel, M.D., as he only 
testified as a rebuttal expert as against Dr. Newman. 
f. Costs for Reporting and Transcribing Depositions. Defendants object to 
the costs for reporting and transcribing depOSitions for Steven Newman, M.D., Mitchell 
Long, D.O., Andrew Chai, M.D., Kay Hall, Nathan Coonrod, M.D., and James Field, 
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M.D. because plaintiffs have not provided invoices or receipts to the Court or the 
defendants detailing the costs for reporting and transcribing of said depositions. 
Plaintiffs must provide documentation in the form of invoices or receipts to the 
defendants or the Court itemizing the cost associated with reporting and transcribing 
depositions in order to prove their actual cost. Without the same, it is impossible for 
defendants to verify whether the amounts claimed were the amounts actually charged. 
Moreover, defendants Nathan Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care Center 
specifically object to costs related to the reporting and transcribing of depositions for co-
defendants and other parties, namely, the depositions for Mitchell Long, D.O., Andrew 
Chai, M.D., and Steven Newman, M.D. Defendants Dr. Coonrod and Primary Health 
Care Center should not be required to pay for deposition costs incurred by plaintiffs 
against other co-defendants or parties nor would such an award of costs be in the best 
interest of justice. 
g. Costs for One (1) Copy of Depositions. Defendants object to the costs for 
one (1) copy of any deposition taken in preparation for trial speCifically relating to 
Guadalupe Maria Aguilar (November 28, 2006), Jose Aguilar, Sr. (November 28, 2006), 
Jose Aguilar, Jr. (November 29, 2006), Alejandro Aguilar (November 29, 2006), Daniel 
Brown, M.D. (April 14, 2008). Thomas Donndelinger, M.D. (April 25, 2008), Dean 
Lapinel, M.D. (May 20, 2008), Paul Blaylock, M.D. (May 29, 2008). Richard Lubman, 
M.D. (May 30, 2008), Samuel LeBaron, M.D. (June 3, 2008), Dean Lapinel, M.D. 
(September 23, 2008), Robb Gibson, M.D. (February 11. 2009). and William Blahd, Jr., 
M.D. (April 24, 2009). Defendants object to these costs because plaintiffs have not 
provided invoices or receipts to the Court or the defendants detailing the costs for one 
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(1) copy of said depositions. Plaintiffs must provide documentation in the form of 
invoices or receipts to the Court itemizing the cost associated with making one (copy) of 
the listed depositions. Without said invoices or receipts neither the defendants nor the 
Court can detennine whether such costs are (a) the actual costs; or (b) whether other 
items are included in these claimed costs; or (c) whether said costs are reasonable. 
2. Discretionary Costs 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1 )(D) controls the award of discretionary 
costs, and provides: 
(0) Discretionary Costs. Additional items of cost not enumerated in, or in 
an amount in excess of that listed in subparagraph (C), may be allowed 
upon a showing that said costs were necessary and exceptional costs 
reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed 
against the adverse party. The trial court, in ruling upon objections to such 
discretionary costs contained in the memorandum of costs, shall make 
express findings as to why such specific item of discretionary cost should or 
should not be allowed. In the absence of any objection to such an item of 
discretionary costs, the court may disallow on its own motion any such 
items of discretionary costs and shall make express findings supporting 
such disallowance. 
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D) (emphasis added). 
Pursuant to IRCP 54(d)(1) the grant or denial of discretionary costs is committed to 
the sound discretion of the trial court. Zimmerman v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 128 
Idaho 851,857, 920 P.2d 67, 73 (1996); Bingham v. Montane Resource Associates, 133 
Idaho 420, 425, 987 P.2d 1035, 1040 (1999); Inama v. Brewer, 132 Idaho 377, 384, 973 
P.2d 148, 155 (1999); Fish v. Smith, 131 Idaho 492,493,960 P.2d 175, 176 (1998). In 
exercising its discretion regarding the grant or denial of discretionary costs, the trial 
court must determine, pursuant to statute and case law, whether the claimed 
discretionary costs were (1) necessary, (2) reasonable, (3) exceptional, and (4) whether 
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the costs should be awarded to promote the interests of justice. Fish v. Smith, 131 
Idaho at 493,960 P.2d at 176. 
Plaintiffs rely on Jones, et al v. ACTV, et ai, Case No. CV PI 0400486D, Fourth 
Judicial District, County of Ada, and Ada County District Judge Ronald J. Wi/per's 
Memorandum Decision and Order, January 12, 2007 J granting discretionary costs to 
plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases. However, the Idaho Supreme Court has not 
reviewed Judge Wilper's determination regarding the award of discretionary costs in 
Jones, et al. v. ACTV, et aI., and has, therefore, neither affirmed nor vacated the award 
for said discretionary costs. 
However, the Idaho Supreme Court has reviewed and affirmed the denial of 
discretionary costs in other cases. In Fish v. Smith, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed a 
denial of discretionary costs in a personal injury action. At the trial court level, The 
Honorable George R. Reinhardt "I, specifically found expert witness fees, travel and 
lodging expenses, and photocopying expenses were not exceptional. The Idaho 
Supreme Court upheld the trial court's findings. The Fish court provided the following 
analysis, in upholding the trial court's determination: 
The trial court found that the requested discretionary costs were both 
necessary and reasonable but found that they were not exceptional. The 
trial court stated that it had "observed the conduct at trial and particularly 
the testimony of the expert witnesses" and was unpersuaded by the 
affidavits submitted by Fish ''that this case was 'exceptional.'" The trial 
court also found that the discretionary costs Fish requested for expert 
witnesses were "not exceptional 'in a case of this nature.'" In addition, 
the trial court found that "travel and lodging expenses for expert 
witnesses and attorneys and photocopy expenses are not exceptional 
but, on the contrary, are common 'in a case of this nature. It, These 
findings satisfied both the dictates of I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1 )(D) and the 
exercise of reason step in the abuse of discretion test outlined in 
Zimmerman. 
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Fish contends that the trial court abused its discretion because it failed to 
define "exceptional." In fact, by its reasoning in ruling that the requested 
costs were not exceptional, the trial court did give meaning to this word. 
The trial court pointed out that "expert witnesses - medical; 
neuropsychological; accident reconstruction; vocational; and so forth -
routinely testify in serious personal injury actions," and that lithe vast 
majority of litigated personal injury cases ... routinely require an 
assessment of the accident and the alleged injuries by various sorts of 
doctors of medicine, accident reconstructionists, vocational experts and 
so on." The trial court concluded: nTh is is the very 'nature' of these sorts 
of cases. Similarly, travel and lodging expenses for expert witnesses and 
attorneys and photocopy expenses are not exceptional but, on the 
contrary, are common 'in a case of this nature.'" This demonstrates the 
trial court's understanding of the meaning of "exceptional" as contained in 
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1 )(D). 
Fish v. Smith. 131 Idaho at 493-94,960 P.2d at 176-77. 
Likewise, the present case includes requests for expert witness fees, travel and 
lodging expenses, and photocopying costs associated with litigation. and due to their 
common and ordinary nature, this Court should deny these costs because they are not 
exceptional. 
In Inama v. Brewer, 132 Idaho 377, 973 P.2d 155 (1999). the Idaho Supreme 
Court affirmed a denial of discretionary costs in a personal injury cause of action. Id., 
132 Idaho at 384, 973 P.2d at 155. At the trial court level, The Honorable George D. 
Carey, specifically found expert witness fees were reasonable and necessary. but not 
exceptional, as required by the Rule, in order to award discretionary costs. The Idaho 
Supreme Court upheld the trial court's findings. In upholding the trial court's 
determination to deny expert witness fees. the Inama court stated "six figure cases 
involving substantial discovery, substantial copying charges, and expert witnesses who 
charge more than $500.00 [now $2.000] no longer are unusual or extraordinary. For the 
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most part the claimed discretionary costs were routine costs associated with modern 
litigation overhead". 
Moreover, in medical malpractice cases, Idaho Code Section § 6-1012 requires 
the plaintiff to prove by direct expert testimony, in its case-in-chief, that the defendant 
health care provider failed to meet the applicable standard of health care practice in the 
community in which the care was, or should have been, provided. I.C.§ 6-1012. See 
also Ramos v. Dixon, 144 Idaho at 35, 156 P.3d at 536; Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 
at 876, 136 P.3d at 347; Dulaney v, St. Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 164, 
45 P.3d 816, 820 (2002): Rhodehouse v. ·Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 868 P.2d 1224, 1227 
(1994). 
Idaho Code Section § 6-1012 must be read in conjunction with Idaho Code 
Section § 6-1013, which provides the foundational requirements for expert testimony in 
medical malpractice cases. The plaintiff must establish by one or more knowledgeable, 
competent expert witness the applicable standard of practice and the failure to 
adequately meet the community standard of care. I.C. § 6-1013. In addition, the plaintiff 
must lay a proper foundation for the expert testimony before the court will admit the 
expert testimony into evidence. I.e. § 6-1013. See also Weeks v. Eastern Idaho Health 
Services, 143 Idaho 834,153 P.3d 1180,1183 (2007); Ramos v. Dixon, 144 Idaho 32, 
156 P.3d 533, 536 (2007); Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho at 164, 
45 P.3d at 533; Evans v. Griswold, 129 Idaho 902, 905, 935 P.2d 165, 168 (1997); 
Watts v. Lynn, 125 Idaho 341 r 345, 870 P.2d 1300, 1304 (1994); Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 
868 P.2d at 1227-28. 
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Since the use of expert witnesses are required by statute, said use of such 
experts cannot be deemed to rise to the level of "exceptional." Both plaintiffs and 
defendants must utilize expert witnesses in medical malpractice cases, and thus, expert 
costs are ordinary expenses in such cases. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has always and consistently construed the 
requirement that a cost be "exceptional" pursuant to IRCP 54(d)(1)(D) to include those 
specific costs incurred due to the case itself being exceptional. See, ~ Hayden Lake 
Fire Protection District v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 314, 109 P.3d 161, 168 (2005) 
("Certain cases, such as personal injury, cases generally involve copy, travel and expert 
witness fees such that these costs are considered ordinary rather than 'exceptional' 
under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D)"); Inama v. Brewer, 132 Idaho at 384, 973 P.2d at 155 ("[S]ix 
figure cases involving sUbstantial discovery, substantial copying charges, and expert 
witnesses who charge more than $500.00 no longer are unusual or extraordinary. For 
the most part the claimed discretionary costs were routine costs associated with 
modern litigation overhead"). 
In Hayden Lake Fire Protection District v. Alcorn, the Idaho Supreme Court 
affirmed a denial of discretionary costs, including expert witness fees. Hayden Lake Fire 
Protection District v. Alcom, 141 Idaho 307, 314, 109 P.3d 161, 168 (2005). The trial 
court granted summary judgment to the defendant after.which the defendant requested 
discretionary costs in the amount of $516,753.18, including $452,508.61 in expert 
witness fees. Id., 141 Idaho at 311, 109 P.3d at 165. In denying the requested 
discretionary costs, the trial court determined the outcome of the litigated case could 
affect over one thousand local Idaho businesses and involve potential damages of over 
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$50 million dollars. Id., 141 Idaho at 314-315, 109 P.3d at 168-169. At the trial court 
level, The Honrable Judge James F. Judd, then denied the request for expert witness 
fees for $452,508.61, specifically finding the expert witness fees were essential, 
reasonable, and a necessary part of the underlying litigation, but not exceptional, as 
required by the Rule in order to be awarded. 
The Idaho Supreme Court upheld the trial court's findings., In upholding the trial 
court's ruling denying expert witness fees, the Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
This description (of the case affecting over one thousand businesses with 
potential damages exceeding $50 million dollars] adequately portrays the 
magnitude of the suit and suggests that the district court found the need 
for expert witnesses an essential but ordinary part of such litigation. 
Complex business litigation often relies on expert witnesses to explain 
alternative management schemes and/or financing. The district court's 
denial of the SIF's additional expert witness fees was not an abuse of 
discretion. 
Id., 141 Idaho at 315,109 P.3d at 169. 
Likewise, again, in a medical malpractice case, experts are an "ordinary" part of 
the litigation. There will a/ways be expert witnesses involved in such cases. There is 
nothing exceptional about this involvement. 
Furthermore, the party seeking discretionary costs has the burden of showing 
their requested discretionary costs are necessary. reasonable, exceptional, and 
whether the costs awarded promote the interests of justice. !.R.C.P. 54(d)(1}(O). See 
also Fuller v. Wolters, 119 Idaho 415, 425, 807 P.2d 633, 643 (1991) (overruled on 
other grounds, City of McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 201 P.3d 629 (2009». In the 
present case, a medical malpractice cause of action, plaintiffs have failed to prove that 
the requested discretionary costs are necessary, reasonable, exceptional, and that such 
an award of costs promotes the interests of justice. Therefore, defendants object to 
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plaintiffs' request for discretionary costs in their entirety as specifically articulated by 
each category of discretionary costs as outlined below. 
a. Expert Fees in Addition to Amount as Allowed as a Matter of Right 
Plaintiffs have claimed discretionary costs for expert witness fees, including 
expert witness consultations, review of records, and trial preparation (in addition to and 
in excess of the $2,000 cost allowed as a matter of right). See Plaintiffs' Verified 
Memorandum of Costs, p. 5-6 (June 3, 2009); Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' 
Request for Award of Discretionary Costs, p. 4-7 (June 3, 2009). Defendants 
specifically object to plaintiffs' request for discretionary costs regarding expert witness 
fees and expenses because such costs are not necessary, reasonable, or exceptional 
in relation to litigation of the present case nor would an award of costs for expert 
witness fees promote the interests of justice. 
Shoaf & Associates/Lorraine Shoaf-Kadish, RN: $3,893.00 
Defendants specifically object to plaintiffs' request for discretionary costs in the 
amount of $3,893.00 regarding expert witness fees and expenses for Shoaf & 
Associates/Lorraine Shoaf-Kadish, RN because such costs are not reasonable or 
necessary, let alone exceptional, in litigating a medical malpractice case such as the 
present case. Plaintiffs apparently retained Ms. Shoaf-Kadish as an outside consultant, 
to identify and locate expert witnesses for plaintiffs. 
Defendants assert it is not necessary to retain an "expert" to identify and locate 
expert witnesses. Identifying and locating expert witnesses is typically an attorney, or 
even a paralegal function, requiring no specific expertise. The hiring of an outside 
consultant to perform this task appears to be nothing more than an attempt to bolster 
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costs. Again, there is absolutely nothing "exceptional" about locating and retaining 
experts. This is a common task that must be performed in nearly any case, no matter 
the nature of the case. 
In addition, the plaintiffs have not provided invoices or receipts to the Court or the 
defendants detailing the specific tasks performed and the costs associated for each 
task pertaining to this expert witness. Plaintiffs must provide documentation in the form· 
of invoices or receipts to defendants and the Court itemizing the task and cost 
associated with this expert witness as it pertains specifically to Nathan Coonrod, M.D. 
and Primary Health Care Center. Defendants assert that the summary nature of what 
this expert billed for and what plaintiffs are seeking fails to demonstrate that the costs 
are reasonable and necessary, let alone exceptional. 
Also, it should be noted this expert did not testify at trial of this matter. Idaho Rule 
of Civil Procedure 54(d){1)(C){8), addressing costs as a matter of right, specifically 
requires the expert testify at deposition or trial in order for a plaintiff to be able to recoup 
this expense. Defendants submit the same is true relative to discretionary costs. If the 
retained expert did not testify at deposition or trial, the cost of that expert should not be 
awarded as a discretionary cost. Finally, an award of costs for this expert witness fee 
would not promote the interests of justice, as it merely provides incentive to plaintiffs' 
counsel to retain "experts" to find experts, which normally would be an overhead cost of 
practicing law. 
Dean Lapine'. M.D.: $10,272.50 
Defendants specifically object to plaintiffs' request for discretionary costs in the 
amount of $10,272.50 regarding expert witness fees and expenses for Dean Lapinel, 
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M.D. because such costs are not reasonable or necessary, let alone exceptional, in 
relation to litigation of the present case. Again, plaintiffs have failed to provide invoices 
or receipts to the Court or the defendants detailing the specific tasks performed and the 
costs associated for each task pertaining to this expert witness. Plaintiffs must provide 
documentation in the form of invoices or receipts to defendants and the Court itemizing 
the task and cost associated with this expert witness as it pertains specifically to Nathan 
Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care Center. There were two defendants in this 
case, and plaintiffs, by not providing invoices, have specifically prevented defendants 
and the Court from determining whether all of this expense was incurred in prosecuting 
plaintiffs' case against Dr. Coonrod and Primary Health Care Center. 
Per Idaho Code Sections 6-1012 and 6-1013, a plaintiff has to include' expert 
testimony in his/her case in chief. This expense was required due to the nature of this 
case being a medical malpractice case. It is not an exceptional expense. Furthermore, a 
plaintiff is aware of this requirement before even filing suit. In addition, plaintiffs have not 
provided details regarding the specific portion of time spent reading depositions and 
other information, nor have plaintiffs provided a breakdown of time and cost relating to 
preparing for persons or other parties not on the verdict form. Moreover, in this matter, 
plaintiffs originally pursued four defendants. Two of the four settled before trial. Most 
certainly Dr. Coonrod and Primary Health Care Center should not be responsible for all 
of an expert's costs, especially if that expert provided opinions against one or more of 
the other three defendants. 
Plaintiffs have not provided information in enough detail for defendants or the 
court to determine whether this expert reviewed duplicative issues or whether the expert 
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himself was duplicative of other experts. Any costs rerated to review of duplicative 
issues should not be awarded. Since there are no detailed invoices, the Court should 
deny any costs related to review of duplicative issues. Also, it should be noted this 
expert only testified as a rebuttal witness at trial of this matter. Dr. Lapinel testified to the 
alleged breach of the standard of care as it applied to co-defendant, Dr. Newman. Dr. 
Lapinel did not testify against Dr. Coonrod or Primary Health Care Center. Therefore, 
Dr. Coonrod should not be required to bear the expenses related to an expert that was 
not retained to testify against Dr. Coonrod. Again, plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate 
the costs claimed for Dr. Lapinel are reasonable and necessary, let alone exceptional, 
and an award of costs for this expert witness fee would not promote the interests of 
justice. 
Cornelius Hofman, GEC Group: $3,626.20 
Defendants specifically object to plaintiffs' request for discretionary costs in the 
amount of $3,626.20 regarding expert witness fees and expenses for Cornelius Hofman 
because such costs are not reasonable or necessary, let alone exceptional, in relation 
to litigation of the present case. Again, plaintiffs have not provided invoices or receipts 
to the Court or the defendants detailing the specific tasks performed or the costs 
associated for each task pertaining to this expert witness. Plaintiffs must provide 
documentation in the form of invoices or receipts to defendants or the Court itemizing 
the task and cost associated with this expert witness as it pertains specifically to Nathan 
Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care Center. 
In addition, plaintiffs have not provided any details regarding the specific portion 
of time spent reading depositions and other information, nor have plaintiffs provided a 
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breakdown of time and cost relating to preparing for persons or other parties not on the 
verdict form. Finally, the summary nature of what this expert billed for and what plaintiffs 
are seeking fails to demonstrate that the costs are reasonable and necessary, let alone 
exceptional, and an award of costs for this expert witness fee would not promote the 
interests of justice. 
Kenneth Bramwell. M.D. $400.00 
Defendants specifically object to plaintiffs' request for discretionary costs in the 
amount of $400.00 regarding expert witness fees and expenses for Kenneth Bramwell, 
M.D. because such costs are not reasonable or necessary, let a/one exceptional, in 
relation to the nature of the litigation of the present case. Plaintiffs have not provided 
invoices or receipts to the Court or the defendants detailing the specific tasks performed 
and the costs associated for each task pertaining to this expert witness. Plaintiffs must 
provide documentation in the form of invoices or receipts to defendants or the Court 
itemizing the task and cost associated with this expert witness as it pertains specifically 
to Nathan Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care Center. 
In addition, plaintiffs have not provided details regarding the specific date and 
time that Dr. Bramwell conversed with expert witnesses or the names of the expert 
witnesses he spoke to, nor have plaintiffs provided a breakdown of time or cost relating 
to preparing for persons or other parties not on the verdict form. 
Plaintiffs have not provided information in enough detail for defendants or the 
court to determine whether this expert reviewed duplicative issues or whether the expert 
himself was duplicative of other experts. Any costs related to review of duplicative 
issues should not be awarded. 
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Finally, the summary nature of what this expert billed for and what plaintiffs are 
seeking fails to demonstrate that the costs are reasonable and necessary, let alone 
exceptional. An award of costs for this expert witness fee would not promote the 
interests of justice. Also, it should be noted this expert did not testify at trial of this 
matter. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1 )(C)(8), addressing costs as a matter of 
right, specifically requires the expert testify at deposition or trial in order for a plaintiff to 
be able to recoup this expense. Defendants submit the same is true relative to 
discretionary costs. If the retained expert did not testify at deposition or trial. the cost of 
that expert should not be awarded as a discretionary cost. 
Michael Roach, M.D.: $250.00 
Defendants specifically object to plaintiffs' request for discretionary costs in the 
amount of $250.00 regarding expert witness fees and expenses for Michael Roach, 
M.D. because such costs are not reasonable or necessary, let alone exceptional, in 
relation to litigation of the present case. Plaintiffs have not provided invoices or receipts 
to the Court or the defendants detailing the specific tasks performed and the costs 
associated for each task pertaining to this expert witness. Plaintiffs must provide 
documentation in the form of invoices or receipts to defendants or the Court itemizing 
the task and cost associated with this expert witness as it pertains specifically to Nathan 
Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care Center. 
In addition, plaintiffs have not provided details regarding the specific date and 
time that Dr. Roach conversed with expert witnesses or the names of the expert 
witnesses he spoke to nor have plaintiffs provided a breakdown of time and cost relating 
to preparing for persons or other parties not on the verdict form. 
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Plaintiffs have not provided information in enough detail for defendants or the 
court to determine whether this expert reviewed duplicative issues or whether the expert 
himself was duplicative of other experts. Any costs related to review of duplicative 
issues should not be awarded. 
Finally, the summary nature of what this expert billed for and what plaintiffs are 
seeking fails to demonstrate that the costs are reasonable and necessary, let alone 
exceptional, and an award of costs for this expert witness fee would not promote the 
interests of justice. Also, it should be noted this expert did not testify at trial of this 
matter. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure ·54(d)(1)(C)(8), addressing costs as a matter of 
right, specifically requires the expert testify at deposition or trial in order for a plaintiff to 
be able to recoup this expense. Defendants submit the same is true relative to 
discretionary costs. If the retained expert did not testify at deposition or trial, the cost of 
that expert should not be awarded as a discretionary cost. 
Paul Blaylock. M.D. $29,351.20 
Defendants specifically object to plaintiffs' request for discretionary costs in the 
amount of $29,351.20 regarding expert witness fees and expenses for Paul Blaylock, 
M.D. because such costs are not reasonable or necessary, let alone exceptional, in 
relation to the litigation of the present case. Plaintiffs have not provided invoices or 
receipts to the Court or the defendants detailing the specific tasks performed and the 
costs associated for each task pertaining to this expert witness. Plaintiffs must provide 
documentation in the form of invoices or receipts to defendants or the Court itemizing 
the task and cost associated with this expert witness as it pertains specifically to Nathan 
Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care Center. 
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Clearly, Dr. Blaylock testified at trial against both Dr. Newman and Dr. Coonrod. 
Therefore, his fees are not solely attributable to Dr. Coonrod. Furthermore, much of Dr. 
Blaylock's expense was likely spent in formulating opinions against the two defendants 
who settled with plaintiffs prior to trial (Le. Dr. Long and Dr. Chai). Furthermore, in his 
deposition testimony, Dr. Blaylock provided opinions against Dr. Long and Dr. Chai as 
well as against Dr. Newman and Dr. Coonrod. Therefore, clearly a substantial amount 
of Dr. Blaylock's review time and deposition time was spent related to defendants other 
than Dr. Coonrod. 
Plaintiffs have not provided details regarding the specific portion of time spent by 
Dr. Blaylock reading depositions and other information, nor have plaintiffs provided a 
breakdown of time and cost relating to preparing for persons or other parties not on the 
verdict form. For example, according to plaintiffs, Dr. Blaylock's time is allocated 75% to 
defendant Nathan Coonrod, M.D. with 25% allocated to co-defendant Steven R. 
Newman, M.D. However, plaintiffs have not detailed or itemized the specific tasks (and 
their respective costs) Dr. Blaylock performed in relation to Dr. Coonrod, Dr. Newman, 
or other parties and/or co-defendants in this case. 
Moreover, plaintiffs have not provided information in enough detail for defendants 
or the court to determine whether this expert reviewed duplicative issues or whether the 
expert himself was duplicative of other experts. Any costs related to review of 
duplicative issues should not be awarded. Finally, the summary nature of what this 
expert billed for and what plaintiffs are seeking fails to demonstrate that the costs are 
reasonable and necessary, let alone exceptional, and an award of costs for this expert 
witness fee would not promote the interests of justice. 
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Richard Lubman, M.D.: $1,019.94 
Defendants specifically object to plaintiffs' request for discretionary costs in the 
amount of $1,019.94 regarding expert witness fees and expenses for Richard Lubman, 
M.D. because such costs are not reasonable or necessary, let alone exceptional, in 
relation to litigation of the present case. Plaintiffs have not provided invoices or receipts 
to the Court or the defendants detailing the specific tasks performed and the costs 
associated for each task pertaining to this expert witness. Plaintiffs must provide 
documentation in the form of invoices or receipts to defendants or the Court itemizing 
the task and cost associated with this expert witness as it pertains specifically to Nathan 
Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care Center. 
Clearty, Dr. Blaylock testified at trial against both Dr. Newman and Dr. Coonrod. 
Therefore, his fees are not solely attributable to Dr. Coonrod. Furthermore, much of Dr. 
Blaylock's expense was likely spent in formulating opinions against the two defendants 
who settled with plaintiffs prior to trial (Le. Dr. Long and Dr. Chai). In addition, plaintiffs 
have not provided details regarding the specific portion of time spent reading 
depositions and other information, nor have plaintiffs provided a breakdown of time and 
cost relating to preparing for persons or other parties not on the verdict form. 
Plaintiffs have not provided information in enough detail for defendants or the 
court to determine whether this expert reviewed duplicative issues or whether the expert 
himself was duplicatiVe of other experts. Any costs related to review of duplicative 
issues should not be awarded. Finally, the summary nature of what this expert billed for 
and what plaintiffs are seeking fails to demonstrate that the costs are reasonable and 
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necessary, let alone exceptional, and an award of costs for this expert witness fee 
would not promote the interests of justice. 
William Blahd. Jr., M.D. $350.00 
Defendants specifically object to plaintiffs' request for discretionary costs in the 
amount of $350.00 regarding expert witness fees and expenses for William Blahd, M.D. 
becaus~ such costs are not reasonable or necessary, let alone exceptional, in relation 
to the litigation of the present case. Plaintiffs have not provided invoices or receipts to 
the Court or the defendants detailing the specific tasks performed and the costs 
associated for each task pertaining to this expert witness. Plaintiffs must provide 
documentation in the form of invoices or receipts to defendants or the Court itemizing 
the task and cost associated with this expert witness as it pertains specifically to Nathan 
Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care Center. 
In addition, plaintiffs have not provided details regarding the specific date and 
time that Dr. Roach conversed with expert witnesses or the names of the expert 
witnesses he spoke to nor have plaintiffs provided a breakdown of time and cost relating 
to preparing for persons or other parties not on the verdict form. 
Plaintiffs have not provided information in enough detail for defendants or the 
court to determine whether this expert reviewed duplicative issues or whether the expert 
himself was duplicative of other experts. Any costs related to review of duplicative 
issues should not be awarded. 
Finally, the summary nature of what this expert billed for and what plaintiffs are 
seeking fails to demonstrate that the costs are reasonable and necessary, let a/one 
exceptional, and an award of costs for this expert witness fee would not promote the 
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interests of justice. Also, it should be noted this expert did not testify at trial of this 
matter. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1 )(C)(8), addressing costs as a matter of 
right, specifically requires the expert testify at deposition or trial in order for a plaintiff to 
be able to recoup this expense. Defendants submit the same is true relative to 
discretionary costs. If the retained expert did not testify at deposition or trial, the cost of 
that expert should not be awarded as a discretionary cost. 
Samuel LeBaron, M.D., Ph.D: $40,773.29 
Defendants specifically object to plaintiffs' request for discretionary costs in the 
amount of $40,773.29 regarding expert witness fees and expenses for Samuel 
LeBaron, M.D., Ph.D because such costs are not reasonable or necessary, let alone 
exceptional, in relation to the litigation of the present case. Plaintiffs have not provided 
invoices or receipts to the Court or the defendants detailing the specific tasks performed 
and the costs associated for each task pertaining to this expert witness. Plaintiffs must 
provide documentation in the form of invoices or receipts to defendants or the Court 
itemizing the task and cost associated with this expert witness as it pertains specifically 
to Nathan Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care Center. 
In addition, plaintiffs have not provided details regarding the specific portion of 
time spent reading depositions and other information, nor have plaintiffs provided a 
breakdown of time and cost relating to formulating opinions against other defendants or 
other parties not on the verdict form. 
Plaintiffs have not provided information in enough detail for defendants or the 
court to determine whether this expert reviewed duplicative issues or whether the expert 
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himself was duplicative of other experts. Any costs related to review of duplicative 
issues should not be awarded. 
In particular, defendants submit an expert witness fee in excess of $42,000.00 for 
a family practice physician, or for any physician for that matter, is wholly unreasonable 
and unnecessary. It is unknown how such an amount could have been generated by Dr. 
LeBaron. Defendants submit this is absolutely unreasonable. and requires this Court to 
deny this request for discretionary costs. 
Plaintiffs must itemize, in detail, the tasks performed by Dr. LeBaron, with the 
respective cost for each task. pertaining specifically to Nathan Coonrod, M.D. Finally, 
the summary nature of what Dr. LeBaron billed for and what plaintiffs are seeking fails 
to demonstrate that the costs are reasonable and necessary. let alone exceptional, and 
an award of costs for this expert witness fee would not promote the interests of justice. 
In conclusion, defendants specifically object to plaintiffs' request for discretionary 
costs regarding expert witness fees and expenses in the amount of $89,936.13 
because such costs are not necessary, reasonable, and exceptional in relation to the 
litigation of the present case nor would an award of costs for expert witness fees in this 
amount promote the interests of justice. 
b. Additional Costs for Preparation of Exhibits ($346.28) 
Plaintiffs request discretionary costs for the additional expense of preparing 
exhibits, such as color photocopies and black and white photocopies and a CD for trial 
(in addition to the costs for preparation of exhibits permitted as a matter of right 
pursuant to IRep 54(d)(1 )(C)(6)). See Plaintiffs' Verified Memorandum of Costs, p. 6 
(June 3, 2009); Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Request for Award of 
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Discretionary Costs, p. 7 (June 3, 2009). Defendants have already objected to the costs 
for preparation of exhibits as a matter of right requested by the plaintiffs. Defendants 
object to the additional costs for preparation of exhibits requested by plaintiffs as 
discretionary costs. 
Defendants specifically object to plaintiffs' request for discretionary costs in the 
amount of $346.28 regarding additional costs for copies of exhibits because plaintiffs 
have not shown that these costs were reasonable and necessary, let alone exceptional, 
other than the assertion of plaintiffs' counsel. Plaintiffs have not provided invoices or 
receipts to the Court or the defendants detailing the cost per copy. the number of 
copies, and/or the number of duplicate copies. Plaintiffs must provide documentation in 
the form of invoices or receipts to the Court itemizing copying costs and charges 
pertaining specifically to Nathan Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care Center. 
In addition, plaintiffs have failed to adequately explain the need for color 
photocopies, rather than black and white photocopies or the neces$ity for a CD in 
preparation for trial. Defendants aver that since plaintiffs have not itemized a breakdown 
detailing why these copies were required, there is simply not enough information and an 
inadequate showing of proof to determine if these costs are reasonable and necessary, 
let alone exceptional, in the present case. 
c. Cost of Procuring and Copying All Medical Records for Use in 
Preparation for Trial (In addition to cost for admitted exhibits) 
Plaintiffs request discretionary costs for the procuring and photocopying of all 
medical records and charts for use in preparation for trial in addition to the costs for 
preparation of exhibits permitted as a matter of right pursuant to IRCP 54(d)(1 )(C)(6). 
See Plaintiffs' Verified Memorandum of Costs, p. 6 (June 3, 2009); Memorandum in 
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Support of Plaintiffs' Request for Award of Discretionary Costs, p. 8 (June 3, 2009). 
Defendants have already objected to plaintiffs' request for this cost as a matter of right. 
Defendants object to the additional costs for procuring and copying all medical records 
and charts for use in preparation of trial requested by plaintiffs as discretionary costs, as 
discussed in detail below. 
However, it should be noted, plaintiffs have not even provided to the Court or the 
defendants the amount of the per page charge for each copy. Furthermore, the expense 
of copying documents clearly is not an exceptional cost, this cost is incurred in aI/ 
litigation, no matter the nature of the case. 
Lee Nelson, M.D.: $88.00 
Defendants specifically object to plaintiffs' request for discretionary costs in the 
amount of $88.00 regarding additional costs for copying the medical records with Lee 
Nelson, M.D. because plaintiffs have not shown that these costs were reasonable and 
necessary, let alone exceptional, other than the assertion of plaintiffs' counsel. Plaintiffs 
have not provided invoices or receipts to the Court or the defendants detailing the cost 
per copy, the number of copies, and/or the number of duplicate copies. Plaintiffs must 
provide documentation in the form of invoices or receipts to the Court or defendants 
itemizing copying costs and charges of this medical record as it pertains specifically to 
Nathan Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care Center. 
In addition, plaintiffs have failed to show who these copies were provided to, how 
these copies were used in preparation of trial or used at trial, if at aU. Plaintiffs have not 
itemized a breakdown detailing why these copies were required, who the copies were 
provided to, and if the copies were to be used against defendants or other non-parties in 
DEFENDANTS NATHAN COONROD, M.D. AND PRIMARY HEALTH CARE CENTER'S 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND FEES, PAGE 26 
3348 -----.----.--
the case, other than Nathan Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care Center. Thus, 
there simply is not enough information and an inadequate showing of proof by plaintiffs 
to determine if these costs are reasonable and necessary, let alone exceptional, in the 
present case. 
Mercy Medical Center. $364.35 
Defendants specifically object to plaintiffs' request for discretionary costs in the 
amount of $364.35 regarding additional costs for copying the medical records with 
Mercy Medical Center because plaintiffs have not shown that these costs were 
reasonable and necessary, let alone exceptional, other than the assertion of plaintiffs' 
counsel. Plaintiffs have not provided invoices or receipts to the Court or the defendants 
detailing the cost per copy, the number of copies, and/or the number of duplicate 
copies. Plaintiffs must provide documentation in the form of invoices or receipts to the 
Court or defendants itemizing copyinQ costs and charges of this medical record as it 
pertains specifically to Nathan Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care Center, as 
opposed to other defendants. 
In addition, plaintiffs have failed to show who these copies were provided to, how 
these copies were used in preparation of tlial or used at trial, if at all. Plaintiffs have not 
itemized a breakdown detailing why these copies were required, who the copies were 
provided to, and if the cOp'ies were to be used against Dr. Coonrod or against other 
parties in the case besides Nathan Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care Center. 
Thus, there simply is not enough information and an inadequate showing of proof to 
determine if these costs are reasonable and necessary, let alone exceptional, in the 
present case. 
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Robin King, DC, CCRD: $35.00 
Defendants specifically object to plaintiffs' request for discretionary costs in the 
amount of $35.00 regarding additional costs for copying the medical records with Robin 
King, DC, CCRD because plaintiffs have not shown that these costs were reasonable 
and necessary, let alone exceptional, other than the assertion of plaintiffs' counsel. 
Plaintiffs have not provided invoices or receipts to the Court or the defendants detailing 
the cost per copy. the number of copies" and/or the number of duplicate copies. 
Plaintiffs must provide documentation in the form of invoices or receipts to the Court or 
defendants itemizing copying costs and charges of this medical record as it pertains 
specifically to Nathan Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care Center, as opposed to 
other defendants. 
In addition, plaintiffs have failed to show who these copies were provided to, how 
these copies were used in preparation of trial or used at trial, if at all. Plaintiffs have not 
itemized a breakdown detailing why these copies were required, who the copies were 
provided to, and if the copies were to be used against Dr. Coonrod or against other 
parties in the case besides Nathan Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care Center. 
Thus, there simply is not enough information and an inadequate showing of proof to 
determine if these costs are reasonable and necessary, let alone exceptional, in the 
present case. 
st. Alphonsus RMC: $5.30 
Defendants specifically object to plaintiffs' request for discretionary costs in the 
amount of $5.30 regarding additional costs for copying the medical records with St. 
Alphonsus RMC because plaintiffs have not shown that these costs were reasonable 
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and necessary, let alone exceptional, other than the assertion of plaintiffs' counsel. 
Plaintiffs have not provided invoices or receipts to the Court or the defendants detailing 
the cost per copy, the number of copies, and/or the number of duplicate copies. 
Plaintiffs must provide documentation in the form of invoices or receipts to the Court or 
defendants itemizing copying costs and charges of this medical record as it pertains 
specifically to Nathan Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care Center, as opposed to 
other defendants. 
In addition, plaintiffs have failed to show who these copies were provided to, how 
these copies were used in preparation of trial or used at trial, if at all. Plaintiffs have not 
itemized a breakdown detailing why these copies were required, who the copies were 
provided to, and if the copies were to be used against Dr. Coonrod or against other 
parties in the case besides Nathan Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care Center. 
Thus, there simply is not enough information and an inadequate showing of proof to 
determine if these costs are reasonable and necessary, let alone exceptional, in the 
present case. 
The Digestive Health Clinic: $48.00 
Defendants specifically object to plaintiffs' request for discretionary costs in the 
amount of $48.00 regarding additional costs for copying the medical records with the 
Digestive Health Clinic because plaintiffs have not shown that these costs were 
reasonable and necessary, let alone exceptional, other than the assertion of plaintiffs' 
counsel. Plaintiffs have not provided invoices or receipts to the Court or the defendants 
detailing the cost per copy, the number of copies, and/or the number of duplicate 
copies. Plaintiffs must provide documentation in the form of invoices or receipts to the 
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Court or defendants itemizing copying costs and charges of this medical record as it 
pertains specifically to Nathan Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care Center, as 
opposed to other defendants. 
In addition, plaintiffs have failed to show who these copies were provided to, how 
these copies were used in preparation of trial or used at trial, if at all. Plaintiffs have not 
itemized a breakdown detailing why these copies were required, who the copies were 
provided to, and if the copies were to be used against Dr. Coonrod or against other 
parties in the case besides Nathan Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care Center. 
Thus, there simply is not enough infonnation and an inadequate showing of proof to 
detennine if these costs are reasonable and necessary, let alone exceptional, in the 
present case. 
West Valley Medical Center: $7.23 
Defendants specifically object to plaintiffs' request for discretionary costs in the 
amount of $7.23 regarding additional costs for copying the medical records with West 
Valley Medical Center because plaintiffs have not shown that these costs were 
reasonable and necessary, let alone exceptional, other than the assertion of plaintiffs' 
counsel. Plaintiffs have not provided invoices or receipts to the Court or the defendants 
detailing the cost per copy, the number of copies, and/or the number of duplicate 
copies. Plaintiffs must provide documentation in the form of invoices or receipts to the 
Court or defendants itemizing copying costs and charges of this medical record as it 
pertains specifically to Nathan Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care Center, as 
opposed to other defendants. 
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In addition, plaintiffs have failed to show who these copies were provided to, how 
these copies were used in preparation of trial or used at trial, if at all. Plaintiffs have not 
itemized a breakdown detailing why these copies were required, who the copies were 
provided to, and if the copies were to be used against Dr. Coonrod or against other 
parties in the case besides Nathan Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care Center. 
Thus, there simply is not enough information and an inadequate showing of proof to 
determine if these costs are reasonable and necessary, let alone exceptional, in the 
present case. 
I n conclusion, defendants specifically object to plaintiffs' request for discretionary 
costs in the amount of $547.88 regarding the procurement and copying of medical 
records for use at trial because plaintiffs have failed to provide sufficient information to 
the Court and to defendants regarding whether these costs are reasonable and 
necessary, let alone exceptional, in the present case. 
d. Cost of Out~of~Town Travel for Attendance at Depositions 
Plaintiffs request an award for discretionary costs regarding their attorneys' out-
oMown travel expenses for attendance at depositions, including airfare expenses. See 
Plaintiffs' Verified Memorandum of Costs, p. 6-7 (June 3, 2009); Memorandum in 
Support of Plaintiffs' Request for Award of Discretionary Costs, p. 8-9 (June 3, 2009). 
Defendants posit that travel expenses incurred by plaintiffs' counsel may be necessary 
costs associated with litigating medical malpractice cases, including the present case, 
but, defendants assert that the travel expenses requested for plaintiffs' attorneys' may 
not be reasonable and certainly are not exceptional and an award of costs for plaintiffs' 
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attorneys' travel costs would not promote the interests of justice. Defendants' objections 
are further delineated below. 
Travel to San Jose, CA for Dr. LeBaron's Deposition: $1,095.49 
Defendants specifically object to plaintiffs' request for discretionary costs in the 
amount of $1,095.49 regarding the travel expenses incurred by plaintiffs' counsel to 
travel to San Jose, CA for Dr. LeBaron's deposition. Such expenses may not be 
reasonable, and certainly are not exceptional. Defendants aver that the cost of 
$1,095.49 may be excessive and not a reasonable amount for traveling to San Jose, 
CA. Furthermore, Dr. LeBaron was an expert retained by plaintiffs' counsel. Therefore, 
plaintiffs cannot argue the distance to this expert increases the cost. 
Plaintiffs have not provided invoices or receipts to the Court or the defendants 
detailing the expenses incurred for traveling to this deposition. Plaintiffs must provide 
documentation in the form of invoices or receipts to the Court or defendants itemizing 
the cost for traveling to this deposition. 
In addition, attorney travel for depositions is a routine cost associated with 
litigating medical malpractice cases and such costs are not exceptional due to their 
common and ordinary nature. Defendants assert that the travel expenses for plaintiffs' 
counsel may not be reasonable and are not exceptional. and an award of costs for this 
travel expense would not promote the interests of justice. 
Travel to Los Angeles. CA for Dr. Lubman's Deposition: $619.50 
Defendants specifically object to plaintiffs' request for discretionary costs in the 
amount of $619.50 regarding the travel expenses incurred by plaintiffs' counsel to travel 
to Los Angeles, CA for Dr. Lubman's deposition. Such expenses may not be 
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reasonable, and certainly are not exceptional. Defendants aver that the cost of $619.50 
may be excessive and may not be a reasonable amount for traveling to Los Angeles, 
CA. Furthermore, Dr. Lubman was an expert retained by plaintiffs' counsel. Therefore, 
plaintiffs cannot argue the distance to this expert increases the cost. 
Plaintiffs have not provided invoices or receipts to the Court or the defendants 
detailing the expenses incurred for traveling to this deposition. Plaintiffs must provide 
documentation in the form of invoices or receipts to the Court or defendants itemizing 
the cost for traveling to this deposition. 
In addition, attorney travel for depositions is a routine cost associated with 
litigating medical malpractice cases and such costs are not exceptional due to their 
common and ordinary nature. Defendants assert that the travel expenses for plaintiffs' 
counsel may not be reasonable and are not exceptional, and an award of costs for this 
travel expense would not promote the interests of justice. 
Travel to Portland, OR for Dr. Blaylock's Deposition: $393.00 
Defendants specifically object to plaintiffs' request for discretionary costs in the 
amount of $393.00 regarding the travel expenses incurred by plaintiffs' counsel to travel 
to Portland, OR for Dr. Blaylock's deposition. Such expenses may not be reasonable, 
and certainly are not exceptional. Defendants aver that the cost of $393.00 may be 
excessive and not a reasonable amount for traveling to Portland, OR. Furthermore, Dr. 
Blaylock was an expert retained by plaintiffs' counsel. Therefore, plaintiffs cannot argue 
the distance to this expert increases the cost. 
Plaintiffs have not provided invoices or receipts to the Court or the defendants 
detailing the expenses incurred for traveling to this deposition. Plaintiffs must provide 
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documentation in the form of invoices or receipts to the Court or defendants itemizing 
the cost for traveling to this deposition. 
In addition, attorney travel for depositions is a routine cost associated with 
litigating medical malpractice cases and such costs are not exceptional due to their 
common and ordinary nature. Defendants assert that the travel expenses for plaintiffs' 
counsel may not be reasonable are not exceptional, and an award of costs for this travel 
expense would not promote the interests of justice. 
In conclusion, defendants specifically object to plaintiffs' request for discretionary 
costs in the amount of $2,107.49 regarding the travel expenses incurred by plaintiffs' 
counsel because such expenses may not be reasonable and are not exceptional due to 
their common, ordinary, and routine occurrance in litigating medical malpractice cases, 
including the present case, and an award of costs for plaintiffs' attorneys' travel costs 
would not promote the interests of justice. 
e. Expenses for Attendance at Trial 
Plaintiffs request an award for discretionary costs regarding additional travel 
expenses for their expert witnesses to attend trial, including lodging, meals, and airport 
parking. See Plaintiffs' Verified Memorandum of Costs, p. 7 (June 3, 2009); 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Request for Award of Discretionary Costs, p. 9"10 
(June 3, 2009). Defendants submit plaintiffs have already requested reimbursement of 
travel expenses for experts as one of their costs as a matter of right. Therefore, 
awarding these costs also as discretionary costs, in addition to an award as a cost as a 
matter of right, would only result in duplicate reimbursement. Therefore, defendants 
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request plaintiffs' request for reimbursement for these expenses as a discretionary cost 
be denied. 
Furthermore, defendants assert the travel expenses requested for plaintiffs' . 
expert witnesses may not be reasonable and certainly are not exceptional and an award 
of costs for plaintiffs' expert witnesses' travel costs would not promote the interests of 
justice. Defendants' specific objections to each claimed cost are as follows: 
The Grove Hotel and Double Tree Hotel Meals and 2 nights for Dr. Blaylock 
and airport parking: $443.30 
Defendants specifically object to plaintiffs' request for discretionary costs in the 
amount of $443.30 regarding the travel expenses incurred by plaintiffs' expert witness, 
Dr. Blaylock, to attend trial in Idaho because such expenses may not be reasonable, 
and are certainly not exceptional, costs associated with litigating a medical malpractice 
case. The amount of $443.30 may not be a reasonable cost for traveling to Caldwell, 10. 
Plaintiffs have not provided invoices or receipts to the Court or the defendants detailing 
the expenses incurred for attendance at trial. Plaintiffs must provide documentation in 
the form of invoices or receipts to the Court or defendants itemizing the cost for 
traveling to this deposition. 
In addition, expert witness travel for attendance at trial is a routine cost 
associated with litigating medical malpractice cases and such costs are not exceptional 
due to their common and ordinary nature. Defendants assert that the travel expenses 
for plaintiffs' expert witness, Dr. Blaylock, are neither reasonable nor exceptional, and 
an award of costs for this travel expense would not promote the interests of justice. 
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The Grove Hotel Meals and 1 Night for Dr. LeBaron and airport parking: $261.69 
Defendants specifically object to plaintiffs' request for discretionary costs in the 
amount of $261.69 regarding the travel expenses incurred by plaintiffs' expert witness, 
Dr. LeBaron, to attend trial in Idaho because such expenses may not be reasonable, 
and certainly are not exceptional, costs associated with litigating a medical malpractice 
case. The cost of $261.69 may not be a reasonable cost for traveling to Caldwell, 10. 
Plaintiffs have not provided invoices or receipts to the Court or the defendants detailing 
the expenses incurred for attendance at trial. Plaintiffs must provide documentation in 
the form of invoices or receipts to the Court or defendants itemizing the cost for 
traveling to this deposition. 
In addition, expert witness travel for attendance at trial is a routine cost 
associated with litigating medical malpractice cases and such costs are not exceptional 
due to their common and ordinary nature. Defendants assert that the travel expenses 
for plaintiffs' expert witness, Dr. LeBaron, may not be reasonable and are not 
exceptional, and an award of costs for this travel expense would not promote the 
interests of justice. 
The Grove Hotel Meals and 2 nights for Dr. Lubman and airport parking: $419.74 
Defendants specifically object to plaintiffs' request for discretionary costs in the 
amount of $419.74 regarding the travel expenses incurred by plaintiffs' expert witness, 
Dr. Lubman, to attend trial in Idaho because such expenses may not be reasonable, 
and certainly are not exceptional, costs associated with litigating a medical malpractice 
case. The cost of $419.74 may not be a reasonable cost for traveling to Caldwell, 10. 
Plaintiffs have not provided invoices or receipts to the Court or the defendants detailing 
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the expenses incurred for attendance at trial. Plaintiffs must provide documentation in 
the form of invoices or receipts to the Court or defendants itemizing the cost for 
traveling to this deposition. 
In addition, expert witness travel for attendance at trial is a routine cost 
associated with litigating medical malpractice cases and such costs are not exceptional 
due to their common and ordinary nature. Defendants assert that the travel expenses 
for plaintiffs' expert witness, Dr. Lubman, may not be reasonable and are not 
exceptional, and an award of costs for this travel expense would not promote the 
interests of justice. 
In conclusion, defendants specifically object to plaintiffs' request for discretionary 
costs regarding expert witness travel expenses in the amount of $1,124.73 because 
such expenses may not be reasonable, and absolutely are not exceptional, due to their 
common, ordinary, and routine nature and occurrence in medical malpractice cases, 
including the present case, and an award of costs for plaintiffs' expert witness travel 
costs would not promote the interests of justice. 
f. Office Expenses Necessary for Prosecution of Case 
Plaintiffs request discretionary costs for office expenses needed to prosecute the 
above~entitled case, such as attorney messenger services, in-house and vendor 
copying charges, postage and shipping charges, facsimile and long distance telephone 
and conference charges, legal research expenses, and paralegal travel expenses to a 
deposition. See Plaintiffs' Verified Memorandum of Costs, p. 7~8 (June 3, 2009); 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Request for Award of Discretionary Costs, p. 10 
(June 3, 2009). Defendants specifically object to plaintiffs' request for discretionary 
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costs regarding "office" expenses incurred for prosecution of the present case, including 
messenger services, copying charges, postage and shipping, facsimile and long 
distance telephone charges, legal research expenses, and paralegal travel expenses, 
because such costs are not necessary, reasonable, and exceptional in relation to the 
litigation of the present case nor would an award of costs for expert witness fees 
promote the interests of justice. Defendants' objections are further detailed below: 
Attorney Messenger Service: $554.43 
Defendants specifically object to plaintiffs' request for discretionary costs 
regarding messenger services in the amount of $554.43 because plaintiffs have not 
shown that these costs were reasonable and necessary, let alone exceptional, other 
than the assertion of plaintiffs' counsel. Plaintiffs have not provided invoices or receipts 
to the Court or the defendants articulating the reason or purpose for utilizing an attorney 
messenger service (or runner) rather than using the postal service. Plaintiffs must 
provide documentation in the form of invoices or receipts to the Court or defendants 
itemizing the costs associated with the messenger service and what messenger service 
expenses pertain specifically to Nathan Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care Center, 
versus other defendants. 
In addition, plaintiffs have failed to adequately explain when the messenger 
services charges were incurred, who messenger service was sent to, the specific 
purpose of messenger service, or if the messenger service related to Nathan Coonrod, 
M.D. and Primary Health Care Center at trial. It is presumed such messenger service 
was utilized in Boise, Idaho. Since Dr. Coonrod's counsel is located in Twin Falls, Idaho, 
it is doubtful any such messenger services were utilized in plaintiffs' case against Dr. 
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Coonrod. Since plaintiffs have not itemized a breakdown detailing why these copies 
were required, there simply is not enough information and an inadequate showing of 
proof to determine if these costs are reasonable and necessary, let alone exceptional, in 
the present case. 
In-house copies-medical records, documents produced in discovery and exhibits 
thereto, depositions, witness disclosures and exhibits thereto, pleadings, and expert 
reports: $~,260.70 
Defendants specifically object to plaintiffs' request for discretionary costs in the 
amount of $3,260.70 regarding additional costs for in-house copies of medical records, 
documents produced in discovery and exhibits thereto, depositions, witness disclosures 
and exhibits thereto, pleadings, and expert reports because plaintiffs have not shown 
that these costs were reasonable and necessary, let alone exceptional, other than the 
assertion of plaintiffs' counsel. Plaintiffs have not provided invoices or receipts to the 
Court or the defendants detailing the cost per copy, the number of copies, and/or the 
number of duplicate copies. Plaintiffs must provide documentation in the form of 
invoices or receipts to the Court or defendants itemizing copying costs and charges 
pertaining specifically to Nathan Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care Center, as 
opposed to other parties. 
In addition, plaintiffs have already requested costs as a matter of right for copying 
charges of documents as well as discretionary costs for additional copying of 
photographs (in color and black and white) and medical records. Defendants assert that 
plaintiffs are improperly requesting duplicate copies of documents, records, 
photographs, and other trial exhibits in their request for discretionary costs without 
providing documentation of these costs or how these expenses pertain to Nathan 
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Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care Center. Also, copying costs are not exceptional 
as they are incurred in every case. 
Since plaintiffs have not itemized a breakdown detailing why these in-house 
copies were required, there simply is not enough information and an inadequate 
showing of proof tD determine if these costs are reasonable and necessary, let alDne 
exceptiDnal, in the present case. Defendants assert an award of costs fDr plaintiffs' in-
house copying CDSts would not promote the interests Df justice. 
VendDr copies-medical records, pleadings, depDsitions, dDcuments prDduced in 
discovery and exhibits thereto: $1,409.15 
Defendants specifically object to plaintiffs' request for discretionary costs in the 
amount of $1,409.15 regarding additional costs for vendor copies of medical records, 
pleadings, depDsitions, documents produced in discDvery and exhibits thereto, because 
plaintiffs have not shown that these costs were reasonable and necessary. let alone 
exceptional, other than the assertion of plaintiffs' counsel. Plaintiffs have not provided 
invoices or receipts to the Court or the defendants detailing the cost per copy, the 
number of copies, the number of duplicate copies, and/or the purpose of such vendor 
copies and charges. Plaintiffs must provide documentation in the form of invoices or 
receipts to the Court or defendants itemizing copying costs and charges pertaining 
specifically tD Nathan Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care Center. as opposed to 
other parties. 
In addition, plaintiffs have already requested costs as a matier of right for copying 
charges of documents as well as discretionary costs for additional copying of 
photographs (in color and black and white) and medical records. Defendants assert that 
plaintiffs are improperly requesting duplicate reimbursement for copies of documents, 
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records, photographs, and other trial exhibits in their request for discretionary costs 
without providing documentation of these costs or how these expenses pertain to 
Nathan Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care Center. Also, copying costs are not 
exceptional as they are incurred in every case. 
Since plaintiffs have not itemized a breakdown detailing why these vendor copies 
were required, there simply is not enough information and an inadequate showing of 
proof to determine if these costs are reasonable and necessary. let alone exceptional, in 
the present case. Defendants assert an award of costs for plaintiffs' vendor copying 
costs would not promote the interests of justice. 
Postage/Shipping charges: $2,099.82 
Defendants specifically object to plaintiffs' request for discretionary costs 
regarding postage and shipping expenses in the amount of $2,099.82 because plaintiffs 
have not shown that these costs were reasonable and necessary, let alone exceptional, 
other than the assertion of plaintiffs' counsel. PlaIntiffs have not provided invoices or 
receipts to the Court or the defendants articulating the reasons or purpose for postage 
or shipping. Nor have plaintiffs articulated the purpose or reason for said shipping costs. 
Plaintiffs must provide documentation in the form of invoices or receipts to the Court or 
defendants itemizing the costs associated with postage and shipping pertaining 
specifically to Nathan Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care Center. 
In addition, plaintiffs have failed to adequately explain when the postage and 
shipping charges were incurred, who the shipping was sent to, the specific purpose of 
such postage and shipping, or if the postage and shipping related to preparing for and 
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prosecuting Nathan Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care Center at trial. 
Furthermore, postage and shipping costs are incurred in every case. 
Since plaintiffs have not itemized a breakdown detailing why postage and 
shipping were required, there simply is not enough information and an inadequate 
showing of proof to determine if these costs are reasonable and necessary, Jet alone 
exceptional, in the present case. 
Facsimile charges: $115.00 
Defendants specifically object to plaintiffs' request for discretionary costs 
regarding facsimile expenses in the amount of $115.00 because plaintiffs have not 
shown that these costs were reasonable and necessary, let alone exceptional, other 
than the assertion of plaintiffs' counsel. Plaintiffs have not provided invoices or receipts 
to the Court or the defendants articulating the reasons or purpose for facsimile charges, 
or how they calculate "charge" for faxing. Nor have plaintiffs articUlated the purpose or 
reason for using facsimile instead of regular mail or email of documents. Plaintiffs must 
provide documentation in the form of invoices or receipts to the Court or defendants 
itemizing the costs associated with facsimile pertaining specifically to Nathan Coonrod, 
M.D. and Primary Health Care Center. 
In addition, plaintiffs have failed to adequately explain when the facsimile 
charges were incurred, where the facsimile documents were sent, the specific purpose 
of such facsimile use, or if the facsimile charges related to preparing for and prosecuting 
Nathan Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care Center at trial. Since plaintiffs have not 
itemized a breakdown detailing why facsimile charges were required, there simply is not 
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enough information and an inadequate showing of proof to determine if these costs are 
reasonable and necessary, let alone exceptional, in the present case. 
Long distancelTelephone conferences: $587.00 
Defendants specifically object to plaintiffs' request for discretionary costs 
regarding long distance telephone charges and telephone conference expenses in the 
amount of $587.00 because plaintiffs have not shown that these costs were reasonable 
and necessary, let alone exceptional, other than the assertion of plaintiffs' counsel. 
Plaintiffs have not provided invoices or receipts to the Court or the defendants 
articulating the reasons or purpose for long distance telephone charges or telephone 
conference charges nor have plaintiffs articulated the purpose or reason for using long 
distance telephone since cellphones typically provide free long distance charges. 
Plaintiffs must provide documentation in the form of invoices or receipts to the Court or 
defendants itemizing the costs associated with long distance telephone charges and 
telephone conference charges pertaining specifically to Nathan Coonrod, M.D. and. 
Primary Health Care Center. Moreover, long distance telephone expenses are incurred 
in every case wherein counsel is located in different cities in Idaho. Therefore, these 
expenses are not exceptional. 
In addition, plaintiffs have failed to adequately explain when the telephone 
charges were incurred, who was called long distance, the specific purpose of such cal/s, 
or if the calls related to preparing for and prosecuting Nathan Coonrod, M.D. and 
Primary Health Care Center at trial, as opposed to other defendants. 
Since plaintiffs have not itemized a breakdown detailing why long distance 
telephone charges or telephone conference charges were required, there simply is not 
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enough information and an inadequate showing of proof to determine if these costs are 
reasonable and necessary, let alone exceptional, in the present case. 
Legal research: $659.96 
Defendants specifically object to plaintiffs' request for discretionary costs 
regarding legal research expenses in the amount of $659.96 because plaintiffs have not 
shown that these costs were reasonable and necessary, let alone exceptional, other 
than the assertion of plaintiffs' counsel. Plaintiffs have not provided invoices or receipts 
to the Court or the defendants articulating the reason or purpose for legal research 
expenses nor have plaintiffs articulated the purpose or reason for using legal research, 
or the manner of legal research (I.e. if this is merely attorney time, it is not 
reimbursable). Plaintiffs must provide documentation in the form of invoices or receipts 
to the Court or defendants itemizing the costs associated with legal research expenses 
pertaining specifically to Nathan Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care Center, as 
opposed to one of the other three defendants. 
In addition, plaintiffs have failed to adequately explain when the legal research 
was incurred, who the legal research was for, the specific purpose of such research, or 
if the research related to preparing for and prosecuting Nathan Coonrod, M.D. and 
Primary Health Care Center at trial. Since plaintiffs have not itemized a breakdown 
detailing why the legal research was required, there simply is not enough information 
and an inadequate showing of proof to determine if these costs are reasonable and 
necessary, let alone exceptional, in the present case. 
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.. 
Paralegal travel to Nampa, Idaho for Kay Hall deposition: $19.13 
Defendants specifically object to plaintiffs' request for discretionary costs 
regarding paralegal travel expenses to Nampa, Idaho in the amount of $19.13 because 
plaintiffs have not shown that these costs were reasonable and necessary, let alone 
exceptional, other than the assertion of plaintiffs' counsel. Plaintiffs have not provided 
invoices or receipts to the Court or the defendants articulating the reasons or purpose 
for the paralegal travel expenses nor have plaintiffs articulated the purpose or reason 
for needing the paralegal to travel to Nampa, 10. Plaintiffs must provide documentation 
in the form of invoices or receipts to the Court or defendants itemizing the costs 
associated with the paralegal's travel expenses pertaining specifically to Nathan 
Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care Center, as opposed to one of the other three 
defendants. 
In addition, plaintiffs have failed to adequately explain when the paralegal travel 
was incurred, the specific purpose of such travel, or if the travel related to preparing for 
and prosecuting Nathan Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care Center at trial. Since 
plaintiffs have not itemized a breakdown detailing why the paralegal travel was required, 
there simply is not enough information and an inadequate showing of proof to determine 
if these costs are reasonable and necessary, let alone exceptional, in the present case. 
In conclusion, defendants specifically object to plaintiffs' request for discretionary 
costs regarding messenger services, copying of documents, postage, shipping, long 
distance telephone, facsimile, legal research expenses, and paralegal travel expenses 
to Nampa, Idaho in the amount of $8,705.19 because such costs are not necessary, 
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reasonable, and exceptional in relation to litigation of the present case. Nor would an 
award of such costs promote the interests of justice. 
Plaintiffs have not established any of their claimed discretionary costs are 
reasonable, necessary, and exceptional. Furthermore, an award of discretionary costs 
incurred in the above-entitled case would not promote the interests of justice. Therefore, 




On the basis of the foregoing, defendants respectfully request plaintiffs' motion 
for discretionary costs be disallowed in their entirety. 
~ 
DATED this \t day of June, 2009. 
By:,~ __ ~~~~~~~~~ 
Steven K. Tolman 
DEFENDANTS NATHAN COONROD, M.D. AND PRIMARY HEALTH CARE CENTER'S 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
(Y~ 
I hereby certify that on this Ji. day of June, 2009, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS NATHAN COONROD, M.D. AND PRIMARY 
HEALTH CARE CENTER'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND FEES to be forwarded with all required charges 
prepared, by the methodes) indicated below, to the following: 
Byron V. Foster 
Attorney at Law 
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Suite 500 
P.O. Box 1584 
Boise, 10 83701-1584 
David E. Comstock 
Law Offices of Comstock & Bush 
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Suite 500 
P.O. Box 2774 
Boise, 10 83701 
Gary T. Dance 
Moffatt Thomas Barrett Rock & Fields 
412 W. Center, Suite 2000 
P.O. Box 817 
Pocatello, 10 83204-0817 
e o o 
~ o o 








I2?t. First Class Mail o Hand Delivered o Facsimile 
D . Overnight Mail 
~ ' ~i~( 
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JUN/17/2009/WED 04:57 PM LAW FAX No. 208-7 P. 002 . , 
steven K. Tolman (IS8 #1769) 
TOLMAN & BRIZEE, P.C. 
132 3rd Avenue East 
P.O. Box 1276 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1276 
Telephone: (208) 733"5566 
'." ;-" ,.-': . '.", , 
Attorney for Defendant Nathan Coonrod, MD and Primary Health Care Center 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
JOSE AGUILAR, individually, as the 
Personal Representative of the Estate of 
Maria A. Aguilar, deceased. and as the 
natural father and guardian of 
GUADALUPE MARIA AGUILAR, 
ALEJANDRO AGUILAR, and LORENA 
AGUILAR. minors, and JOSE 




ANDREW CHAI, M.D., STEVEN R. 
NEWMAN, M.D., NATHAN COONROD. 
M.D .• MITCHELL LONG, D.O., and 
PRIMARY HEALTH CARE CENTER, an 
Idaho corporation, JOHN and JANE 
DOES I through X, employees of one or 
more of the Defendants, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV 05-5781 
DEFENDANTS NATHAN COONROD, 
M.D. AND PRIMARY HEALTH CARE 
CENTER'S MOTION TO DISALLOW 
COSTS 
COMES NOW the defendants Nathan Coonrod, M,D. and Primary Health Care 
Center by and through their attorney of record, Tolman & Brizee, P.C., and respectfully 
move this Court, pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) and 54(d)(6), to 
DEFENDANTS NATHAN COONROD, M.D. AND PRIMARY HEALTH CARE CENTER'S MOTION TO 
DISALLOW COSTS, PAGE 1 
JUN/17/2009/WED 04:57 PM LAW FAX No, 208- p, 003 
,/ , 
disallow plaintiffs' requested costs as a matter of right and requested discretionary 
costs, filed with this Court on or about June 3,2009. 
Filed herewith in support thereof is the Defendants Nathan Coonrod, M.D. and 
Primary Health Care Center's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Memorandum of 
Costs and Fees. Defendants hereby request oral argument on the matter. 
I'");~ . 
DATED this .R day of June, 2009. 
~:LMAbC~l~ 
Steven K. Tolman ~ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this __ day of June, 2009, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS NATHAN COONROD, M.D. AND PRIMARY 
HEALTH CARE CENTER'S MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS to be forwarded with all 
required charges prepared, by the method(s) indicated below, to the following: 
Byron V. Foster 
Attorney at Law 
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Suite 500 
P.O. Box 1584 
Boise, 10 83701-1584 
David E. Comstock 
Law Offices of Comstock & Bush 
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Suite 500 
P.O. Box 2774 
Boise, 10 83701 
Gary T. Dance 
Moffatt Thomas Barrett Rock & Fields 
412 W. Center, Suite 2000 
P.O. Box 817 
Pocatello, JD 83204-0817 
~ o o o 
~ o 
D 












DEFENDANTS NATHAN COONROD. M.D. ANO PRIMARY HEALTH CARE CENTER'S MOTION TO 
DISALLOW COSTS, PAGE 2 
ORIGINAL 
David E. Comstock 
LAW OFFICES OF COMSTOCK & BUSH 
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste 500 
P.O. Box 2774 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2774 
Telephone: (208) 344-7700 
Facsimile: (208) 344-7721 
ISB #: 2455 
Byron V. Foster 
Attorney At Law 
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste 500 
P.O. Box 1584 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 336-4440 
Facsimile: (208) 344-7721 
ISB #: 2760 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
rt--\ ~ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
JOSE AGUILAR, individually, as the Personal ) 
Representative of the Estate of Maria.A. Aguilar, ) 
deceased, and as the natural father and ) 
guardian of GUADALUPE MARIA AGUILAR, ) 
ALEJANDRO AGUILAR, and LORENA ) Case No. CV 05-5781 
AGUILAR, minors, and JOSE AGUILAR, JR., ) 
heirs of Maria A. Aguilar, deceased, ) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF BYRON V. 




STEVEN R. NEWMAN, M.D., NATHAN ) 
COONROD, M.D., and PRIMARY HEALTH ) 
CARE CENTER, an Idaho corporation, JOHN ) 
and JANE DOES I through X, employees of one ) 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Ada ) 
I, Byron V. Foster, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. That I am an attorney, duly licensed by the State of Idaho Bar Association 
to practice law in the State of Idaho. 
2. That I am one of the attorneys for Plaintiffs Aguilar in the above-
referenced lawsuit. I make this affidavit upon my own personal knowledge. 
3. That attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct of Hearing on 
H.B. No. 92, Before the Senate Jud. And Rules Comm., March 3, 2003, pages 2 -3; 
4. That attached hereto as Exhibit "8" is a true and correct copy of the 
Honorable John K. Butler's Order Denying CRST's Motion (1) to Alter or Amend 
Judgment; and (2) for a Stay of Execution of Judgment filed March 10, 2005 in Stanger 
v. CRST, et ai, Case No. CV 02-1003; 
5. That attached hereto as Exhibit "c" is a true and correct copy of the Post 
Trial Hearing Transcript, page 2015, line 12 - page 2016, line 5 in Couch v. St. Luke's 
Regional Medical Center, Case No. CV PI 99-00-0289; 
6. That attached hereto as Exhibit "0" is a true and correct copy of The 
Honorable James C. Herndon's Memorandum Decision filed August 31,2006 in Vollmer 
v. Snake River School District, Case No. CV 05-2014; 
7. That attached hereto as Exhibit "E" is a true and correct copy of the 
Special Verdict Form approved by The Honorable Ronald J. Wilper in Jones, et al v. 
Anesthesiology Associates of Treasure Valley, Case No. CV PI 0400486; 
AFFIDAVIT OF BYRON V. FOSTER· P. 2 
3373 
8. That attached hereto as Exhibit "F" is a true and correct copy of the 
Special Verdict Form approved by The Honorable Kathryn Sticklen in Couch v. St. 
Luke's Regional Medical Center, Case No. Cv-PI-99-00289-0; 
9. That attached hereto as Exhibit "G" are true and correct copies of Yates v. 
Pollock, 194 Cal. App. 3d 195, 239 Cal. Rptr. 383 (Ca. App. 2nd• Oist. 1987); and 
California Health and Safety Code, Sections 3333.1-3333.2; 
10. That attached hereto as Exhibit "H"are true and correct copies of Cook v. 
Newman, 142 S.W.3d, 880 (Mo. App. W.O. 2004) and Missouri Revised Statutes 
Sections 538.210; 537.080; and, 537.095; 
11. That attached hereto as Exhibit "I" are true and correct copies of Mitson v. 
AG Engineering and Development Co., 835 F. Supp. 572 (D. Colo. 1993) and Colorado 
Revised Statutes Sections 13-21-102.5; 13-21-203; 13-64-102;and, 13-64-302; 
12. That attached hereto as Exhibit "J" is a true and correct copy of Plaintiffs' 
Trial Exhibit No. 18, Plaintiffs' expert Cornelius Hofman's Assessment of Economic 
Loss. 
13. That attached hereto as Exhibit "K" is a true and correct copy of the 
Affidavit of Cornelius Hofman dated June 17, 2009. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the -D-day of June, 2009, I served a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Steven K. Tolman 
Tolman & Brizee, PC 
132 3rd Ave. E 
P.O. Box 1276 
Twin Falls, 1083303 
Attorneys for Defendants Nathan 
Coonrod, M.D. and Primary Health Care 
Center 
Gary T. Dance 
Moffatt Thomas Barrett Rock & 
Fields Chartered 
412 W. Center, Suite 2000 
PO Box 817 
Pocatello 1083204-0817 
Attorneys for Defendant Steven R. 
Newman, M.D. 








Facsimile (208) 733-5444 
Email 
0-- U.S. Mail 
o Hand Delivery 
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0-- Email 
laho State Legislature - 2003 Senate J 
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Rules Committee '.. http://WWW.J''~'l~i<l.Ul 3/StandingCommittee., . 
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il DATE: I March 3, 2003 :: 
• f-- ---- -.---lr- ...... --.. -.. -.------------ .. -..... -.-------..... -.... -- ..... -.. ---. --. ---.......... ----. --...... --.---.. -.... ;.:. ! 
i TIME: 1 1:30 pm :1 'i .-.-.... -..... -·---·l'''·-·----.. -- ----... -- ... -. --... - ...... -- .. --.--- ... --.-.- -... --.--.-- ... --- .. -.. ----.. - ........ -."--,,,--,1 
I PLACE: il Room 437 ,/ 
.i ...... -·-·--·---··--·j,-· .. ----···----·---·- .. ·-.. ·-.. ·---· .. ····· .. ·· .... -·-.. - .. ·--.. · .... -· .. -.... -· ...... -------...... --·-.. -:1 
:1 MEMBERS I' Chainnan Darrington, Vice Chainnan Lodge, Senators ii 
!i PRESENT: ! Sorensen, Richardson, Bunderson, Davis, Marley, Burkett! 
·1 MINUTES: .. I Senator Sorensen made a motion to accept the minutes of il 
, I February 28 as written. Second was by Senator Marley and II 
:, II the motion carried by a voice vote. II 
i ,.:::.::..:::;:==::.::::.=..-=-2 :-.:.:==~:::.-=.:.:::::::.::..::.::::-=.:.:::..;:..::::=~:..:;:::::;:;:::::::: _;;::::.;;:::::;:;:;~7.:.:.:.:.::::: .. = .. :::~.::::.:.::......:.:.:.::..:,;:.....:.:~::.:.:::::::::.:.::.::~:.;:;:.::::::;;:::=::::.::::.::::::::.::_.::~:;:::..::~:!I 
·1 H 92 I Ken McClure representing Givens Pursley on behalf of the ii 
'I' I Liability Refonn Coalition spoke in favor of Tort Refonn, and 
. I presented a list of the Members of the Idaho Liability Refonn 





! He said this was brought about to modifY rules for the :1 
! detennination and imposition of tort liability in Idaho, and Mr. :1 
I McClu:e. asked the committee to take another !ook at some of I, 
I the deCISIons made when tort refonn was conSIdered before, as i, 
! the coalition felt they were not appropriate and asks for Ii 
i correction at this time. Three provisions of tort refonn would II 
i be modified, as the original tort refonn was enacted in 1987 !i 
! and has not been revisited since. It would clean up the repeal " 
! of joint and several liability by repealing exceptions for :1 
i environmental damages and damages associated with medical ') 
i devices and pharmaceutical products. It would reduce the cap II 
I ~n ~oneconor:n!c damages to ~250,0~O.OO It woul~ impose iii 
i hmIts on purutlve damages. Fmally, It would modifY the i 
I appeal bond requirements to enable defendants to appeal large 11 
I awards for punitive damages by posting a bond for I:,' 
I 
compensatory damages and the first million dollars of punitive I 
damages. To the extent that it makes civil disputes more II 
I e~ci~nt to res~lve, it sh~uld reduce costs for governmental i/ 
I uruts mvolved ill those disputes. :1 
I !I 
! ~ I 
! In 1987, the "deep pockets" rule was repealed except for '1 
! subsection 5 which basically says that either party is :! 
i responsible for actions of another. Subsection 6 and 7 are now :1 
i stricken, but were only placed there in the beginning as two I! 
I committee members said they wouldn't vote for refonn if that Ii 
i language was not there. These concern cause of action arising ii 
lout of a violation oflaw relating to hazardous or toxic waste or II 
I SOli? waste disposal ~d also the manufacture of any medica il 
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, $400,000 to $250,000 beginning July 1,2004. In Idaho Code 
16-1603, Economic damages is described as "mean objectively 
1 verifiable monetary loss, including but not limited to 
I out-of· pocket expenses, loss of earnings, loss of use of 
property, cost of replacement or repair, cost of obtaining 
substitute domestic services, loss of employment, medical 
expenses, or loss of business or employment opportunities." In 
! the case of a wrongful death, each gets up to $250,000. This 
cap is constitutional and violates the right to a jury trial. There 
is no history of large punitive awards in Idaho and this is 
award is not designed to compensate for injuries, but for civil 
punishment for the person causing the injury. The function of 
the judiciaJ system is to compensate, but not more than 
necessary. If a person owes another, and they know it, why 
does there need to be a lawsuit, unless the person wants to 
! become rich and retire off the lawsuit. 
I 
Senator Darrington asked what you say to a young person 
who has been in an accident, the economic damage not 
especially great, as they can work and go about their normal 
activities, but they are in tremendous pain and will be for the 
rest of their lives, they suffer day in and day out, and with a 
$250,000 cap awarded in full, they might get $150,000.00 if 
this were to become law. Mr. McClure told the committee "At 
I some point you have to acknowledge that payment of any 
amount of money doesn't make pain go away. Unfortunately, 
irrespective of the amount of money paid, the pain continues. " 
Senator Darrington then commented that according to his 
mail, doctors and business people expect that the passage of 
I I this legislation will ease, alleviate and cure their insurance 
problems, and asked what he should say to them. Mr. McClure 
told the Senator to say to them what he would say to them, that 
he "hoped they were right." There are a number of things that 
affect the price of insurance and this is principally an 
insurance bill. 
Senator Davis asked in the interest oftime, to submit three 
pages of questions to Mr. McClure and asked if they could be 
I answered and returned to the committee at the ne,,'t meeting. 
I (See attached #2) 
He did ask Mr. McClure if the proposal the coalition brought 
forth in 1987 had an escalator clause put in and was told it did 
not. The follow-up question was if that escalator was put on 
the $250,000 that was proposed as anticipated year, what 
would it be today. He was told that it would be $426,350. 
Then Senator Davis asked why that wasn't the starting 
6122/2006 8:58 AM 
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Walter H. Bithell, ISB #1206 
Ted C. Murdock ISB #5431 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
U. S. Bank Plaza, Suite 1400 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
Post Office Box 2527 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527 
Telephone: (208) 342-5000 
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
\ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEROME 
KEVIN B. STANGER and JUDITH L. ) 






eRST INTERNATIONAL, INC., an Iowa) 
corporation; CRST, INC., an Iowa ) 
corpoTation; JAMES L. BINNEY, ROCK ) 
CREEK FARMS, L.L.C., an Idaho ) 
company; ROCK CREEK FARMS, INC., ) 




Case No. CV02-1003 
(fonnerly Case No. CV -PI-02-1) 
ORDER DENYING eRST'S 
MOTION (1) TO ALTER OR 
AMEND JUDGMENT; AND (2) 
FOR ASTA Y OF EXECUTION 
OF JUDGMENT 
ORDER DENYING eRST'S MOTION: (1) TO ALTER OR AMEND JUD_ ... G,.-iiiE.N!T!!i!· ~~~_ .. 
AND (2) FOR A STAY OF EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT - 1 • EXHIBIT 
B 
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HARTFORD CASUALTY INSURANCE ) 
CO., a foreign corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
CRST INC., a foreign corporation, CRST 
INTERNATIONAL, INC., a foreign 
corporation, and JAMES L. BINNEY, an 












___________ D_e_f_en_d_a_n_ts_. _______ ) 
ROCK CREEK FARMS, LLC and 
CRAIG GILES and EVYON GILES, 
husband and wife, dba GILES FARMS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CRST INTERNATIONAL, INC., an Iowa 
corporation, CRST VAN EXPEDITED, 


















Before the Court is CRST's Motion: (1) To Alter or Amend the Judgment; and 
(2) For a Stay of Execution of Judgment filed aD December 9, 2004. The motion was 
heard on March 1,2005. The Court makes the following findings of fact and 
conclusions of law: 
(1) At trial, the jury awarded Kevin Stanger Don-economic damages in the 
amount of $500,000, and awarded Judith Stanger non-economic damages in the amount 
of $200,000. eRST argued the Court must aggregate the two awards of non-economic 
ORDER DENYING CRST'S MOTION: (1) TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT; 
AND (2) FOR A STAY OF EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT - 2 
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damages and apply a single statutory cap pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-1603. The statute 
states, "[I]n no action seeking damages for personal injuries, including death, shall a 
judgment for noneconomic damages be entered for a claimant exceeding the maximum 
amount ... " I.C. § 6-1603 (emphasis added). Idaho Code § 6-1601(2) defines 
"claimant" as "any party to a civil action making a claim for relief, legal or equitable, 
compensatory or noncompensatory." 
This is a matter 0 f statutory interpretation. The Court finds that § 6-1603 is 
unambiguous and clear on its face and applies per each claimant. Under the statutory 
definition of "claimant," Kevin Stanger and Judith Stanger are each a separate claimant. 
The derivative nature of Judith Stanger's claim for loss of consortium does not change 
the statutory analysis. The statutory cap on non-economic damages does not apply. 
Oaks v. Connors, 660 A.2d 423 (Ct. App. MD 1995) and Wessels v. Garden Way, 
Inc., 2004 WL 2168627 eCt. App. Mich. 2004) are distinguishable because the 
Ma.ryland statute and Michigan statute both apply to the total amount of non-economic 
damages recovered. The Idaho statute does not apply to the total amount, but rather 
applies per claimant. 
(2) At the time of the collision Kevin Stanger was driving a truck owned by 
Craig Giles. Giles insured the truck with The Hartford Insurance Company. The 
Hartford paid Kevin Stanger $10,000 under the terms of Giles' policy. CRST argues 
that the Judgment must be reduced by the $10,000 payment to prevent Stanger from 
obtaining a double recovery under Idaho Code § 6-1606. 
ORDER DENYING CRST'S MOTION: (1) TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT; 
AND (2) FOR A STAY OF EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT - 3 
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The Court finds that the $10,000 payment is not a collateral source under Idaho 
Code § 6-1606. There is no threat of a double recovery to Stanger because The 
Hartford has asserted its contractual right of subrogation. 
Based on the foregoing and for all the reasons given at the hearing, IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED that CRST's Motion To Alter or Amend the Judgment is 
DENIED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that CRST's Motion For a Stay of Execution of the 
Judgment is MOOT. 
DATED this -1i2 day of '7?kZ{l L 2005. 
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the cap. I 
So I underSfaJld tl)at this isn't anything !.hat, 2 
of course. f can find any Idaho law on. Ilooked, and 3 
I'm sure Your Honor is well aware of that. 4 
I'm asking that the court recognize my 5 
;ugumcnt Ilncl see if it's applicable in this case, since 6 
it G a wrongful dcalh case; it is a ca.~e that flows out . 7 
ot the de::)th of 000 indi vidual. 8 
And it ~s the type of case that in California, 9 
under rlleir statute •• where, again, it's a singular 10 
action applied two diffenmt ways, depending on whether 11 
ies a wrongful doath or a regular ton action •• whother 12 
in this <.:a:-le the applicatioll would fit. 13 
Tha nk you, Your Honor. 14 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Janis, arc you arguing tl1is 15 
one, tw? 16 
MRJANIS: Yes, Your Honor. l'mgoD1gtOtryto 17 
be reillti vely brief becauso I know this has already been 18 
presented to tl Ie court, and we've hashed this about a 19 
lime or tv.·o already. r just want to make a few points 20 
here. 21 
Firs~ I think it's really important to 22 
understand here thilt we're talking about one issue here; 23 
dUll is the intel'pretation ofIdaho Code Section 6·1603. 24 
There is lr.laho law on the subject That's the slatute. 25 
20n 
So I t11ink, based on that alone. it's f~ir1y 
clear that the authority they're providing you to support 
this proposilion does not hold any weigh~ li"nnkly. 
Secondly, what I keep hearing about tl,at they 
keep coming back to is (he notion that ldaho is a 
so-caned single-action stale. Anti tl)ere again, r don't 
think that has any bearing on what welre talking about 
here, which is interpreting the statute. 
The fact Ihat we <Ire a single-action state, 
which of course provides for judicial economy and 
judicial integrity - economy illlhe sense of not having 
multiple actions or trials; integrity in ti\e sense of not 
having inconsistent results for the same incident giving 
rise to a death. 
It has nothing to do v,1t11 interp("oling Tda1)o 
Code 6-1603, And no Idaho case, since tllis statute has 
been in. the books. since 1987, hiiS evor said that it is 
somehow a cap (hat is to b~ applied in the aggregate in a 
wrongful death ca~c. 
On the contrary, the language says the 
limitation applies to the sum of noneconomic damages 
sustained by a claimant. And it uses that teml several 
times ill the statute. 
And in this case, it is to overstate the 
obvious. We had four separate claimnnts who each 
201~ 
~------------------.----.---------------+------------------------------------~ 
I ancllhat's \vhilt we're talking about. 
2 That statute .vas not in any way based on 
3 California law. There's no h,dication whatsoever that it 
4 h~s anything to do with California I~w. 
5 And it is truo, as T've pointed out in my 
6 brief, that CaJifoOlia does have a specific statute that 
7 is ul)iquely applicable to medical malpractice actions. 
8 . And the Yates case decided·· even though the Califonlia 
9 legislature didn't lhrow the words nwrongful death" in 
10 thero, Yates decided it applied to wrongful death 
II actions. 
l2 And the Yates case also decided that because 
I J the statute says it applies 10 all nctions, quotG, 
14 unquote, that the C:lP applies in the aggrofjlite. 
15 But lhat's not wOOt we're tandog about here. 
16 Welre simply interpreting a stabJte that we've had 011 the 
17 books fo!' some time here~ and it has never. ever been 
18 held to be limited in the nlaJ.Ul.er a)cdbed by tho 
19 defendant here. 
20 I don'! tllink Ihe Califomia authority 
2. \ prOVlde5 any per:'llasive .- it certainly has no 
n prececJential valuc~ but it dOCS1\'t even. provide. any 
23 persuasive value, becaU5je the statute 1$ very dlfferent. 
24 It bcars no substantive resemblanco to the statute that 
25 we oro talking about here in Jdaho. 
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suffered four seprJIate and distinguishable damages, and 
that is fairly allo'w'cd under !he statute. 
Thank you, Your HOllor. 
THF. COURT: Mr. Bush, /lI"C you arguing this one? 
MR.. BUSH: If r could say something different, 1 
would, Your Honor, but r clln'~ so I won't. 
THE COURT: Ms. Garrett? 
MS. GARRETT: The only ~hing I would point out, in 
subsection 2, the limitation is not a plural; it's a 
limitation, singular. So, liThe limitation is tl\C sum 
of ... " That's all. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well. here's what I think at 
least on 6·1603. having read all the briefs, looked at 
the cases: I thhlk that dlCfC isn't Ii unitary cap on 
noneconomic damages. And I think thal b~cause oflho 
reference to ndrumant" in our statute as opposed to the 
California statute, v,.hich made reference to an "acLion." 
And it seems to me !he purposo of the two statutes were . 
quita different. 
And I also think thal becauso in vil'll.lnlly the 
entire b.istory of fdtlho ",'!ongful death stat1.1tes, each 
plaintiffhas been et'llitled to recover their own uniquo 
loss. And Our jury instructions indicate !hal. 
I know of no Idaho case that dlTectly say$ 
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I the! cfainl for wrongful death and thoy have to share in 1 the clerk's office down there. 
2 whatever damages there are. That's just not the way our 2 THE COURT: Okay. And just for tlle record, I'm not 
3 statij h!l.~ dODe tllat. 3 going to be issuing a v{fittcn opinion on this. 
4 So I think the cap appljes to each pJaintiff 4 (The hearing was concluded.) 
5 separately. And that will be my ruling on that. 5 
6 l.find the other issue much more trouble.:lome, 6 
7 but it seems to me tllilt tile ~tatute 6.805(2) says what it 7 
8 says. Ant! it's clear to me that these two defendants 8 
9 wore not jointly and severally liable in tort because the 9 
10 join! and severnl Ji.ability has been abolished in all 10 
11 excepl three categories of claims, ilnd this didu~ fit II 
12 into any ofthern. 12 
13 I Illllst say, I don't like wllllt this stal'ute 13 
14 nppcar$ to do. But it says what it says. And so lin 14 
15 [Deli ned to rule th~t. on the facts of this case, that IS 
16 tllcre isn't any credit, either. 16 
17 As I say, l doo't know tll<lt I'm really happy 17 
18 with ~lat result. But that's what the statute says, so 18 
19 thaI's what it says. And the fact that I'm 110t happy 19 
20 with it doesn't mean 1 get to change it. I didn't choose 20 
21 the:' words dlC legislature used. 21 
22 So that will be my mling on that aspect of 22 
23 it, too. 23 
24 And given tho::;!! rulings. them, r will·· 24 
25 iJ.'\SuminB that there's no other objections to tl1e 25 
2016 2018 
1 judgments, right? 
2 r ll)oked at lhem, and it seemli to me that the 
3 proposed judgment::: had the appropriate reductions applied 
4 to •• 
5 MS. FOUSER: Yeah. 8ased on the representation of 
6 plaintiffs that Ihe metlical bills are subrogated, there 
7 is no otl)er objections. 
8 THE COURT: Okay. I meru:1., I don't know whether 
9 U1CY nrc or not. I assumo that's somothing you might 
10 have fOUlld out in discovery. 
Jl Okay. Well, then, I don't know that r have 
12 them in here. Once I find them, I'll sign !hem. Because 
13 it appears to me the cap had been appropriately applied. 
14 So PH do thnt. 
15 MS. GARRETT; So, Your I {onor, for clarification, 
J6 will you enter tho juugml7nts today? 
\7 THE COURT: Yeah. r don't see any reason not to. 
18 MS: GARHETT: Ok:'iy. 
]9 MlUANtS: Judge, I read somcwhero along the way. 
20 \\'l.y memory bank is telling Ule, that the judgmerit is not in 
21 effe<;:t until the clerk enters it, stamps it. So I'd bo 
22 h3PPY to be the one to take il down there) so to spellk. 
23 THE COURT: My clerk sitting right here can stamp 
24 judgments. 
25 MR. JANIS: I stand corrected. J think ill tenns of 
2017 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BINGHAM 
KENNETH VOLMER, JR.; NATALIE 
FUSS; MELINDA WlLKES; JOEY 
VOLLMER; JACOB VOLLMER; 
WENDY VOLLMER; ANDREA 
BROWER; and JARED VOLLMER, 
individually and as duly appointed guardian 
of DEVIN VOLLMER and 
CHRlSTOPHER VOLLMER, minors; 
Plaintiffs, 
YS. 
SNAKE RIVER SCHOOL DISTRICT and 
KLAUS AXMAN, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 05-2014 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND GRANTING IN 
PART AND DENYING IN PART 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION 




Fuss's daughter money to move to Arizona. 66 He gave money to Fuss's other children.67 He 
gave Fuss and her family money and gifts at Christmas. 68 If Fuss needed money, she could turn 
to Vollmer Sr. and was not expected to pay the money back.69 Vollmer Sr. would take Fuss and 
her family to outings and pay for functions. 7o These facts support an inference of Vollmer Sr.' s 
provision of support or services to Fuss, and stave off partial summary judgment at this stage of 
the litigation. 
3. The Idaho Noneconomic Damages Cap Applies per Claimant, rather than per 
Claim. 
Finally, the Defendants argue that the Idaho noneconomic damages cap, pursuant to I.e. § 
6-1603, applies per claim, rather than per person/claimant, limiting the Plaintiffs to the recovery 
of a single noneconomic damage sum, rather than potential mUltiple sums awarded to each 
Plaintifr.?l The Plaintiffs respond that I.C. § 6-1603 allows recovery of noneconomic damages 
per claimant, rather than per claim.72 
Idaho Code § 6-1603 reads, in pertinent part: 
(1) In no action seeking damages for personal injury, including death, shall a 
judgment for noneconomic damages be entered for a claimant exceeding the 
maximum amount of two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000); 
provided, however, that beginning on July 1, 2004, and each July 1 






70 Brody Affidavit, at Exhibit B, p. 38. 
71 Defendants' Memorandum, at pp. 18-21. 
72 Plaintiffs' Response, at pp. 13-19. 
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thereafter, the cap on noneconomic damages established in this section shall 
increase or decrease in accordance with the percentage amount of increase or 
decrease by which the Idaho industrial commission adjusts the average 
annual wage as computed pursuant to section 72-409(2), Idaho Code. 
(2) The limitation contained in this section applies to the sum of: (a) 
noneconomic damages sustained by a claimant who incurred personal injury 
or who is asserting a wrongful death; (b) noneconomic damages sustained by 
a claimant, regardless of the number of persons responsible for the damages 
or the number of actions filed. 
At first blush, the statute appears to apply a damages cap per claimant, rather than per 
claim (although each claimant is limited to one recovery, regardless of the number of persons 
held responsible for the damages). This Court's reading of the statutory language is apparently 
not ill1iversally accepted, however. 
The Defendants point to an opinion authored by United States Magistrate Judge Larry 
Boyle entitled Clarendon National Insurance Company v. Phillips,73 wherein Judge Boyle 
opined that I.C. § 6-1603(2) applies the $250,000.00 non-economic damages cap collectively, 
regardless of the "number of actions filed."74 Thus, Judge Boyle limited non-economic damages 
to $250.000.00 per claim, rather than per claimant. 
However, a more recent decision by the Idaho Supreme Court is contrary to Judge 
Boyle'S interpretation of I.C. § 6-1603(2)~ On August 8, 2006, Justice Trout handed down the 
Horner v. Sani-Top, Inc. 75 opinion, wherein she wrote: 
7J 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 35364 (AprilS, 2005). 
74 Clarendon National insurance Co. v. Phillips, 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 35364, at * 11. 
75 2006 WL 2254797 (August 8, 2006) (Chief Justice Schroeder and Justices Eismann and Jones and Justice Pro 
Tern Walters concurring). This Court notes that as of this date, the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion in Horner has 
not been released for publication and is, therefore, subject to revision or withdrawal. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
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... in preparing to enter judgment against Sani-Top, [the district judge] considered 
I.e. § 6-1603, which provides that no judgment shall be entered for a claimant 
exceeding the statutory cap. Since not one of the plaintiff s [sic] damage awards 
for noneconomic damages exceeded the statutory cap, the judge appropriately 
entered judgment in compliance with I.e. § 6-1603. 
* * * 
The language "regardless of the number of persons responsible for the damages or 
the number of actions filed" found in I.e. § 6-1603(2) simply means that 
regardless of how many defendants are listed on the verdict form or how many 
actions the plaintiff brings to collect damages, ultimately, a judgment cannot be 
entered in favor of "a claimant" that exceeds the amount of the statutory cap. 
After properly apportioning liability as found by the jury at trial, a court must then 
determine whether the total noneconomic damage award for a particular plaintiff 
exceeds the cap.76 
Justice Trout's description of the scope of I.e. § 5-311 concurs with this Court's view of the 
statutory language as limiting each claimant's non-economic damages to $250,000.00. 
In addition, this Court is moved by the fact that the Idaho Legislature did not use 
language which would clearly limit noneconomic damages to a single figure, to be divided 
amongst the claimants. As the Plaintiffs astutely point out, the Idaho Legislature used the 
following damage cap language in the Idaho Tort Claims Act: 
The combined, aggregate liability of a governmental entity and its employees for 
damages, costs and attorney fees under this chapter, on account of bodily or 
personal injury, death, or property damage, or other loss as the result of anyone 
(1) occurrence or accident regardless of the number of persons injured or the 
number of claimants, shall not exceed and is limited to five hundred thousand 
dollars ($500,000), unless the governmental entity has purchased applicable, 
valid, collectible liability insurance coverage in eXCess of said limit, in which 
event the controlling limit shall be the remaining available proceeds of such 
insurance. 77 
76 Horner v. Sani-Top, inc., 2006 WL 2254797, at *3 [underlined emphasis added, italic emphasis in original]. 
77 I.e. § 6-926 
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The comparison between the language utilized in I.C. § 6-1603(2) and in I.C. § 6-926, 
together with the Horner decision, convince this Court that each of the Plaintiffs may, if they 
prevail on the liability issue and if the jury so finds, recover up to $250,000.00 (plus or minus the 
Idaho Industrial Commission adjustment) in noneconomic damages from the Defendants. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing findings, the Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
is denied. 
The Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is granted in part and denied 
in part. The adult Plaintiffs: Kenneth Vollmer, Jr.; Natalie Fuss; Melinda Wilkes; Joey Vollmer; 
Jacob Vollmer; Wendy Vollmer; Andrea Brower and Jarid Vollmer, shall take nothing by their 
claims against Klaus Axman and Snake River School District for (1) economic losses arising out 
of Vollmer Sr.'s 60% ownership in Vollmer Well Drilling, L.L.C. and (2) lost wages. 
In all other respects, Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is denied. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
~ 
DATED this J/ ~of August, 2006. 
James C. Herndon 
District Judge 
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NOV 15 2005 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRIQ.'· 
~' __ ~~mrr.nr~~~ 
THESTATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
lLL ANTHONY JONES, 
~diVidual1y and as guardian ad litem for 
, S ALEXANDB~ JONES (DOB 
" 12P/99) and MOIRA EIDHLrN JONES 
. ~B 7/04/02), LYNNE ROYER, as 
tp,ral mother ofLOru MARIE JONES, 
e8eased, and HAROLD BOWERS as 
'. 'II ' atilral father of LORI MARIE JONES, 
edeased 
I Plaintiffs, 
'~[": TImSIOLOGY CONSULTANTS 
~TREASURE VALLEY. PLLC, 
:Ep30RAH JENKINS, M.D., THOMAS 
LARK, M.D., B&B 
, :qTOTRANSFUSION SERVICES, 
.p., an Idaho Coxporation, and JOHN 
OES I through V 
I :! I, Defendants. 
Case No. CV PI 0400486D 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
, ii' We
1 
the jury, answer the questions submitted to us in the Special Verdict as 
,I ' 
£ lows: 
D; )~ldani Deborah Jenkins has admitted that she breached the applicable standard <;If 
h . ~ care in her treatment of Lori Jones and that the breach was a proximate cause C!f 
~'e·9fa.th of Lan Jones. You are instructed to:answer ~'Yes" to Question No. 1. ! 
~STION NO.1; Did Dr. Jenkins breach the applicable standard of health cme 
p~a#ce in her treatment of Lori Jones) and If so, was that breach a proximate cause of 
LOri Jo~es7s death. 
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Q : STION NO.2: Did Dr. Lark breach the applicable standard of health care practice 
i~ I .I~ treatment of Lori Jones, and if so, was that breach a proximate cause of Lori 
Jo J, s death? 
; 1,1 ANSWER: YES[6j NO~ , 
Q i :: ,TION NO.3: Did MS. Kurtz breach the applicable standard of health car+ 
tipe in her treatment of Lori Jones, and if so, was that breach a proximate cause Of 
. Jones' s death? ' 
I 
i ANSWER: YES[2U NOL-] 
, 1 
I If you answered "Nd' to both Question No.2 and 3, you should skip Questions 4 
u~ 6 and proceed to answer Questions No. 7 through 13. If you answered ''Yes'' to 
eit 'er Question No, 2 or 3, you should answer questions Nos. 4 through 13. 
I 
Qlb.STION NO.4: In this question, you are to apportion the fault between the parties 
in l~s of a percentage. AP. to each party to which you answered "Yes" to Questions 
N . l~ 2, and 3, detonnine the percentage of fault for that party, and enter the percentage 
on the? appropriate line. If you answered "No" to any of the above questions, insert a 1'0" 
as orhat party. Your total percentages must equal 1 00%. 
',iis the percentage of fault (ifany) you assign to each of the following: 
" I- To defendant Thomas Lark. M.D. ~% 
I :' Ii 
, To defendant Deborah Jenkins, M.D. 
, ; ~" To defendant Geraldine Kurtz 
" I 
Total must ,equal 100% 
If o~ S?BWered yea to Question N? 2, tha~.is you have found neglige,nce on the part of 
Dr Lark~ please ~wex- the followmg question. If you answered no to Question No.2) 
pI. t lproceed to Question No.6. ' 
I 
q~l, ~':f.'I~N NO.~: W~ the c?nd~ct by the Defendant Thomas Lark, M.D. "reckless» 
as dfined ill the Court's mstructions? 
:: 
ANSWER; YESLJ NO~ 
If u. answered yes to Question No.3, that is you have found negligence on the part of 
,,'. e Ku:rt2i~ please answer the following question. If you answered no to Question 
N : jplease proceed to Question No.7. 
, , , , 
i 
: : I, 
, I, 
, : I 
' , 
t, i 
, , I ':1 
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1 , , , 
i " , 
DISTRICT COURT 
Q ~TION NO.6: Was the conduct by the Defendant Geraldine Kurtz "reckless" as 
de led in the Court's instructions? , I 
i ANSWER: YESUU NOLJ 
Qk~TIOlN NO.7: Was the conduct by the Defendant Deborah Jenkins, M.D . 
.. rdckless" as defined in the Court's instructions? 
ANSWER: NOLJ 
Q I • STION NO.8: What is the total amount of economic damages sustained by 
Pl :- I !- Michael Anthony Jones. Rhys Alexander Jones and Moira Eibhlin Jones? 
I 
i #} ',I $ t>'! 0 l...fl.~-r1 .::::.6..u..fl.L..,? _____ _ 
; 1 i. I 
Q nON NO.9: What is the total amount of non-economic damages sustained by 
Pi '. !tjiffRhys Alexander Jones? 
1 
I 
'; $ __ ~J,~;r~C~D~J~~~6~~~ ________ _ 
,I 
Q~E$TION NO. 10: What is tho total amount of non-economic damages sustained by 
PIr' 'tiffMolra Eibhlin Jones? 
'r 
: $ I} StJ l!:. 1 0 () ~ 
I , ' 
Q, ;:f~TION NO. 11: What is the total ropount ofnon~economic damages sustained. by 
P ~~ffMjchael Anthony Jones? 
Q I~TION NO. lZ: What is the total amount of non-economio damages sustained by 
PI; : 'I~ff Lynne Royer? 
; Ii, $ '/ ~ S* 00(> , 
,!, i, . 
Q ,~TION NO. 13: What is the total amount of non-economio damages sustained by 
Pl u ffHarold Bowers? I ;': r!" ", I 
, , 
'$ 1).5.066 ' 
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,i 'Please sign the verdict form and notify the bailiff that you have finished your 
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Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, Cali-
fornia. 
Dorothy YATES, Richard Yates, Darlene Domin-
guez, Charles Yates, Jr., Debbie Everett and Lydia 
Yates, Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 




Certified for Partial Publication FN* 
FN * Pursuant to California Rules of Court, 
rules 976(b) and 976.1, this opinion is cer-
tified for partial publication. The portions 
which have been deleted from publication 
are identified by double brackets ( ((/]] ). 
Review Denied Nov. 12, 1987. 
Patient's widow and five adult children brought 
wrongful death action against doctor who had oper-
ated on patient to remove gallbladder for doctor's 
alleged malpractice. The Superior Court, Los 
Angeles County, Robert J. Higa, J., entered judg-
ment in favor of plaintiffs, and doctor appealed. 
The Court of Appeal, Gates, J., held that: (1) Med-
ical Injury Compensation Reform Act, which 
placed a $250,000 limit on the noneconomic dam-
ages recoverable for "injuries" resulting from doc-
tor's malpractice, limited damages recoverable in 
wrongful death as well as personal injury actions; 
(2) $250,000 limit applied to plaintiffs' in aggreg-
ate; and (3) $250,000 award in noneconomic dam-
ages was not excessive. 
Modified and affirmed as modified. 
West Headnotes 
[1\ Health 198H ~834(2) 
Page 1 
198H Health 
198HV Malpractice, Negligence, or Breach of 
Duty 
198HV(G) Actions and Proceedings 
198Hk828 Damages 
198Hk834 Statutory Limits on Dam-
ages Awards 
198Hk834(2) k. Wrongful Death. 
Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 299k18.110 Physicians and Surgeons) 
Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act, which 
placed a $250,000 cap on the noneconomic dam-
ages recoverable for "injuries" resulting from doc-
tor's professional negligence, limited noneconomic 
damages recoverable in wrongful death as well as 
personal injury actions. West's Ann.CaI.Civ.Code § 
3333.2. 
(2\ Health 198H ~834(1) 
198H Health 
198HV Malpractice, Negligence, or Breach of 
Duty 
198HV(G) Actions and Proceedings 
198Hk828 Damages 
198Hk834 Statutory Limits on Dam-
ages Awards 
198Hk834( 1) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
(Formerly 299k18.110 Physicians and Surgeons) 
Two-hundred-and-fifty-thousand dollar limit on 
plaintiffs' recovery in malpractice action applied to 
all plaintiffs in aggregate, so that no more than 
$250,000 in noneconomic damages could be re-
covered in any single malpractice action regardless 
of number of plaintiffs involved. West's 
Ann.Cal.Civ.Code § 3333.2. 
[3) Death 117 €:=99(4) 
117 Death 
1 I 7 III Actions for Causing Death 
1 1 7 IlI(H) Damages or Compensation 
117k94 Measure and Amount Awarded 
EXHIBIT 
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117k99 Excessive Damages 
I 17k99(4) k. Allowance to Surviv-
ing Husband, Wife or Children. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 299k18.11 0 Physicians and Surgeons) 
Two-hundred-and-fifty-thousand dollars in noneco-
nomic damages awarded to patient's widow and 
five adult children in wrongful death action arising 
out of doctor's professional negligence was not ex-
cessive, where patient and wife had been married 
for 35 years at time of patient's death, patient had 
engaged in frequent communications with children 
and visited them regularly, and patient was in every 
respect very generous and supportive of children. 
**384 Law Offices of *197 Samuel Shore by David 
M. Luboff, Los Angeles, and James R. McGrath, 
Glendale, for plaintiffs and appellants. 
Bonne, Jones, Bridges, Mueller & O'Keefe by 
Joseph D. McNeil and Thelen, Marrin, Johnson & 
Bridges by Curtis A. Cole and Susan A. Bey tin, Los 
Angeles, for defendant and appellant. 
Horvitz, Levy & Amerian by S. Thomas Todd and 
Frederic D. Cohen, Encino, as amici curiae on be-
half of California Hosp. Ass'n and Truck Ins. Ex-
change. 
Fred J. Hiestand, San Francisco, as amici curiae on 
behalf of Ass'n for California Tort Reform. 
GATES, Associate Justice. 
Defendant Lawrence Pollock, a surgeon, appeals 
from the judgment entered pursuant to a jury ver-
dict that awarded damages to plaintiffs Dorothy 
Yates, Richard Yates, Darlene Dominguez, Charles 
Yates, Jr., Debbie Everett and Lydia Yates, the 
spouse and adult children of decedent Charles 
Yates, in this wrongful death action based upon 
medical malpractice. He contends: 
"I. The judgment for noneconomic damages is con-
trary to both fact and law.[[/]] 
*198 Plaintiffs cross-appeal from the order denying 
defendant's motion for new trial which was condi-
Page 2 
tioned upon their acceptance of a reduction in the 
judgment from $1,903,560 to $1,603,560.FN1 
FN 1. In accordance with an agreement 
entered into by plaintiffs and approved by 
the trial court, damages were apportioned 
so that decedent's widow received the en-
tire economic loss award of $103,560 and 
the noneconomic loss award totaling 
$1,500,000 was divided equally among the 
six plaintiffs. 
On August 24, 1982, defendant performed surgery 
on decedent to remove his gallbladder. Following 
the operation decedent developed a number of seri-
ous postoperative complications. Because defend-
ant made no attempt to determine the cause of these 
problems, decedent sought treatment from another 
physician, Doctor Herman Smith. 
Doctor Smith suspected decedent might have an 
abscess and that his common bile duct was obstruc-
ted. When decedent's condition had improved suffi-
ciently to permit further surgery, Smith's suspicions 
were confirmed. He found an abscess below the liv-
er where decedent's gallbladder had been removed 
and discovered defendant had ligated decedent's 
common bile duct rather than his cystic duct during 
the August 24, surgery. Unfortunately, the correct-
ive measures taken by Smith failed to stem the bac-
terial infection in decedent's abdominal cavity ne-
cessitating additional surgery a week later in a final 
attempt to save his life. This procedure, too, was 
unsuccessful and on October 31, 1982, Charles 
Yates died. 
All doctors testifying at the time of trial, including 
defendant, concurred that ligation of the common 
bile duct violates the standard of care required of a 
reasonably prudent surgeon. Doctor Smith further 
agreed it was probable decedent would have "been 
alive today" were it not for "the events that took 
place in the course of the surgery on August the 
24th at Pico Rivera Community Hospital which res-
ulted in the obstruction of the common bile duct 
and the development of abscesses and infections 
© 2009 Thomson ReuterslWest. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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and the consequences of that act.. .. " 
Defendant's first contention is persuasive insofar as 
he challenges the trial court's refusal to reduce 
noneconomic damages to $250,000 as required by 
the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 
1975 (MICRA). (Stats. 1975, 2nd Ex. Sess., chs. 1 
and 2.) Civil Code section 3333.2 provides in per-
tinent part: "(a) In any action for injury against a 
health care provider based on professional negli-
gence, the injured plaintiff shall be entitled to re-
cover noneconomic losses to compensate for pain, 
suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, dis-
figurement and other nonpecuniary damage. [1] (b) 
In no action shall the amount of damages for 
noneconomic losses exceed two hundred fifty thou-
sand dollars ($250,000). [~] (c) For the *199 pur-
poses of **385 this section: ... (2) 'Professional 
negligence' means a negligent act or omission to 
act by a health care provider in the rendering of 
professional services, which act or omission is the 
proximate cause of a personal injury or wrongful 
death .... " (Emphasis added.) 
[ I] We have no difficulty ascertaining the legislat-
ive intent of this statute since it is unambiguous on 
its face. Its plain language unequivocably manifests 
a desire to place a $250,000 cap on awards for 
noneconomic damages in all medical malpractice 
litigation, whether recovery is sought by patients 
who have themselves suffered personal injuries or 
by the survivors of such victims who initiate suits 
for wrongful death. 
Should any lingering doubt exist on this point, it is 
quickly dispelled by an examination of the legislat-
ive history of section 3333.2. Certain of the tentat-
ive drafts of the proposed MICRA legislation actu-
ally did explicitly exclude plaintiffs in wrongful 
death actions from the specified ceiling on noneco-
nomic damages and permitted them to recover 
"[a]ll noneconomic damages .... " (Assem. Bi11 No.1 
(1975-1976 2nd Ex. Sess.) May 19, 1975, proposed 
Health & Safety Code sections 21153, 21154, pp. 
11-12; Sen. Amend. to Assem. Bill No. 1 
(1975-1976 2nd Ex. Sess.) June 27, 1975, §§ 24.6, 
Page 3 
24.7.) Utimately, however, the Legislature rejected 
that approach in favor of a comprehensive provi-
sion which restricted the amount of noneconomic 
damages without regard to the status of the 
plaintiff. 
Despite the clear wording of the statute plaintiffs 
maintain it has no applicability to wrongful death 
actions because subdivision (a) refers only to ac-
tions for "injury" rather than "injury or wrongful 
death." This argument fails, inter alia, because it ig-
nores the fact that wrongful death claims are for 
"injuries" suffered by the heirs of medical malprac-
tice victims. (See Krouse v. Graham (1977) 19 
Cal.3d 59, 68, 137 Cal.Rptr. 863, 562 P.2d 1022.) 
Plaintiffs also urge that inasmuch as survivors may 
not recover for "pain, suffering, inconvenience, 
physical impairment, disfigurement and other non-
pecuniary damage" (§ 3333.2, subd. (a», the Legis-
lature must have intended to exclude wrongful 
death actions from the reach of the statute. We dis-
agree. Subdivision (a) does not purport to set forth 
a comprehensive catalogue of the types of losses to 
which the statute is applicable; it simply identifies 
certain of the more common types of noneconomic 
damages which arise in malpractice actions. 
Similarly the statute's reference to "nonpecuniary 
damage" is not fatal to its application in the wrong-
ful death context. Although it is true that California 
decisional law indicates only "pecuniary" losses are 
compensable in wrongful death suits, nonetheless, 
as our highest court recognized in *200Kl'olise v. 
Graham, supra, 19 Ca1.3d at pp. 67-68, 137 
Cal.Rptr. 863, 562 P.2d 1022, damage awards in 
such cases, in fact, have never been restricted to 
those elements having an ascertainable economic 
value. That is to say, they have included what are, 
in effect, inherently nonpecuniary factors akin to 
pain and suffering, e.g., the loss of a decedent's so-
ciety, comfort, protection, care, companionship, 
etc. ( /d., at p. 68, 137 Cal.Rptr. 863, 562 P.2d 
1022. See also Canavin v. Pacific Southwest Air-
lines (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 512, 527, 196 
Cal.Rptr. 82.) The continued affirmance of such 
© 2009 Thomson ReuterslWest. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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awards, notwithstanding their "noneconomic" 
nature, undoubtedly reflects "a realization that if 
damages truly were limited to 'pecuniary' loss, re-
covery frequently would be barred by the heirs' in-
ability to prove such loss .... " ( Krouse, supra, 19 
Cal.3d at p. 68, 137 Cal.Rptr. 863,562 P.2d 1022.) 
Plaintiffs' contention that section 3333.2 unconsti-
tutionally abridges the right to a jury trial (Cal. 
Const.. art. L § 16) is but an indirect attack upon 
the Legislature's power to place a cap on damages. 
While it is clear section 3333.2 will in some cases 
result in the recovery of a lower jUdgment than 
would have been obtained before the enactment of 
the statute, it is well-established that "the Legis-
lature retains broad control over the measure, as 
well as the **386 timing, of damages that a defend-
ant is obligated to pay and a plaintiff is entitled to 
receive, and that [it] may expand or limit recover-
able damages so long as its action is rationally re-
lated to a legitimate state interest...." ( Fein v. Per-
manente Medical Group (I 985) 38 Ca1.3d 137, 158, 
211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 695 P.2d 665, emphasis in ori-
ginal; American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community 
Hospital (1984) 36 Ca1.3d 359, 368-369, 204 
Cal.Rptr. 671, 683 P.2d 670.) 
While the general propriety of noneconomic dam-
ages is "firmly imbedded in our common law juris-
prudence [citation]," no California case "has ever 
suggested that the right to recover for such noneco-
nomic injuries is constitutionally immune from le-
gislative limitation or revision. [Citations.]" ( Fein 
v. Permanente Medical Group, supra, 38 Ca1.3d at 
pp. 159-160,211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 695 P.2d 665.) 
This being so, plaintiffs challenge must be rejected. 
[2] As a "fall back" position, plaintiffs assert that 
even if section 3333.2 is applicable to wrongful 
death actions, its $250,000 limitation should be ap-
plied to each plaintiff individually and not to all 
plaintiffs in the aggregate. However, it is evident 
from the terms of the statute that while each injured 
plaintiff is entitled to seek noneconomic damages, 
the maximum recovery permitted in any single 
medical malpractice action is $250,000, regardless 
Page 4 
of the number of plaintiffs involved. Since the Le-
gislature was obviously aware that "case precedent 
has consistently held 'only one action [can] be 
brought for the wrongful death of a person thereby 
preventing multiple actions by individual heirs and 
the personal representative' ... " and that "the cause 
of action for wrongful death has been consistently 
*201 characterized as 'a joint one, a single one and 
an indivisible one' ... " ( Canavin v. Pacific Southw-
est Airlines, supra, 148 Cal.App.3d at p. 529, 196 
Cal.Rptr. 82; emphasis in original; Cross v. Pacific 
Gas & Elec. Co. (1964) 60 Cal.2d 690, 694, 36 
Cal. Rptr. 321,388 P.2d 353), we can but conclude 
its use of the word "action" in section 3333.2 rep-
resents its conscious decision to limit the total re-
covery for noneconomic loss in such suits to 
$250,000. 
[3] Our decision in this respect renders moot 
plaintiffs' cross-appeal, as well as defendant's claim 
that the judgment may not exceed plaintiffs' spe-
cification of damages in the amount of $1,000,000. 
Likewise, we need not pass on defendant's charge 
that the jury's assessment of noneconomic damages 
was excessive, since the actual award to be entered, 
$250,000, is eminently reasonable.
FN2 
Decedent 
and his wife had been married for 35 years at the 
time of his death. They had an extremely close and 
loving relationship, brought about in part perhaps 
FN3 
because both were deaf mutes. Decedent also 
shared a special bond with his children, enhanced 
again to some degree by his disability. He was in 
frequent communication with four of his five chil-
dren and they visited regularly. He was in every re-
spect a very generous and supportive father, includ-
ing financially. Merely by way of example, imme-
diately prior to his initial surgery he and his wife 
were residing with one daughter and decedent was 
contributing $500 per month to aid her with her ex-
penses. [(/]] 
FN2. Defendant also notes in passing that 
"[t]he record does not reveal any factual 
basis for the jury's finding of economic 
damages either." However, he offers no 
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support for this proposition and our review 
of the record has disclosed none. 
FN3. Even defendant concedes in his open-
ing brief that "an award of $200,000 to de-
cedent's widow is arguably not excess-
ive .... " 
The judgment is modified to provide that plaintiffs 
are awarded damages in the aggregate amount of 
$353,560.00. As so modified, it is affirmed. Each 
party shall bear its own costs on appeal. 
COMPTON, A.C.l, and FUKUTO, J., concur. 
Cal.App. 2 Dist.,1987. 
Yates v. Pollock 
194 Cal.App.3d 195, 239 Cal.Rptr. 383 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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the remainder of the section and the application of those provisions to other 
persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby. 
The following codes and sections are referenced in the above section: 
California Health and Safety Code, Section 1345, subsection (f): 
(f) "Health care service plan" or "specialized health care service plan" means 
either of the following: 
(1) Any person who undertakes to arrange for the provision of health care 
services to subscribers or enrollees, or to pay for or to reimburse any part of the 
cost for those services, in return for a prepaid or periodic charge paid by or on 
behalf of the subscribers or enrollees. 
(2) Any person, whether located within or outside of this state, who solicits or 
contracts with a subscriber or enrollee in this state to pay for or reimburse any 
part of the cost of, or who undertakes to arrange or arranges for, the provision of 
health care services that are to be provided wholly or in part in a foreign country 
in return for a prepaid or periodic charge paid by or on behalf of the subscriber or 
enrollee. 
California Business and Professions Code, Section 6146: 
(2) "Health care provider" means any person licensed or certified pursuant to 
Division 2 (commencing with Section 500), or licensed pursuant to the 
Osteopathic Initiative Act, or the Chiropractic Initiative Act, or licensed pursuant to 
Chapter 2.5 (commencing with Section 1440) of Division 2 of the Health and 
Safety Code; and any clinic, health dispensary, or health facility, licensed 
pursuant to Division 2 (commencing with Section 1200) of the Health and Safety 
Code. "Health care provider" includes the legal representatives of a health care 
provider. 
California Civil Code, Sections 3333.1-3333.2 
3333.1. (c) For the purposes of this section: "Health care provider" means any 
person licensed or certified pursuant to Division 2 (commencing with Section 500) 
of the Business and Professions Code, or licensed pursuant to the Osteopathic 
Initiative Act, or the Chiropractic Initiative Act, or licensed pursuant to Chapter 2.5 
(commencing with Section 1440) of Division 2 of the Health and Safety Code; and 
any clinic, health dispensary, or health facility, licensed pursuant to Division 2 
(commencing with Section 1200) of the Health and Safety Code. "Health care 
provider" includes the legal representatives of a health care provider; (1) 
"Professional negligence" means a negligent act or omission to act by a health 
care provider in the rendering of professional services, which act or omission is 
the proximate cause of a personal injury or wrongful death, provided that such 
services are within the scope of services for which the provider is licensed and 
which are not within any restriction imposed by the licensing agency or licensed 
hospital. 
3333.2. (a) In any action for injury against a health care provider based on 
professional negligence, the injured plaintiff shall be entitled to recover 
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noneconomic losses to compensate for pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical 
impairment, disfigurement and other nonpecuniary damage. (b) In no action shall 
the amount of damages for noneconomic losses exceed two hundred fifty 
thousand dollars ($250,000). (c) For the purposes of this section: (1) "Health care 
provider" means any person licensed or certified pursuant to Division 2 
(commencing with Section 500) of the Business and Professions Code, or 
licensed pursuant to the Osteopathic Initiative Act, or the Chiropractic Initiative 
Act, or licensed pursuant to Chapter 2.5 (commencing with Section 1440) of 
Division 2 of the Health and Safety Code; and any clinic, health dispensary, or 
health facility, licensed pursuant to Division 2 (commencing with Section 1200) of 
the Health and Safety Code. "Health care provider" includes the legal 
representatives of a health care provider; (2) "Professional negligence" means a 
negligent act or omission to act by a health care provider in the rendering of 
professional services, which act or omission is the proximate cause of a personal 
injury or wrongful death, provided that such services are within the scope of 
services for which the provider is licensed and which are not within any restriction 
imposed by the licensing agency or licensed hospital. 
California Code of Civil Procedure Sections 340.5, 364, 667.7, and 1295: 
For the purposes of this section: (1) "Health care provider" means any person 
licensed or certified pursuant to Division 2 (commencing with Section 500) of the 
Business and Professions Code, or licensed pursuant to the Osteopathic Initiative 
Act, or the Chiropractic Initiative Act, or licensed pursuant to Chapter 2.5 
(commencing with Section 1440) of Division 2 of the Health and Safety Code; and 
any clinic, health dispensary, or health facility, licensed pursuant to Division 2 
(commencing with Section 1200) of the Health and Safety Code. "Health care 
provider" includes the legal representatives of a health care provider; (2) 
"Professional negligence" means a negligent act or omission to act by a health 
care provider in the rendering of professional services, which act or omission is 
the proximate cause of a personal injury or wrongful death, provided that such 
services are within the scope of services for which the provider is licensed and 
which are not within any restriction imposed by the licensing agency or licensed 
hospital. 
California Code of Civil Procedure Section 415.13 
415.13. (b) For the purposes of this section, "health care provider" means any 
person licensed or certified pursuant to Division 2 (commencing with Section 500) 
of the Business and Professions Code, or licensed pursuant to the OsteopathiC 
Initiative Act, or the Chiropractic Initiative Act, or licensed pursuant to Chapter 2.5 
(commencing with Section 1440) of Division 2 of the Health and Safety Code; and 
any clinic, health dispensary, or health facility, licensed pursuant to Division 2 
(commencing with Section 1200) of the Health and Safety Code. "Health care 
provider" includes the legal representatives of a health care provider. 
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ORDER 
PER CURIAM. 
Jimmy Williams appeals his convictions 
of first-degree murder and armed criminal 
action, for which he was sentenced to life 
imprisonment without the possibility of 
probation or parole and a consecutive 
term of life imprisonment. Williams con-
tends that the court erred in admitting 
prejudicial evidence at trial and in failing 
to ensure that Williams agreed with his 
counsel's decision that he not testify. We 
afflrm. Rule 30.25(b). 
2 
Clarence COOK, et aI., Respondents, 
v. 
Joseph NEWMAN, M.D., 
et al., Appellants, 
Alan Buchele M.D. and Alan Buchele 
M.D., P.C., Defendants. 
No. WD 62634. 
Missouri Court of Appeals, 
Western District, 
En Banc. 
July 27, 2004. 
Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to 
Supreme Court Denied Aug. 31, 2004. 
Application for Transfer Denied 
Sept. 28, 2004. 
Background: Patient's relatives brought 
medical malpractice action against doctors 
and medical clinic. The Circuit Court, 
Jackson County, Justine Elisa Del Muro, 
J., entered judgment on jury verdicts in 
favor of relatives, and doctors and clinic 
appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Robert 
G. Ulrich, J., held that: 
(1) even though patient's surviving hus-
band and two children were entitled to 
recover damages for her wrongful 
death, together they were considered 
one "plaintiff' within meaning of stat-
ute providing that, in any action 
against a health care provider for dam-
ages for personal injury or death aris-
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failure to render health care services, 
no "plaintiff' shall recover more than 
three hundred fifty thousand dollars 
per occurrence for noneconomic dam-
ages from anyone defendant; 
(2) there were two "occurrences" within 
meaning of statute, and these two oc-
currences were the separate and dis-
tinct acts of negligence of the two doc-
tors; and 
(3) medical clinic and doctors each consti-
tuted a separate "defendant" within 
meaning of statute. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Appeal and Error e=>893(1) 
The interpretation of a statute is a 
question of law, and therefore, appellate 
review is de novo. 
2. Statutes e=>181(1), 188 
The primary rule in statutory con-
struction is to ascertain the intent of the 
legislature from the language used, to give 
effect to that intent if possible, and to 
consider the words in their plain and ordi-
nary meaning. 
3. Statutes e=>190 
When the legislative intent cannot be 
ascertained from the language of the stat-
ute, by giving it its plain and ordinary 
meaning, the statute is considered ambigu-
ous. 
4. Statutes e=>190 
"Ambiguity," in context of statutory 
interpretation, means duplicity, indistinct-
ness or uncertainty of meaning of an ex-
pression. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
5. Statutes e=>190 
The issue is not whether a particular 
word in a statute, considered in isolation, 
is ambiguous, but, rather, whether the 
statute itself is ambiguous. 
6. Statutes e=>208 
The meaning of a particular word 
must be considered in the context of the 
entire statute in which it appears. 
7. Statutes e=>190 
Only when a statute is ambiguous can 
the rules of statutory construction be ap-
plied. 
8. Statutes e=>181(1) 
In construing an ambiguous statute, 
the ultimate guide is the intent of the 
legislature. 
9. Health e=>834(2) 
Even though patient's surviving hus-
band and two children were entitled to 
recover damages for her wrongful death, 
together they were considered one "plain-
tiff' within meaning of statute providing 
that, in any action against a health care 
provider for damages for personal injury 
or death arising out of the rendering of or 
the failure to render health care services, 
no "plaintiff' shall recover more than three 
hundred fifty thousand dollars per occur-
rence for noneconomic damages from any 
one defendant. V.A.M.S. § 538.210. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
10. Statutes e=>184, 214, 215, 217.1 
Only when a statute's language is am-
biguous or uncertain or if its plain meaning 
would lead to an illogical result will extrin-
sic matters, such as the statute's history, 
surrounding circumstances and objectives 
to be accomplished through the statute, be 
considered. 
11. Health e=>834(l) 
With the enactment of statute direct-
ing that no medical malpractice plaintiff 
shall recover more than a limited amount 
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per occurrence for noneconomic damages, 
the legislature intended to impose a specif-
ic limitation on tort claims against health 
care providers to temper the high cost of 
health care. V.A.M.S. § 538.210. 
12. Statutes e=>212.1 
A presumption exists that the legisla-
ture acts with the knowledge of statutes 
involving similar or related subject mat-
ters. 
13. Statutes e=>212.1 
Presumably, legislature is aware of 
the state of the law at the time it enacts a 
statute. 
14. Health e=>834(2) 
There were two "occurrences" within 
meaning of statute providing that, in any 
action against health care provider for 
damages for personal injury or death aris-
ing out of rendering of or failure to render 
health care services, no plaintiff shall re-
cover more than three hundred frfty thou-
sand dollars per "occurrence" for noneco-
nomic damages from anyone defendant, 
and these two occurrences were the sepa-
rate and distinct acts of negligence of the 
two doctors; each act was independent act 
of negligence committed by each doctor 
that contributed to cause patient's death, 
and each doctor was a defendant within 
meaning of statute. V.A.M.S. § 538.210. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
15. Statutes e=>212.6 
When the legislature enacts a statute 
referring to terms that have had other 
judicial or legislative meanings attached to 
them, a presumption exists that it acts 
with knowledge of that judicial or legisla-
tive action. 
16. Damages e=>212 
The term "occurrence," as used in in-
struction for personal and property dam-
ages, refers to the defendant's wrongful 
act. MAl No. 4.01. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
17. Health e=>834(2) 
Medical clinic and doctors each consti-
tuted a separate "defendant" within mean-
ing of statute providing that, in any action 
against a health care provider for damages 
for personal injury or death arising out of 
the rendering of or the failure to render 
health care services, no plaintiff shall re-
cover more than three hundred fIfty thou-
sand dollars per occurrence for noneco-
nomic damages from anyone defendant; 
legislature did not intend for health care 
provider to include its employed physicians 
for purposes of defIning "defendant" under 
noneconomic damages cap statute. 
V.A.M.S. § 538.210. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
18. Statutes e=>208 
One rule of statutory construction is 
that the provisions of a statute are not 
read in isolation but construed together, 
and if reasonably possible, the provisions 
are harmonized with each other. 
19. Statutes e=>212.6 
Presumably, a word has the same 
meaning in every place used within a stat-
ute. 
20. Statutes e=>212.6 
When different terms are used in dif-
ferent subsections of a statute, presum-
ably, the legislature intended the terms to 
have different meaning and effect. 
21. Statutes e=>212.6 
Presumably, the legislature intends 
that every word, clause, sentence, and pro-
vision of a statute have effect. 
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22. Statutes e=:>212.6 
A presumption exists that the legisla-
ture does not insert idle verbiage or super-
fluous language in statute. 
23. Health e=:>834(1) 
Legislature did not intend the term 
"employees" to include physicians as that 
term was used in statute limiting noneco-
nomic damages recoverable in tort action 
against defendant based on improper 
health care and defining "defendant" as 
any other health care provider having the 
legal capacity to sue and be sued and who 
is not included in other subdivisions, in-
cluding "employees" of any health care 
providers who are insured under the 
health care provider's professional liability 
insurance policy; in other words, legisla-
ture did not intend for health care provid-
er to include its employed physicians for 
purposes of defining "defendant" under 
noneconomic damages cap statute. 
V.A.M.S. § 538.210, subd. 2. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
24. Health e=:>834(2) 
Applicable noneconomic damages cap 
amount in medical malpractice case was 
$547,000, which was the cap amount in 
effect at time of trial; noneconomic dam-
ages cap statute was not amended between 
time of negligent acts that caused patient's 
death and time of trial, statute provided 
cap on noneconomic damages in malprac-
tice action and for yearly increase or de-
crease in cap amount in accordance with 
economic index, malpractice cause of ac-
tion arose after enactment of statute, and 
thus, in sense that legislature did not enact 
a statute during life of this cause of action, 
constitutional article providing that no ex 
post facto law nor law impairing obli-
gations of contracts nor retrospective in its 
operation shall be enacted was inapplica-
ble. V.A.M.S. Const. Art. 1, § 13; 
V.A.M.S. § 538.210. 
25. Constitutional Law e=:>188 
The underlying repugnance to the ret-
rospective application of laws is that an act 
or transaction, to which certain legal ef-
fects were ascribed at the time they tran-
spired, should not, without cogent reasons, 
thereafter be subject to a different set of 
effects which alter the rights and liabilities 
of the parties thereto. 
26. Statutes e=:>265 
Statutory provisions that are substan-
tive are generally presumed to operate 
prospectively unless the legislative intent 
that they be given retroactive operation 
clearly appears from the express language 
of the act or by necessary or unavoidable 
implication, and "substantive law" creates, 
defines and regulates rights. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
27. Statutes e=:>264, 267(1) 
Statutory provisions that are remedial 
or procedural operate retrospectively un-
less the legislature expressly states other-
wise, and "procedural law" prescribes a 
method of enforcing rights or obtaining 
redress for their invasion. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
28. Statutes e=:>265, 267(1) 
The distinction between substantive 
law and procedural law is that substantive 
law relates to the rights and duties giving 
rise to the cause of action, while procedur-
al law is the machinery used for carrying 
on the suit, for purposes of principle that 
substantive statutory provisions operate 
prospectively and procedural provisions 
operate retrospectively. 
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29. Statutes e:::>263 
When determining whether statute 
applies retrospectively, it is not sufficient 
merely to label certain consequences as 
substantive and others as procedural; no-
tions of justice and fair play in a particular 
case are always germane. 
30. Health e:::>834(1) 
Statutory noneconomic damages cap 
for actions against a health care provider 
was enacted to maintain the integrity of 
health care for all Missourians by limiting 
the liability of health care providers for 
noneconomic damages caused by their acts 
of medical malpractice. V.A.M.S. 
§ 538.210. 
Charles H. Stitt, Kansas City, MO, for 
Appellant. 
Michelle Boehm O'Neal, Joplin, MO, for 
Respondents. 
Before JOSEPH M. ELLIS, C.J., 
HAROLD L. LOWENSTEIN, ROBERT 
G. ULRICH, PAUL M. SPINDEN, 
JAMES M. SMART, JR., EDWIN H. 
SMITH, VICTOR HOWARD, THOMAS 
H. NEWTON, RONALD R. HOLLIGER, 
LISA WHITE HARDWICK, JJ., and 
WILLIAM E. TURNAGE, SR. J. 
ROBERT G. ULRICH, Judge. 
Joseph Newman, M.D., Walter Dan-
dridge, Jr., M.D., and Joplin Surgical As-
sociates, Inc. ("JSA")(collectively "Appel-
lants") appeal the trial court's amended 
judgment entered upon jury verdict in fa-
vor of Clarence Cook, Clarence Cook, Jr., 
1. All statutory references are to RSMo 2000 
unless otherwise indicated. 
2. Respondents also sued Alan Buchele, M.D. 
and Alan BucheIe, M.D., P.C. The jury ren-
and Eugenia White (collectively "Respon-
dents") in the amount of $7,281,886.30 in 
this medical malpractice action. This ap-
peal involves section 538.210,1 which limits 
the recovery for noneconomic damages 
from a defendant ("cap"). Appellants 
claim that the trial court erred in calculat-
ing the number of statutory caps on non-
economic damages to be applied in the 
case. Appellants also claim that the trial 
court erred in applying the cap amount in 
effect at the time of trial rather than the 
cap amount in effect at the time of the 
occurrence. The judgment of the trial 
court is reversed, and the case is remand-
ed with directions. 
Facts 
In July 2000, Respondents filed this 
medical malpractice action against Appel-
lants for the wrongful death of Ruth Cook, 
their spouse and mother. They alleged 
that Ms. Cook underwent a laparoscopic 
cholecystectomy on April 6, 1998, and that 
as a result of Dr. Newman's and Dr. Dan-
dridge's negligent care of her, she devel-
oped symptoms of peritonitis and died on 
June 17, 1998.2 
The verdict director against Dr. New-
man and JSA directed the jury to find for 
Respondents if it believed: 
First, either: 
defendant Joseph Newman, M.D. in-
jured Ruth Cook's duodenum while 
performing a laparoscopic cholecystec-
tomy on April 6, 1998, or, 
defendant Joseph Newman, M.D. 
failed to inspect and test for injury to 
Ruth Cook's duodenum during the la-
paroscopic cholecystectomy on April 6, 
1998, or, 
dered a verdict in favor of these defendants, 
and judgment was entered in their behalf; 
therefore, they are not parties to this appeal. 
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defendant Joseph Newman, M.D. 
failed to timely repair Ruth Cook's 
duodenum after the laparoscopic cho-
lecystectomy on April 6, 1998, or 
defendant Joseph Newman, M.D. 
failed to adequately repair Ruth 
Cook's duodenum during the surgery 
performed on April 7, 1998, or 
defendant Joseph Newman, M.D. 
failed to order diagnostic testing to 
determine the adequacy of the April 7, 
1998 repair, or, 
defendant Joseph Newman, M.D. 
failed to reoperate on Ruth Cook after 
April 7, 1998. 
Furthermore, to return a verdict for Re-
spondents, the jury was required to find 
that Dr. Newman was negligent in anyone 
or more of the respects submitted and that 
such negligence directly caused or directly 
contributed to cause the death of Ruth 
Cook. 
The verdict director against Dr. Dan-
dridge and JSA directed the jury to fmd 
for Respondents if it believed: 
First, defendant Walter C. Dandridge, 
M.D. failed to test or reoperate or rec-
ommend reoperation or testing to deter-
mine the adequacy of the April 7, 1998 
repair on April 16th, or April 25th, or 
April 26th, or May 14th, or May 15th, or 
June 2nd, or June 9th, or June 14th, 
1998, when he provided care to Ruth 
Cook. 
Furthermore, to return a verdict for Re-
spondents, the jury was required to find 
that Dr. Dandridge was negligent in any 
one or more of the respects submitted and 
that such negligence directly caused or 
directly contributed to cause the death of 
Ruth Cook. 
The jury returned verdicts in favor of 
Respondents on the claim against Dr. 
Newman and JSA and on the claim against 
Dr. Dandridge and JSA. It awarded Re-
spondents past economic damages in the 
amount of $717,886.31 and past and future 
noneconomic damages in the amount of 
$7,282,113.69 for total damages in the 
amount of $8,000,000. The trial court en-
tered judgment in favor of Respondents in 
accordance with the jury's verdict. 
Thereafter, Appellants filed their motion 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
or, in the alternative, for new trial or, in 
the alternative, to modify the judgment. 
In their post-trial motion, Appellants con-
tended, in pertinent part, that the judg-
ment amount should be reduced to 
$1,230,886.31 to reflect the sum of the eco-
nomic damages assessed by the jury to-
gether with one cap amount for noneco-
nomic damages pursuant to section 
538.210. They argued that the appropri-
ate maximum awarded for noneconomic 
damages should be calculated on the basis 
that the three persons joining in the 
wrongful death action constitute one plain-
tiff; only one occurrence was determined 
by the jury, that being the death of Ruth 
Cook; Dr. Newman, Dr. Dandridge, and 
JSA constitute one defendant as the term 
"defendant" is defined in section 538.210; 
and the applicable cap amount for events 
that occurred in 1998 is $513,000. Appel-
lants attached to their post-trial motion an 
affidavit of Dr. Newman stating that at all 
times referenced in the petition, JSA was a 
Missouri corporation; at all such times, 
JSA was engaged in the business of pro-
viding health care services, by and through 
licensed medical practitioners (including 
Dr. Newman and Dr. Dandridge); at all 
times from April 6, 1998, Dr. Newman and 
Dr. Dandridge were employed by JSA; 
and at all times from April 6, 1998, Dr. 
Newman and Dr. Dandridge were insured 
under a professional liability insurance pol-
icy issued to JSA. 
Following a hearing on the post-trial 
motion, the trial court entered an order 
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declaring that each of the three persons 
joining in the wrongful death action consti-
tute a plaintiff as that term is used in 
section 538.210; cap amounts shall be 
avvarded for hvo occurrences because the 
jury returned verdicts against Dr. Nevv-
man and JSA and against Dr. Dandridge 
and JSA for separate and distinct acts of 
negligence; JSA, Dr. Nevvrnan, and Dr. 
Dandridge constitute separate defendants 
under section 538.210; and the applicable 
cap amount is $547,000, the amount in 
effect at the time of the verdict, vvhich vvas 
greater than the cap amount at the time of 
the occurrences for vvhich suit vvas filed. 
The court, therefore, concluded that Re-
spondents shall collect noneconomic dam-
ages equal to tvvelve cap amounts. The 
same day, the trial court entered its 
amended judgment reducing noneconomic 
damages to $6,564,000 for total damages in 
the amount of $7,281,886.30. It also allo-
cated the proceeds of the judgment after 
attorneys' fees and expenses at 50% to 
Clarence Cook, 25% to Clarence Cook, Jr., 
and 25% to Eugenia White. This appeal 
by Drs. Nevvrnan and Dandridge and JSA 
follovved. 
Standard of Revievv 
[1-8] Appellants' appeal asserts that 
the trial court misinterpreted and misap-
plied section 538.210. The interpretation 
of a statute is a question of lavv; therefore, 
appellate revievv is de novo. Knob Noster 
Educ. v. Knob Noster R-VIII Sch. Dist., 
101 S.W.3d 356, 360 (Mo.App. W.D.2003). 
The primary rule in statutory construction 
is to ascertain the intent of the legislature 
from the language used, to give effect to 
that intent if possible, and to consider the 
vvords in their plain and ordinary meaning. 
Landman v. Ice Cream Specialties, Inc., 
107 S.W.3d 240, 251 (Mo. banc 2003), over-
ruled on other grounds by Hampton v. Big 
3. Appellants' points are not addressed in the 
Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220 (Mo. 
banc 2003). When the legislative intent 
cannot be ascertained from the language of 
the statute, by giving it its plain and ordi-
nary meaning, the statute is considered 
ambiguous. Stotts v. Progressive Classic 
Ins. Co., 118 S.W.3d 655, 664 (Mo.App. 
W.D.2003)(quoting Ozark Wholesale Bev-
erage Co. v. Supervisor of Liquor Control, 
80 S.W.3d 491, 497 (Mo.App. W.D.2002». 
Ambiguity means "duplicity, indistinctness 
or uncertainty of meaning of an expres-
sion." J.B. Vending Co. v. Dir. of Reve-
nue, 54 S.W.3d 183, 188 (Mo. banc 
2001)(quoting Lehr v. Collier, 909 S.W.2d 
717, 721 (Mo.App. S.D.1995». "The issue 
is not vvhether a particular vvord in a stat-
ute, considered in isolation, is ambiguous, 
but vvhether the statute itself is ambigu-
ous." Id. at 187. Thus, the meaning of a 
particular vvord must be considered in the 
context of the entire statute in which it 
appears. Id. Only when a statute is am-
biguous can the rules of statutory con-
struction be applied. Stotts, 118 S.W.3d at 
664 (quoting Ozark Wholesale Beverage, 80 
S.W.3d at 497). "In construing an ambigu-
ous statute, the ultimate guide is the intent 
of the legislature." Long v. Interstate 
Ready-Mix, L.L.C., 83 S.W.3d 571, 577 
(Mo.App. W.D.2002)(quoting Lincoln In-
dus., Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 51 S.W.3d 
462, 465 (Mo. banc 2001». 
Plaintiffs 
[9] In the flrst point addressed in this 
appeal,3 Appellants claim that the trial 
court erred in determining that Clarence 
Cook, Clarence Cook, Jr., and Eugenia 
White each constitute a plaintiff for pur-
poses of applying the statutory cap for 
noneconomic damages under section 
538.210. They contend that all the wrong-
ful death claim beneflciaries constitute a 
order presented in their brief. 
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single plaintiff within the meaning of sec-
tion 538.210. 
Section 538.210.1 provides: 
In any action against a health care pro-
vider for damages for personal injury or 
death arising out of the rendering of or 
the failure to render health care ser-
vices, no plaintiff shall recover more 
than three hundred frfty thousand dol-
lars per occurrence for noneconomic 
damages from anyone defendant as de-
fendant is defined in subsection 2 of this 
section. 
Chapter 538 does not, however, define the 
term "plaintiff." Respondents argue that 
the term should, therefore, be construed 
according to its plain and ordinary mean-
ing citing Wright v. Barr, 62 S.W.3d 509, 
536 (Mo.App. W.D.2001). 
In Wright, Virginia Wright filed a medi-
cal malpractice action against a physician 
and his cardiology practice after the physi-
cian's alleged negligent treatment of her 
atrial fibrillation causing her to suffer a 
stroke. Id. at 515. Her husband sued for 
loss of consortium. Id. The jury returned 
a verdict in favor of the Wrights. Id. at 
523. One issue on appeal was the number 
of plaintiffs for purposes of the statutory 
noneconomic damages cap, section 538.210. 
The physician and cardiology practice 
urged that because Mr. Wright's consor-
tium claim was derivative of Mrs. Wright's 
claim, the Wrights collectively constituted 
one plaintiff under section 538.210. Id. at 
535. 
This court found that the term "plain-
tiff' was unambiguous, meaning a person 
who brings a lawsuit or a party who com-
plains or sues in a civil action; therefore, 
looking for the definition of "plaintiff' be-
yond the plain and ordinary meaning of 
the statute was unnecessary. Id. at 536. 
Because Mr. Wright's claim of loss of con-
sortium was a separate' personal injury 
claim from his wife's negligence claim, this 
court found that Mr. Wright was a second 
plaintiff. Id. at 537. This case, however, 
is distinguishable from Wright. Unlike 
Wright, the underlying action in this case 
is a wrongful death action. Under the 
wrongful death statute, the surviving 
spouse, children, parents, or others named 
in the statute may sue for damages for the 
wrongful death of the decedent. 
§ 537.080.1. Only one action, however, may 
be brought under section 537.080 against 
anyone defendant for the death of anyone 
person. § 537.080.2. Thus, the term "plain-
tiff' in section 538.210 is ambiguous when 
considered in the context of a wrongful 
death action. 
[10, 11] Only when a statute's language 
is ambiguous or uncertain or if its plain 
meaning would lead to an illogical result 
will extrinsic matters, such as the statute's 
history, surrounding circumstances and 
objectives to be accomplished through the 
statute, be considered. Riordan v. Clark, 
67 S.W.3d 610, 613 (Mo.App. 
W.D.2001)(quoting Riordan v. Clark, 8 
S.W.3d 182, 184 (Mo.App. W.D.1999»; 
Wright, 62 S.W.3d at 536. Accordingly, 
the legislature's intent in adopting section 
538.210 is considered. The Supreme 
Court held in Mahoney v. Doerhoff Surgi-
cal Services, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 503, 507 (Mo. 
banc 1991), that Chapter 538 is "a legisla-
tive response to the public concern over 
the increased cost of health care and the 
continued integrity of that system of es-
sential services." With the enactment of 
section 538.210, which directs that "no 
plaintiff shall recover more than" a limited 
amount per occurrence for noneconomic 
damages, the legislature intended to im-
pose a specific limitation on tort claims 
against health care providers to temper 
the high cost of health care. Burns v. Elk 
River Ambulance, Inc., 55 S.W.3d 466, 486 
(Mo.App. S.D.200l). 
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[12, 13] Additionally, a presumption 
exists that the legislature acts with the 
knowledge of statutes involving similar or 
related subject matters. I d. Presumably, 
it is also aware of the state of the law at 
the time it enacts a statute. Id. At the 
time Chapter 538 was enacted, the wrong-
ful death statute identified those persons 
entitled to sue and recover damages for a 
wrongful death, namely the surviving 
spouse, children, parents, or others named 
in the statute. § 537.080.1. It provided, 
however, that "[o]nly one action may be 
brought under this section against anyone 
defendant for the death of anyone per-
son." § 537.080.2. Thus, the wrongful 
death statute provided that anyone plain-
tiff could settle the claim for damages or 
maintain such suit and recover such dam-
ages without joinder therein by any other 
person entitled to recover damages, 
§ 537.095.1, and that a recovery by any 
one plaintiff shall be apportioned by the 
court according to the laws of descent or in 
proportion to the losses suffered by each 
person entitled to share in the proceeds. 
§ 537.095.2. In interpreting these statutes, 
the Missouri Supreme Court has said, 
"The wrongful death statute creates but 
one indivisible cause of action which re-
mains the same whether enforceable by 
the surviving spouse, by the minor child or 
children, or by the others named in the 
statute." Nelms v. Bright, 299 S.W.2d 
483, 487 (Mo. banc 1957). Knowing that 
the wrongful death statute created an indi-
visible cause of action enforceable by one 
or more persons, the legislature chose not 
4. Appellants claim in another point on appeal 
that the trial court erred in failing to appor-
tion the jury's award of damages among the 
three plaintiffs before reducing the jury's 
award in accordance with the cap statute. 
They contend that because the trial court allo-
cated damages after it calculated the amount 
of noneconomic damages recoverable, the 
surviving children actually received a greater 
award, the amount of the statutory cap, than 
to increase the noneconomic damages cap 
where more than one person brings a 
wrongful death action. 
Such was the analysis in Burns v. Elk 
River Ambulance, Inc., 55 S.W.3d 466, 
486-87 (Mo.App. S.D.2001), where the 
Southern District applied one statutory 
cap for noneconomic damages even though 
two people were entitled to recover for the 
wrongful death of the decedent, his mother 
and father. After discussing the legisla-
ture's intent in adopting various provisions 
of Chapter 538 and the wrongful death 
statute and case law interpreting it, the 
Southern District explained: 
If Plaintiffs argument [that two caps 
should have been applied] is accepted, a 
widow could sue for her husband's death 
and recover a separate cap for herself 
and each of the couple's six children. 
This interpretation does not further the 
legislative goal of harnessing increasing 
health care costs nor does it square with 
the legislature's awareness of the appli-
cation of § 537.080 when chapter 538 
was enacted. 
Id. 
In this case, even though Ms. Cook's 
surviving husband and two children are 
entitled to recover damages for her wrong-
ful death, together they are considered one 
plaintiff for the purposes of section 
538.210. The point is granted.4 
Occurrences 
[14] In the second point addressed in 
this appeal, Appellants claim that the trial 
they were entitled to receive based on the 
court's allocation. Appellants' argument, 
however, is based on a finding that Ms. 
Cook's surviving husband and two children 
were each a plaintiff for purposes of section 
538.210. As discussed in this point, however, 
such determination by the trial court is re-
versed; therefore, this point need not be ad-
dressed. 
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court erred in determining that each of the 
separate and distinct acts of negligence of 
Dr. Newman and Dr. Dandridge found by 
the jury constituted a distinct actionable 
occurrence for purposes of section 538.210. 
Again, section 538.210.1 provides: 
In any action against a health care pro-
vider for damages for personal injury or 
death arising out of the rendering of or 
the failure to render health care ser-
vices, no plaintiff shall recover more 
than three hundred fifty thousand dol-
lars per occurrence for noneconomic 
damages from anyone defendant as de-
fendant is defined in subsection 2 of this 
section. (emphasis added). 
Appellants contend that the term "occur-
rence" refers to the injurious consequences 
of acts, i.e. the wrongful death of Ruth 
Cook, rather than the acts themselves; 
therefore, the noneconomic damages maxi-
mum should have been calculated on the 
basis of a single occurrence. 
The term "occurrence" as used in sec-
tion 538.210.1 is not defined. And the 
meaning of "occurrence" as used in section 
538.210.1 is not clear and unambiguous. 
Scott v. SSM H ealthcare St. Louis, 70 
S.W.3d 560, 570 (Mo.App. E.D.2002). The 
term could plausibly be interpreted as ei-
ther the harm plaintiff has sustained or 
the act of medical negligence causing that 
harm. I d. The statutory meaning must, 
therefore, be construed with the aid of 
rules of construction. [d. 
Appellant's contention that the term "oc-
currence" refers to the injurious conse-
quences of acts was expressly rejected in 
Scott v. SSM Healthcare St. Louis, 70 
S.W.3d 560 (Mo.App. E.D.2002). In Scott, 
plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action 
against a hospital asserting vicarious liabil-
ity based on the conduct of two of its 
physicians for injuries suffered when a 
sinus infection was misdiagnosed and 
spread to his brain. [d. at 563. In partic-
ular, plaintiff alleged that one physician 
misread a CT scan and the other physician 
failed to instruct plaintiff to return to the 
hospital emergency room after being dis-
charged. [d. After a jury verdict in favor 
of plaintiff, the defendant hospital argued 
that under section 538.210, a single statu-
tory cap on noneconomic damages applied. 
Id. at 564. The trial court, however, re-
jected the hospital's argument determining 
that two statutory noneconomic damage 
caps applied in the case because "there 
were two separate occurrences of malprac-
tice in the instant case, each of which 
contributed to cause [plaintiffs] injuries 
.. , and each of which could support the 
application of a statutory damage cap." 
[d. 
On appeal, the trial court's application of 
two statutory caps was affirmed. [d. at 
571. The Eastern District interpreted the 
term "occurrence" as used in the context 
of section 538.210 as a singular wrongful 
act sued upon, not the receipt of injury by 
the plaintiff. [d. (citing Romero v. United 
States, 865 F.Supp. 585 (E.D.Mo.1994)). 
It explained that had the legislature in-
tended one damages cap to apply regard-
less of the number of occurrences of medi-
cal malpractice by a single defendant, "the 
clearest and most unambiguous way for 
the legislature to have expressed such an 
intent would have been to simply leave the 
words 'per occurrence' out of the statute 
entirely." [d. "If that had indeed been the 
legislative intent, then using the words 
'per occurrence' would amount to mere 
surplusage which added nothing at all to 
the intended statutory meaning." [d. Pre-
sumably, the legislature does not insert 
superfluous language in a statute. [d. 
[15, 16] An interpretation of the term 
"occurrence" as a wrongful act sued upon 
rather than a resulting injury or death is 
also consistent with other statutory law. 
When the legislature enacts a statute re-
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ferring to terms that have had other judi-
cial or legislative meanings attached to 
them, a presumption exists that it acts 
with knowledge of that judicial or legisla-
tive action. Leiser v. City of Wildwood, 59 
S.W.3d 597, 603 (Mo.App. E.D.2001). The 
medical malpractice statute of limitations, 
section 516.105, utilizes the term "occur-
rence" to describe the alleged negligent 
act upon which a suit can be brought. It 
provides that "[aJU actions against physi-
cians, hospitals '" for damages for mal-
practice, negligence, error or mistake re-
lated to health care shall be brought within 
two years from the date of occurrence of 
the act of neglect complained of .... " 
§ 516.105 (emphasis added). Similarly, 
Missouri's Wrongful Death Act contem-
plates the term "occurrence" to mean the 
wrongful act sued upon. Section 537.080.1 
provides, "Whenever the death of a person 
results from any act, conduct, occurrence, 
transaction, or circumstance which, if 
death had not ensued, would have entitled 
such person to recover damages in respect 
thereof, the person or party who, or the 
corporation which, would have been liable 
if death had not ensued shall be liable in 
an action for damages .... " (emphasis 
added). See also § 537.085 (In a wrongful 
death action, "the defendant may plead 
and prove as a defense any defense which 
the defendant would have had against the 
deceased in an action based upon the same 
act, conduct, occurrence, transaction, or 
circumstance which caused the death of the 
deceased . ... ")(emphasis added). Finally, 
an interpretation of the term "occurrence" 
as a wrongful act sued upon rather than a 
resulting injury or death is also consistent 
with MAl 4.01 and cases analyzing it. The 
instruction for personal and property dam-
ages provides, in pertinent part: 
If you find in favor of plaintiff, then you 
must award plaintiff such sum as you 
5. See verdict directors in Facts section above. 
believe will fairly and justly compensate 
plaintiff for any damages you believe 
plaintiff sustained as a direct result of 
the occurrence mentioned in the evi-
dence. 
MAl 4.01. The term "occurrence" in the 
instruction refers to the defendant's 
wrongful act. Smith v. Courter, 575 
S.W.2d 199, 204 (Mo.App.1978); Nelson v. 
R.H. Macy & Co., 434 S.W.2d 767, 774 
(Mo.App.1968). 
In this case, Respondents submitted 
separate verdict directors against Dr. 
Newman and JSA and Dr. Dandridge and 
JSA for each doctor's individual acts of 
negligence. The jury found in favor of 
Respondents on the claim against Dr. 
Newman and JSA and on the claim against 
Dr. Dandridge and JSA. Thereafter, the 
trial court applied two statutory caps for 
the two occurrences or acts of negligence 
found by the jury. 
Appellants argue that because the 
claimed negligent acts or omissions of the 
two physicians were submitted in the dis-
junctive and the trial court could not and 
did not make a finding as to which disjunc-
tive submission was actually true and be-
cause the verdict director for both doctors 
included an allegation that each doctor 
failed to test the adequacy of the April 7, 
1998, repair,5 the jury possibly found only 
one occurrence in the case. This argu-
ment, however, is meritless. First, even if 
the jury did find that each doctor negli-
gently failed to test the adequacy of the 
April 7, 1998, repair, each act was an 
independent act of negligence committed 
by each doctor that contributed to cause 
the death of Ms. Cook. Second, as dis-
cussed in the next point, each doctor was a 
defendant for purposes of section 538.210, 
The trial court, therefore, did not err in 
concluding that there were two occur-
3417 
COOK v. NEWMAN Mo. 891 
Cite as 142 S.W.3d 880 (Mo.App. W.D. 2004) 
rences in this case, the separate and dis-
tinct acts of negligence of Drs. Newman 
and Dandridge. The point is denied. 
Defendants 
[17] Appellants next claim that the tri-
al court erred in determining that Dr. 
Newman, Dr. Dandridge, and JSA each 
constitute a defendant for purposes of ap-
plying the noneconomic damages cap of 
section 538.210. Section 538.210.1 pro-
vides, in pertinent part, that no plaintiff 
shall recover more than a limited amount 
per occurrence for noneconomic damages 
"from anyone defendant as defendant is 
defined in subsection 2 of this section" 
Subsection 2 of section 538.210 defines 
"defendant" as: 
(1) A hospital as defmed in chapter 197, 
RSMo, and its employees and physi-
cian employees who are insured un-
der the hospitals professional liabili-
ty insurance policy or the hospital's 
self-insurance maintained for profes-
sionalliability purposes; 
(2) A physician, including his nonphysi-
cian employees who are insured 
under the physician's professional 
liability insurance or under the 
physician's self-insurance main-
tained for professional liability pur-
poses; 
(3) Any other health care provider hav-
ing the legal capacity to sue and be 
sued and who is not included in sub-
divisions (1) and (2) of this subsec-
tion, including employees of any 
health care providers who are in-
sured under the health care provid-
er's professional liability insurance 
policy or self-insurance maintained 
for professional liability purposes. 
The term "health care provider" is defined 
in section 538.205(4) as: 
[A]ny physician, hospital, health mainte-
nance organization, ambulatory surgical 
center, long-term care facility, dentist, 
registered or licensed practical nurse, 
optometrist, podiatrist, pharmacist, chi-
ropractor, professional physical thera-
pist, psychologist, physician-in-training, 
and any other person or entity that pro-
vides health care services under the au-
thority of a license or certificate. 
Appellants contend that the two physicians 
and the corporation constitute a single de-
fendant because, under paragraph 3 of sec-
tion 538.210.2, all physicians employed by a 
corporation that provides health care ser-
vices through such physicians and that in-
sures such physicians under its profession-
al liability insurance policy are included 
with such corporation as a single defen-
dant. The question, therefore, is whether 
physicians practicing their profession 
through another health care provider are 
included within the meaning of "employ-
ees" of a health care provider under sec-
tion 538.210.2(3). The meaning of the 
term "employees" as used in that para-
graph is not clear and unambiguous. Sec-
tion 538.210.2 and specifically paragraph 3 
of the statute could plausibly be interpret-
ed as defining a health care provider and 
the physicians employed by it either as one 
defendant or as separate defendants. 
Thus, resort to the rules of construction of 
a statute is necessary. Stotts, 118 S.W.3d 
at 664. 
[18-23] One rule of statutory con-
struction is that the provisions of a stat-
ute are not read in isolation but construed 
together, and if reasonably possible, the 
provisions are harmonized with each oth-
er. Bachtel v. Miller County Nursing 
Home Dist., 110 S.W.3d 799, 801 (Mo. 
banc 2003). Paragraph 1 of section 
538.210.2 includes as a defendant hospital 
its "employees and physician employees." 
Paragraph 3, however, includes as a de-
fendant any other health care provider 
not included in paragraphs 1 and 2 and its 
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"employees." Physicians are specifically 
included as a defined defendant in para-
graph 2 of the statute and the word "phy-
sicians" is omitted in paragraph 3. Pre-
sumably, a word has the same meaning in 
every place used within a statute. Wes-
ton Point Resort Condo. Owners' Ass'n, 
Inc. v. Floro, 796 S.W.2d 928, 930 (Mo. 
App. S.D.1990)(quoting A.M.G. v. Mo. 
Div. of Family Servs., 660 S.W.2d 370, 
372 (Mo.App. E.D.1983)). When different 
terms are used in different subsections of 
a statute, presumably, the legislature in-
tended the terms to have differ(1nt mean-
ing and effect. Landman, 107 S.W.3d at 
251-52. Accordingly, if the legislature in-
tended for a health care provider and its 
employed physicians to enjoy the same 
protection it provided to a hospital and its 
physician employees,S it could have ex-
pressly provided similar language. To 
construe the term "employees" in para-
graph 3 to include physicians as suggested 
by Appellants would render as superflu-
ous the use of the term "employees" in 
paragraph 1. The legislature's inclusion of 
paragraph 2 applicable to physicians, in-
cluding non physician employees,7 is fur-
ther reflective of its intent that physicians 
employed by a health care provider that is 
not a hospital be defmed as separate de-
fendants. If the legislature had intended 
for a health care provider to include its 
employed physicians for the purposes of 
defming a "defendant" under the noneco-
6. The term "physician employee" is defined 
in section 538.205, RSMo 2000, as "any per-
son or entity who works for hospitals for a 
salary or under contract and who is covered 
by a policy of insurance or self-insurance by a 
hospital for acts performed at the direction or 
under control of the hospital." Merely be-
cause the term "physician employee" is de-
fined to include not only physicians but enti-
ties who work for a hospital under a salary or 
contract does not negate the fact that the 
legislature did not intend the term "employ-
ees" to include physicians in section 
538.210.2(3). 
nomic damages cap statute, it could have 
omitted paragraph 2, without which, a 
physician would have fallen within para-
graph 3 as a health care provider. Pre-
sumably, the legislature intends that ev-
ery word, clause, sentence, and provision 
of a statute have effect. Landman, 107 
S.W.3d at 252. Conversely, a presump-
tion exists that the legislature does not 
insert idle verbiage or superfluous lan-
guage in the statute. Id. Thus, the legis-
lature did not intend the term "employ-
ees" in paragraph 3 of section 538.210.2 to 
include physicians. Thus, under para-
graphs 2 and 3 of the statute, JSA, Dr. 
Newman, and Dr. Dandridge each consti-
tute a separate defendant. The point is 
denied. 
Applicable Cap Amount 
[24] In their fmal point on appeal, Ap-
pellants claim that the trial court erred in 
applying the noneconomic damages cap in 
. effect at the time of trial rather than the 
cap in effect at the time of the occur-
rences. They assert that application of 
the cap amount in effect at the time of trial 
in 2002, $547,000, rather than that in effect 
at the time of the negligent acts in 1998, 
$513,000, imposed or ascribed new or dif-
ferent legal effects to such acts in violation 
of the constitutional proscription against 
retrospective laws. 
7. Appellants also argue that because the legis-
lature used the term "non physician employ-
ees" in paragraph 2, it did not intend to use 
the word "employees" in the other para· 
graphs of the statute to refer only to nonphy-
sician employees. The legislature's use of the 
term "nonphysician employees" in paragraph 
2, however, merely indicates its intent to ex-
clude from a defendant physician other physi-
cians who are employed by the defendant 
physician. The use of the term in paragraph 
2 is not inconsistent with interpretation of the 
term "employees" as not including physicians 
in paragraph 3. 
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As originally enacted in 1986, the non-
economic damages cap statute provided 
that no plaintiff in a medical malpractice 
action could recover more than $350,000 in 
noneconomic damages per occurrence from 
anyone defendant. § 538.210, RSMo 1986. 
A related statute enacted at the same time 
provides that this limitation applies "only 
to causes of action arising on or after 
February 3, 1986." § 538.235, RSMo 1986. 
The cap statute further provides that the 
limitation amount is to be increased or 
decreased every year in accordance with a 
specified economic index: 
The limitation on awards for noneco-
nomic damages provided for in this sec-
tion shall be increased or decreased on 
an annual basis effective January flrst of 
each year in accordance with the Implic-
it Price Deflator for Personal Consump-
tion Expenditures as published by the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis of the 
United States Department of Com-
merce. The current value of the limita-
tion shall be calculated by the director of 
the department of insurance, who shall 
furnish that value to the secretary of 
state, who shall publish such value in the 
Missouri Register as soon after each 
January flrst as practicable, but it shall 
otherwise be exempt from the provisions 
of section 536.021, RSMo. 
§ 538.210.4. 
[25] "The general rule of law is ex-
pressed as a reluctance of retroactive ap-
plication of newly enacted legislation." 
State Bd. of Registration for the Healing 
Arts v. Warren, 820 S.W.2d 564, 565 (Mo. 
App. W.D.1991)(citing State ex rel. St. 
Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Buder, 
515 S.W.2d 409, 411 (Mo. banc 1974». Ar-
ticle I, Section 13 of the Missouri Constitu-
tion provides that no ex post facto law, nor 
law impairing the obligations of contracts 
nor retrospective in its operation shall be 
enacted. Buder, 515 S.W.2d at 410. 
[T]he underlying repugnance to the ret-
rospective application of laws is that an 
act or transaction, to which certain legal 
effects were ascribed at the time they 
transpired, should not, without cogent 
reasons, thereafter be subject to a dif-
ferent set of effects which alter the 
rights and liabilities of the parties there-
to. 
Id. at 411. 
[26-29] "Under the rules of statutory 
construction, statutory provisions that are 
substantive 'are generally presumed to op-
erate prospectively unless the legislative 
intent that they be given retroactive oper-
ation clearly appears from the express 
language of the act or by necessary or un-
avoidable implication.''' Callahan v. Car-
dinal Glennon H osp., 863 S.W.2d 852, 872 
(Mo. banc 1993)(quoting Dep't. of'Soc. 
Servs. v. Villa Capri Homes, Inc., 684 
S.W.2d 327, 332 (Mo. banc 1985». Con-
versely, statutory provisions that are re-
medial or procedural operate retrospec-
tively unless the legislature expressly 
states otherwise. Id. Substantive law cre-
ates, defmes and regulates rights; proce-
dural law prescribes a method of enforcing 
rights or obtaining redress for their inva-
sion. Wilkes v. Mo. Highway & Transp. 
Comm'n, 762 S.W.2d 27, 28 (Mo. banc 
1988). The distinction between substan-
tive law and procedural law is that sub-
stantive law relates to the rights and 
duties giving rise to the cause of action, 
while procedural law is the machinery 
used for carrying on the suit. I d. Merely 
to label certain consequences as substan-
tive and others as procedural is not suffi-
cient; notions of justice and fair play in a 
particular case are always germane. Crof-
foot v. Max German, Inc., 857 S.W.2d 435, 
436 (Mo.App. E.D.1993)(citing Buder, 515 
S.W.2d at 411). 
Appellants cite two cases, State ex rel. 
St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co. v. 
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Buder, 515 S.W.2d 409 (Mo. banc 1974), 
and Stillwell v. Universal Construction 
Co., 922 S.W.2d 448 (Mo.App. W.D.1996), 
for the proposition that legislative change 
to a statutory ceiling on damages in a 
particular type of case is considered sub-
stantive and, therefore, cannot be applied 
retroactively. In Buder, the Missouri Su-
preme Court reviewed the application of a 
change in the statute that set a $50,000 
recovery limitation in wrongful death ac-
tions. 515 S.W.2d at 409-10. After the 
decedent's death but before trial, the limit 
was removed by the legislature. Id. The 
Court held that the limit in effect at the 
time of the accident still applied because 
the statutory limit had served to protect 
defendants from verdicts in excess of the 
limit. Id. at 411. 
In Stillwel~ the court reviewed an 
amended workers' compensation statute 
increasing the monetary limit of an em-
ployer's liability for burial expenses for 
work-related death. 922 S.W.2d at 455-56. 
The statutory maximum was increased by 
the legislature after the accident. I d. at 
455. This court denied retrospective ap-
plication of the statutory increase holding 
that the amendment of the statute affected 
the substantive rights of the employer be-
cause the employer possessed a vested 
right under the statute that its liability for 
burial expenses could not exceed a certain 
amount. Id. at 456. 
This case is distinguishable from Buder 
and Stillwell. First, the noneconomic 
damages cap statute was not amended be-
tween the time of the negligent acts that 
cause the death of Ms. Cook and the time 
of trial. Section 538.210 was enacted in 
1986 and has remained unchanged since. 
It provides a cap on noneconomic damages 
in a medical malpractice action and for a 
yearly increase or decrease in the cap 
amount in accordance with a specified eco-
nomic index. The legislature unambigu-
ously provided that the noneconomic dam-
ages cap statute only applied prospectively 
to causes of action arising on or after 
February 3, 1986. § 538.235. Respondents' 
cause of action arose in 1998 after the 
enactment of the cap statute. Thus, in the 
sense that the legislature did not enact a 
statute during the life of this cause of 
action, Article I, Section 13 of the Missouri 
Constitution is inapplicable in this case. 
[30] Additionally, the noneconomic 
damages cap statute was enacted to main-
tain the integrity of health care for all 
Missourians by limiting the liability of 
health care providers for noneconomic 
damages caused by their acts of medical 
malpractice. Adams By & Through 
Adams v. Children's Mercy Hosp., 832 
S.W.2d 898, 904 (Mo. banc 1992), cert. de-
nied, 506 U.S. 991, 113 S.Ct. 511, 121 
L.Ed.2d 446 (1992); Scott v. SSM Health-
care St. Louis, 70 S.W.3d 560, 570 (Mo. 
App. E.D.2002). While pursuing that pur-
pose, the legislature contemplated the ef-
fect of inflation on an award of noneconom-
ic damages in subsection 4 of the statute. 
Section 538.210.4 unambiguously expresses 
the legislative intent that a plaintiffs non-
economic damages award be protected 
from inflation. The practical effect of the 
subsection is that compensation received 
from injury incurred is not diminished 
from the time of the act of negligence to 
the time of trial, which may occur years 
later, by the impact of inflation. In that 
regard, the annual adjustment for inflation 
merely affects procedure or remedy. It 
neither defines or regulates a plaintiffs 
right to compensation nor imposes or as-
cribes new or different legal effects to a 
defendant's conduct in violation of the con-
stitutional proscription against retrospec-
tive laws. Thus, the applicable cap 
amount in this case is $547,000, the cap 
amount in effect at the time of trial. See 
Adams, 832 S.W.2d at 902 n. 4, 904; Scott, 
70 S.W.3d at 570 n. 10; Burns v. Elk River 
Ambulance, Inc., 55 S.W.3d 466, 485 (Mo. 
~4?1 
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App. S.D.2001)(where courts applied cap 
amounts in effect at time of trial). The 
point is denied. 
Conclusion 
The trial court erred in applying twelve 
statutory caps for noneconomic damages in 
this case. Instead, four noneconomic dam-
ages caps each in the amount of $547,000 
shall be awarded. For the occurrence of 
Dr. Newman's negligence, Respondents, as 
a single plaintiff, shall collect a statutory 
cap from Dr. Newman and a separate stat-
utory cap from JSA. For the occurrence of 
Dr. Dandridge's negligence, Respondents, 
as a single plaintiff, shall collect a statuto-
ry cap from Dr. Dandridge and a separate 
statutory cap from JSA. The judgment is, 
therefore, reversed, and the case is re-
manded to the trial court for entry of a 
judgment consistent with this opinion. 
All concur. 
Beverley J. BUMM, Trustee, Frank 
Bumm, Jr., Trustee, Betty J. Gray, 
Charles E. Gray and Sara Lee Hamil-
ton, Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
OLDE IVY DEVELOPMENT, LLC, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
No. 25734. 
Missouri Court of Appeals, 
Southern District, 
Division Two. 
July 29, 2004. 
Motion for Rehearing or Transfer to 
Supreme Court Denied Aug. 18, 2004. 
Application for Transfer Denied 
Sept. 28, 2004. 
Background: Trustees of revocable living 
trusts brought action against developer, 
seeking enforcement of two restrictive cov-
enants that allegedly prevented developer 
from dedicating lots for use as public resi-
dential street. The Circuit Court, Greene 
County, Henry W. Westbrooke, Jr., J., 
granted developer summary judgment. 
Trustees appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Jeffrey 
W. Bates, J., held that: 
(1) restrictive covenant regarding type of 
structures allowed did not prevent lot 
owner from using lot to build residen-
tial street, and 
(2) covenant preventing lot owner· from 
dedicating lot for use as street was 
invalid. 
Affirmed. 
1. Covenants e=>49 
Restrictions upon the use of real prop-
erty, being in derogation of the fee, are not 
favored and are strictly construed; doubts 
in connection therewith are resolved in 
favor of the free use of the property. 
2. Covenants e=>49 
Restrictive covenants will not be ex-
tended by implication to include anything 
not clearly expressed in them. 
3. Covenants e=>49 
A restrictive covenant is not open to 
judicial construction if it is unambiguous. 
4. Covenants e=>49 
Terms used in restrictive covenants 
should be applied in accordance with their 
plain, everyday or popular meaning; the 
language used in the entire instrument 
should be considered, however, and not 
just one clause. 
5. Covenants e=>49 
If restrictive covenants are ambigu-
ous, the Court of Appeals attempts to de-
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Missouri Revised Statutes 
Chapter 538 
Tort Actions Based on Improper Health Care 
Section 538.210 
August 28, 2008 
Limitation on noneconomic damages--jury not to be informed of limit--limit--punitive 
damages, requirements. 
538.210. 1. In any action against a health care provider for damages for personal injury or death arising out of the 
rendering of or the failure to render health care services, no plaintiff shall recover more than three hundred fifty 
thousand dollars for noneconomic damages irrespective of the number of defendants. 
2. (1) Such limitation shall also apply to any individual or entity, or their employees or agents that provide, refer, 
coordinate, consult upon, or arrange for the delivery of health care services to the plaintiff; and 
(2) Who is a defendant in a lawsuit brought against a health care provider under this chapter, or who is a 
defendant in any lawsuit that arises out of the rendering of or the failure to render health care services. 
(3) No individual or entity whose liability is limited by the provisions of this chapter shall be liable to any 
plaintiff based on the actions or omissions of any other entity or person who is not an employee of such 
individual or entity whose liability is limited by the provisions of this chapter. 
Such limitation shall apply to all claims for contribution. 
3. In any action against a health care provider for damages for personal injury or death arising out of the 
rendering of or the failure to render health care services, where the trier of fact is a jury, such jury shall not be 
instructed by the court with respect to the limitation on an award of noneconomic damages, nor shall counsel for 
any party or any person providing testimony during such proceeding in any way inform the jury or potential 
jurors of such limitation. 
4. For purposes of sections 538.205 to 538.230, any spouse claiming damages for loss of consortium of their 
spouse shall be considered to be the same plaintiff as their spouse. 
5. Any provision of law or court rule to the contrary notwithstanding, an award of punitive damages against a 
health care provider governed by the provisions of sections 538.205 to 538.230 shall be made only upon a 
showing by it plaintiff that the health care provider demonstrated willful, wanton or malicious misconduct with 
respect to his actions which are found to have injured or caused or contributed to cause the damages claimed in 
the petition. 
6. For purposes of sections 538.205 to 538.230, all individuals and entities asserting a claim for a wrongful death 
under section 537.080, RSMo, shall be considered to be one plaintiff. 
(L. 1986 S.B. 663 § 5, A.L. 2005 H.B. 393) 
CROSS REFERENCES: 
Applicability of statute changes to cases filed after August 28, 2005, RSMo 538.305 




Section 538-210 Limitation 'U""-'VUVL .. L'" damages--jury Page 2 of2 
(1992) Statute does not violate the equal protection, due process, nor does it deny plaintiffs a lawful remedy for a wrong done; it simply redefines the substantive 
law by limiting the amount of noneconomic damages plaintiffs can recover. Because statute is not applied until after the jury has completed its constitutional 
task, it does not infringe upon the right to ajury trial. Adams v. The Children's Mercy Hospital, 832 S. W.2d 898 (Mo. bane). 
(1992) Where question facing court is whether there are one or two caps on noneconomic damages, it depends on whether there are one or two defendants which 
turns on whether the doctor is insured as an employee of the hospital's malpractice insurance policy. If the doctor is insured as an employee under the hospital's 
policy, then there is one cap. Vincent v. Johnson, 833 S.W.2d 859 (Mo.banc). 
(2004) In wrongful death action, patient's surviving husband and two children are considered one "plaintiff' for purposes of applying statutory cap for 
noneconomic damages. Cook v. Newman, 142 S.W.3d 880 (Mo.App. W.D.). 
~ 
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Search Site 
LS!J Law Center's 
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St~tute of Limitations 
Missouri Laws On Wrongful Death and Survival 
537.080. Action for wrongful death--who may sue--limitation 
1. Whenever the death of a person results from any act, conduct, occurrence, transaction, or 
circumstance which, if death had not ensued, would have entitled such person to recover damages in 
respect thereof, the person or party who, or the corporation which, would have been liable if death had 
not ensued shall be liable in an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, 
which damages may be sued for: 
(1) By the spouse or children or the surviving lineal descendants of any deceased children, natural or 
adopted, legitimate or illegitimate, or by the father or mother of the deceased, natural or adoptive; 
(2) If there be no persons in class (1) entitled to bring the action, then by the brother or sister of the 
deceased, or their descendants, who can establish his or her right to those damages set out in section 
537.090 because of the death; 
(3) If there be no persons in class (1) or (2) entitled to bring the action, then by a plaintiff ad litem. Such 
plaintiff ad litem shall be appointed by the court having jurisdiction over the action for damages 
provided in this section upon application of some person entitled to share in the proceeds of such action. 
Such plaintiff ad litem shall be some suitable person competent to prosecute such action and whose 
appointment is requested on behalf of those persons entitled to share in the proceeds of such action. 
Such court may, in its discretion, require that such plaintiff ad litem give bond for the faithful 
performance of his duties. 
2. Only one action may be brought under this section against anyone defendant for the death of anyone 
person. 
537.090. Damages to be determined by jury--factors to be 
considered 
In every action brought under section 537.080, the trier ofthe facts may give to the party or parties 
entitled thereto such damages as the trier of the facts may deem fair and just for the death and loss thus 
occasioned, having regard to the pecuniary losses suffered by reason of the death, funeral expenses, and 
the reasonable value of the services, consortium, companionship, comfort, instruction, guidance, 
counsel, training, and support of which those on whose behalf suit may be brought have been deprived 
by reason of such death and without limiting such damages to those which would be sustained prior to 
attaining the age of majority by the deceased or by the person suffering any such loss. 
http://biotech.law.lsu.edulcases/soIlWrongful_ D3425 Survival.htm 615/2009 
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In addition, the trier of the facts may award such damages as the deceased may have suffered between 
the time of injury and the time of death and for the recovery of which the deceased might have 
maintained an action had death not ensued. The mitigating or aggravating circumstances attending the 
death may be considered by the trier of the facts, but damages for grief and bereavement by reason of 
the death shall not be recoverable. 
537.010. Action for damages to property to survive regardless of 
death of either party 
Actions for wrongs done to property or interests therein may be brought against the wrongdoer by the 
person whose property or interest therein is injured. If the person whose property or interest therein is 
injured is dead, the action survives and may be brought against the wrongdoer by the person appointed 
as fiduciary for the estate of the deceased person. If the wrongdoer is dead, the action also survives and 
may be brought and maintained in the manner set forth in section 537.021. Such actions shall be brought 
and maintained in the same manner and with like effect in all respects as actions founded upon contracts. 
537.020. Action for personal injury or death to survive regardless 
of death of either party 
1 . Causes of action for personal injuries, other than those resulting in death, whether such injuries be to 
the health or to the person of the injured party, shall not abate by reason of his death, nor by reason of 
the death of the person against whom such cause of action shall have accrued; but in case of the death of 
either or both such parties, such cause of action shall survive to the personal representative of such 
injured party, and against the person, receiver or corporation liable for such injuries and his legal 
representatives, and the liability and the measure of damages shall be the same as if such death or deaths 
had not occurred. Causes of action for death shall not abate by reason of the death of any party to any 
such cause of action, but shall survive to the personal representative of such party bringing such cause of 
action and against the person, receiver or corporation liable for such death and his or its legal 
representatives. 
2. The right of action for death or the right of action for personal injury that does not result in the death 
shall be sufficient to authorize and to require the appointment of a personal representative by the probate 
division of the circuit court upon the written application therefor by one or more of the beneficiaries of 
the deceased. The existence of the right of action for death or personal injury that does not result in 
death shall be sufficient to authorize and to require the appointment of a personal representative for the 
person liable for such death or injury by the court having probate jurisdiction upon his death upon the 
written application of any person interested in such right of action for death or injury. 
537.030. Section 537.010 not to extend to what action 
Sections 537.010 and 537.020 shall not extend to actions for slander, libel, assault and battery or false 
imprisonment. 
The Medical and Public Health Law Site 
The Best on the WWW Since 19951 
Copyright as to non-public domain materials 
See DR-KA TE. COM for hurricane and disaster preparation 
See WWWEPR-ART. COM for photography of Southern Louisiana and Hurricane Katrina 
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Missouri Revised Statutes 
Chapter 537 
Torts and Actions for Damages 
Section 537.095 
August 28, 2008 
Page 1 of2 
Joinder of parties not required, when, effect on recovery--plaintiff ad litem, recovery, 
distribution. 
537.095. 1. Except as provided in subsection 2 of this section, if two or more persons are entitled to sue for and 
recover damages as herein allowed, then anyone or more of them may compromise or settle the claim for 
damages with approval of any circuit court, or may maintain such suit and recover such damages without joinder 
therein by any other person, provided that the claimant or petitioner shall satisfY the court that he has diligently 
attempted to notifY all parties having a cause of action under section 537.080. Any settlement or recovery by suit 
shall be for the use and benefit of those who sue or join, or who are entitled to sue or join, and of whom the court 
has actual written notice. 
2. When any settlement is made, or recovery had, by any plaintiff ad litem, the persons entitled to share in the 
proceeds thereof shall be determined according to the laws of descent, and any settlement or recovery by such 
plaintiff ad litem shall likewise be distributed according to the laws of descent unless special circumstances 
indicate that such a distribution would be inequitable, in which case the court shall apportion the settlement or 
recovery in proportion to the losses suffered by each person or party entitled to share in the proceeds and, 
provided, that any person entitled to share in the proceeds shall have the right to intervene at any time before any 
judgment is entered or settlement approved under this section. 
3. In any action for damages under section 537.080, the trier ofthe facts shall state the total damages found, or 
upon the approval of any settlement for which a petition or application for such approval has been filed, the court 
shall state the total settlement approved. The court shall then enter a jUdgment as to such damages, apportioning 
them among those persons entitled thereto in proportion to the losses suffered by each as determined by the court. 
4. The court shall order the claimant: 
(1) To collect and receipt for the payment of the judgment; 
(2) To deduct and pay the expenses of recovery and collection of the judgment and the attorneys' fees as 
contracted, or if there is no contract, or if the party sharing in the proceeds has no attorney representing him 
before the rendition of any judgment or settlement, then the court may award the attorney who represents the 
original plaintiff such fee for his services, from such persons sharing in the proceeds, as the court deems fair and 
equitable under the circumstances; 
(3) To acknowledge satisfaction in whole or in part for the judgment and costs; 
(4) To distribute the net proceeds as ordered by the court; and 
(5) To report and account therefor to the court. In its discretion the court may require the claimant to give bond 
for the collection and distribution. 
(L. 1967 p. 663, A.L. 1979 S.B. 368) 
http://www.rnoga.rno.gov/statutes/C500-599/53~4~~·HTM 6/15/2009 
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Court would never intend such an absurd 
result. Therefore, Clark's waiver, estoppel 
and collateral estoppel defenses are ineffec-
tive against the RTC in this Rule 106(a)(5) 
proceeding. 
E. 
In summary, I hold that Clark is jointly 
and seyerally liable to the RTC for the full 
amount of the note's increase under the mod. 
iflcation agreement ($72,800.00), plus any in-
creased interest accruing on that amount, 
and one-third of the note ($129,067.00) plus 
interest attributable to that. amount as a 
result of Clark's assumption of that liability 
in the Agreement. 
IV. 
[17] The RTC also seeks to hold Clark 
personally liable for its attorneys' fees and 
costs incurred in bringing this Rule 106(a)(5) 
proceeding. In pertinent part, Rule 106(a)(5) 
provides that "such persons may be cited to 
show cause why they should not be bound by 
the Judgment ... ". (emphasis added). The 
RTC fails to cite any authority justifying 
expansion of this Rule. The plain language 
of the Rule limits RTC's relief to the original 
judgment which, in this case. does not in-
dude post-judgment attorneys' fees and 
costs. However, under Rule 106(a)(5), Clark 
is liable for $.38,000.00 in prejudgment attor-
neys' fees and costs which was included in 
the original judgment. 
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED THAT: 
1) Clark's Rummary judgment motions are 
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part; 
and, 
2) The RTC's summary judgment motion 
is GRAKTED to the extent that Clark is 
jointly and severally liable upon the Teem 
judgment for $38,000.00 in prejudgment at-
torneys' fees and costs, for one-third of the 
note in the amount of $129,067.00, plus at-
tributable interest on that amount, and for 
the note's increase under the modification 
agreement in the amount of $72,800.00, plus 
interest accruing on that amount; and, 
3) The parties shall meet "'ithin 10 days 
from the date of this order to prepare a 
stipulated form of judgment to enter in ac-
cordance ",rith the ,riews expressed in this 
opinion and order and if the parties are 
unable to so agree, they shall submit on or 
before K ovember 15, 1993 proposed judg-
ments and memoranda in support thereof. 
Loretta MITSON, Alegria Mitson-Salazar 
and Alyssa Mitson-8alazar, by and 
through their next friend Loretta Mit-
son, and Loretta Mitson as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Leandro 
Salazar, Plaintiffs, 
v. 
AG ENGINEERING AND DEVELOP-
MENT CO., INC., a Washington corpo-
ration, Deere and Company, a Delaware 
corporation, and Coaldale Iron Prod-
ucts, Ltd., an Alberta, Canada corpora-
tion, Defendants, 
Civ. A. No. 92-B-1376. 
United States District Court, 
D. Colorado. 
Nov. 1, 1993. 
Wife and daughters of farm accident 
victim sought recovery for noneconomic dam-
ages. The District Court, Babcock, J., held 
that, because Colorado's $250,000 statutory 
cap for noneconomic damages applied to 
wrongful death plaintiff on collective, and not 
individual, basis, victim's "'idow and daugh-
ters were limited to recovering $250,000 in 
noneconomic damages and could not recover 
$250,000 per person. . 
Motion to limit recovery granted. 
1. Death Q;;;:>7, 11 
Wrongful death actions, which did not 
exist at common law, are purely creatures of 
statute, and, thus, terms of recovery are 
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C.R.S.A. §* 12-21-203 et seq., 13-21-102.5, MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
13-21-203(1}. 
2. Statutes <!?223.2(.5) 
If two statutes concern same subject 
matter, court must read them together and 
reconcile them, if possible, so as to give effect 
to each. 
3. Statutes <!?181(1) 
If statute is silent as to particular issue, 
court looks to legislative intent when constru-
ing statute. 
4. Statutes <!?188 
For purposes of statutory construction, 
primary indicia of legislative intent is plain 
and ordinary meaning of language employed. 
5. Death ~96 
Colorado's $250,000 statutory cap for 
noneconomic damages applied to wrongful 
death plaintiff on collective, and not individu-
al, basil;. West's C.R.S.A. §§ 12-21-203 et 
seq., 13-21-102.5, 13-21-203(1). 
6. Death <!?96 
Because Colorado's $250,000 statutory 
cap for noneconomic damages applied to 
wrongful death plaintiff on collective, and not 
individual, basis. victim's widow and daugh-
ters were limited to recovering $250,000 in 
noneconomic damages and could not recover 
$250,000 per person. West's C.R.S.A. §§ 12-
21-203 et seq., 13-21-102.5, 13-21-203(1). 
7. Death <!?96 
Number of plaintiffs bringing wrongful 
death action does not increase statutory cap 
on noneconomic damages. West's C.R.SA 
§§ 12-21-203 et seq., 13-21-102.5, 13-21-
203(1). 
John Gehlhausen, John Gehlhausen, P.C., 
Lamar, CO, for plaintiffs. 
Michael S. Burg, Tom Van Buskirk, Burg 
& Eldredge, P.C., Denver, CO, for AG Engi-
neering. 
Charles L. Casteel, Davis, Graham & 
Stubbs, Denver, CO, for Deere and Co. 
Stan L. Spangler, Peggy A. Richter, Shaw, 
Spangler & Roth, P.C., Denver, CO, for Coal-
dale Iron Products, Ltd. 
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BABCOCK. District Judge. 
Defendants AG Engineering and Develop-
ment Co., and Deere and Company (collec-
tively AG) move to limit plaintiffs' Loretta 
Mitson, Alegria Mitson-Salazar and Alyssa 
Mitson-Salazar's (collectively Mitson Family) 
recovery for noneconomic damages to a total 
of $250,000.00. This motion has been ade-
quately bliefed and oral argument will not 
materially aid its resolution. For all the 
reasons stated below, AG's motion .... ill be 
granted. 
This is a wrongful death action brought 
pursuant to § 13-21-201, C.R.S. et seq. by a 
widow and her two daughters. This suit 
stems from the death of Leandro Salazar 
who died on April 23, }992 in a farm accident. 
Each. plaintiff seeks to recover noneconomic 
damages totaling $250,000 for the wrongful 
death of her husband/father-for a total re-
covery of $750,000. 
[1] The sole issue presented here is 
whether the $250,000 statutory cap for non-
economic damages applies to wrongful death 
plaintiffs on an individual or collective basis. 
Wrongful death actions did not exist at com-
mon law; they are purely creatures of stat-
ute. Niven, by a.nd through Nivenv. Falk-
enlnu'g, 553 F.Supp. 1021, 1023 (D.Col0.1983). 
Therefore, the terms of recovery are deter-
mined exclusively from the statute. Camp-
bell v. Shankle. 680 P.2d 1352, 1353 (Colo. 
App.1984). 
Colorado statutorily limits the types and 
amounts of damages recoverable in wrongful 
death actions. § 13-21-203 et seq., 6A 
C.R.S. (1993 Supp.) In relevant part, § 13-
21-203(1) provides: 
All damages accruing under § 13-21-202 
shall be sued for and recovered by the 
same parties and in the same manner as 
provided in § 13-21-201, and in every such 
action the jury may give such damages as 
they deem fair and just . . . including dam-
ages for noneconomic loss '" subject to 
the limitations in § 13-21-102.5 and in-
cluding within noneconomic loss or injury, 
damages for grief, loss of companionship, 
574 835 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT 
pain and suffering, and emotional stress, to 
the surviving parties who may be entitled 
to sue '" There shall be only one civil 
action under this part 2 for recovery of 
damages for the wrongful death of anyone 
decedent. Notwithstanding anything in 
this section or in section 13-21-102.5 to the 
contrary. there shaH be no recovery under 
this palt 2 for noneconomic loss .. , in 
excess of two hundred fift~ .. thousand dol-
lars. 
Section 13-21-102.5, 6A C.R.S. (l986), 
which predates § 13-21-203(1), provides in 
relevant part: 
... (3)(a) In any ci\il action in which dam-
ages for noneconomic loss or injury may be 
awarded, the total of such damages shall 
not. exceed the sum of two hundred fifty 
thousand dollar, unless the court finds jus-
tification by clear and convincing evidence 
therefor. In no case shall the amount of 
such damages exceed five hundred thou-
sand dollars. 
[2] 'When two statutes concern the same 
subject matter, I must read them together 
and reconcile them, if possible, so as to give 
effect to each. M.S. t'. People. 812 P.2d 632. 
637 (Colo.1981). Section 13-21-203(1) and 
§ 13-21-102.5 concern the same subject mat-
ter-limitations on damages for noneconomic 
loss. 
Read together, these statutory provisions 
limit noneconomic damages to a total of 
$250,000 for a single wrongful death claim in 
"only one ch.;l action". § 13-21-203(1) 
("there shall be no recovery under (these 
wrongful death statutes) for noneconomic 
Joss or injury in excess of two hundred fifty 
thousand dollars"). However, these statutes 
are silent as to whether this statutory cap is 
applicable jointly' or severally to multiple 
plaintiffs. 
[3-5] I look to legislative intent when 
construing a statute silent as to a particular 
issue. Watters v. Pelican Iutenl., Inc .. 706 
F.Supp. 1452 (D.Colo.1989). The primary 
indicia of legislative intent is the plain and 
ordinary meaning of the language employed. 
ld. Neither § 13-21-203(1) nor § 13-21-
102.5 distinguish the amount of noneconomic 
re<:overy for multiple versus single plaintiffs. 
These statutory provisions read together cap 
the noneconomic recovery in the one civil 
action. If the Colorado General Assembly 
intended that the statutory cap be applicable 
to each individual plaintiff. it could have ex-
plicitly said so. It is not for the courts to 
supply this missing language absent evidence 
of legislative intent that it be there. 73 
Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 314 (1974). 
Moreover, this interpretation is consistent 
with the purpose of the statutory limitation 
on noneconomic damages. Section 13-21-
102.5, incorporated by § 13-21-203(1), pro-
"ides in part: 
The general assembly finds ... that 
awards ... for noneconomic losses .,. 
often unduly burden '" persons in t.his 
state; therefore, .,. the general assembly 
. " plac[es] monetal"y limitations on dam-
ages for noneconomic losses ... 
This expression of Colorado public policy 
demonstrates the General Assembly'S con-
cern with protecting individual defendants 
from responsibility for paying excessive 
amounts for noneconomic damages. Niemet 
v. General Elec. Co., 843 P.2d 87, 90 (Colo. 
App.1992) (addressing the application of the 
noneconomic statutory damages cap in con-
junction with pro-rata liability (§ 13-21-
111.5. C.R.S.) Here. imposing several rath-
er than joint liability for noneconomic dam-
ages would effectively nullify clear Colorado 
public policy. 
[6,7] The legislath'e history of the 
amendments to § 13-21-203(1), C.R.S. also 
supports my interpretation. In discussing 
the amendments. Representative BelTY stat-
ed: 
There have been some misunderstandings 
as to whether multiple actions could be 
brought based on the death of one person. 
It i~ the Colorado case law as interpreted 
by the courts that only one action can be 
brought for the wrongful dea.th of anyone 
decedent, and based on some of the misun-
derstanding, I felt it was necessary to put 
that into the statute to codify that rule. 
And you see the Berry floor amendment 
which says that for the wrongful death of 
any person there may only be one action 
and Ol1e 1'ecovery and not multiple actions 
by multiple S'lt1"l'iVOI'S, and I would ask for 
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its adoption. Transeript of Proceedings in 
re: Senate Bill 93: Wrongful Death, 
House-Second Reading (March 22, 1989) 
at 146-147. <emphasis added). 
11oreover, § 13-21-201, 6A C.R.S. (1993 
Supp.) further confIrms this limitation on 
noneconomic damage recovery by a spouse 
and a decedent's heirs in a single wrongful 
death action. Section 13-21-201, C.R.S. pro-
vides that damages for death may be sued 
for and recovered: 
(l)(a) In the fIrst year after such death: 
(l) By the spouse of the deceased; 
(II) Cpon the written election of the 
spouse. by the spouse and the heir or heirs 
of the deeeased: 
(III) Cpon the written eleetion of the 
spouse, by the heir or heirs of the de-
ceased; or 
(IV) If there is no spouse, by the heir or 
heirs of the deceased. 
(2) '" The judgment obtained in an ac-
tion under this section shall be owned by 
such persons as are heirs at law of the 
deceased under the statutes of decent and 
distribution and shall be divided among 
such heirs at law in the same manner as 
real estate is divided according to said 
statute of descent and distribution. 
Hence, a wrongful death action lies first and 
foremost in the spouse, who may join at her 
election, heir or heirs of the deceased. 
Campbell 1'. Shankle, 680 P.2d at 1353-54. 
The judgment's amount does not vary by the 
number of plaintiffs entitled to share in the 
proceeds. 
I conclude that the Mitson Family is eol-
lectively limited to recovering the statutory 
cap of $250,000 for noneconomic injury in this 
action. The number of plaintiffs bringing 
this single wrongful death action does not 
increase the statutory cap set forth in § 13-
21-203(1), C.R.S. 
Because this case concerns one decedent 
only, I need not address the Mitson Family's 
argument that application of the noneconom-
ic statutory cap here would have a chilling 
effect on class action suits. Section 13-21-
203, C.R.S. limits noneconomic recovery "for 
the wrongful death of anyone decedent", not 
multiple decedents. 
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that AG's 
motion to limit plaintiffs' recovery for non-
economic damages is GRANTED. 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN HOSPITAL AND 
MEDICAL SERVICE, d/b/a Blue Cross 
and Blue Shield of Colorado, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Judith PHILLIPS, Defendant. 
Ch'. A. No. 93-K-1272. 
United States District Court, 
D. Colorado. 
Nov. 2, 1993. 
Insurer under a Federal Employees 
Health BenefIts Program medical policy sued 
for declaratory judgment regarding the pro-
priety of its denial of coverage under policy 
on the ground that medical treatment for 
which coverage was sought was not "medical-
ly necessary." On motion to dismiss for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction, the District 
Court, Kane, Senior District Judge, held that 
district court could not exercise federal ques-
tion jurisdiction over insurer's declaratory 
action. 
Motion granted. 
I. Federal Courts e=>192 
District court could not exercise federal 
question jurisdiction over action by insurer 
for declaratory judgment on propriety of its 
denial of claims under a Federal Employee 
Health Benefits Program medieal policy on 
theory that treatment for which coverage 
was sought was not medically necessary; 
federal government's role under the Federal 
Employee Health Benefits Act to negotiate 
health benefit plans would not be significant-
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Session Laws of Colorado 2003 
First Regular Session, 64th General Assembly 
CHAPTER 271 
COURTS 
HOUSE BILL 03-1007 < span style="font-size: 12pt">[Digest] 
BY REPRESENTATIVE(S) Williams T., Clapp, Brophy, Hall, Hoppe, Lee, Schultheis, Spence, Spradley, and StaflDrd; 
also SENATOR(S) Hilhnan, Andrews, Arnold, Cairns, Chlouber, Evans, Johnson S., Jones, Kester, May R., Owen, Taylor, and Teck. 
AN ACT 
CONCERNING THE LIMITATION ON NONECONOMIC DAMAGES FOR CERTAIN PHYSICAL INJURIES IN 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS. 
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Colorado: 
SECTION 1. 13-21-102.S (3) (a), Colorado Revised Statutes, is amended to read: 
13-21-102.5. Limitations on damages for noneconomic loss or injury. (3) (a) In any civil action 
OTHER THAN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTIQNS in which damages for noneconomic loss or mjury may be 
awarded, the total of such damages shall not exceed the sum of two hundred fifty thousand dollars, unless 
the court fmds justification by clear and convincing evidence therefor. In no case shall the amount of st1Gh 
NONECONOMIC LOSS OR INJURY damages exceed five hundred thousand dollars. THE DAMAGES FOR 
NONECONOMIC LOSS OR INJURY IN A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION SHALL NOT EXCEED THE LIMITATIONS 
ON NONECONOMIC LOSS OR INJURY SPECIFIED IN SECTION 13-64-302. 
SECTION 2. 13-21-203 (1), Colorado Revised Statutes, is amended to read: 
13-21-203. Limitation on damages. (1) (a) All damages accruing under section 13-21-202 shall be sued 
for and recovered by the same parties and m the same manner as provided in section 13-21-201, and in 
every such action the jury may give such damages as they may deem fair and just, with reference to the 
necessary injury resultrng from such death, incluaing damages for noneconomic loss or injury as defrned in 
section 13-21-102.5 and subject to the limitations of this section and including within noneconomic loss or 
injury damages for grief, loss of companionship, pain and suffering, and emotional stress, to the surviving 
parties who may be entitled to sue; and also havmg regard to the mitigating or aggravating circumstances 
attending any such wrongful act, neglect, or default; except that, if tne decedent left neither a widow, a 
widower, minor children, nor a dependent father or mother, the damages recoverable in any such action 
shall not exceed the limitations for noneconomic loss or injury set fortn in section 13-21-102.S, unless the 
wrongful act, neglect, or default causing death constitutes a felonious killing, as defrned in section 
IS-11-803 (1) (b), C.R.S., and as determined in the manner described in section lS-11-803 (7), C.R.S., in 
which case there shall be no limitation on the damages for noneconomic loss or injury recoverable in such 
action. No action shall be brought and no recovery shall be had under both section 13-21-201 and section 
13-21-202, and in all cases the plaintiff is required to elect under which section he or she will proceed. 
There shall be only one civil action under this part 2 for recovery of damages for the wrongful death of any 
one decedent. Notwithstanding anything in this section or in section 13-21-102.S to the contra!)" there shall 
be no recovery under this part 2 for noneconomic loss or injury in excess of two hundred fifty thousand 
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dollars, unless the wrongful act, neglect, or default causing death constitutes a felonious killing, as defmed 
in section 15-11-803 (1) (b), C.R.S., and as detennined in the manner described in section 15-11-803 (7), 
c.R.S. 
(b) THE DAMAGES RECOVERABLE FOR NONECONOtvlIC LOSS OR INJURY IN ANY rvtEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
ACTION SHALL NOT EXCEED THE LItvlITATIONS ON NONECONOtvlIC LOSS OR INJURY SET FORTH IN SECTION 
13-64-302. 
SECTION 3. 13-64-102, Colorado Revised Statutes, is amended to read: 
13-64-102. Legislative declaration. (1) The general assembly detennines and declares that it is in the 
best interests of the citizens of this state to assure the continued availability of adequate health care 
services to the people of this state by containing the significantly increasing costs of malpractice insurance 
for medical care institutions and licensed medical care professionals, and that such is rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest. To attain this goal and in recognition of the exodus of professionals from health 
care practice or from certain portions or specialties thereof, the general assembly fmds it necessary to enact 
this article limited to the area of medical malpractice to preserve the public peace, health, and welfare. 
(2) THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY FURTHER DETERtvlINES AND DECLARES: 
(a) THE PURPOSE OF ENACTING THE "HEALTH CARE AVAILABILITY ACT" AND AMENDrvtENTS THERETO IS TO 
CLEARLY AND UNEQUIVOCALLY STATE THE INTENT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY THAT, IN ORDER TO PROMOTE 
THE PURPOSES SET FORTH IN SUBSECTION (1) OF THIS SECTION, THE LItvlITATIONS OF LIABILITY SET FORTH IN 
SECTION l3-64-302 ARE HEREBY REAFFIRrvtED; AND 
(b) ALL NONECONOtvlIC DAMAGES OF ANY KIND WHATSOEVER, WHETHER DIRECT OR DERIVATIVE, 
lNCLUDING BUT NOT LItvlITED TO GRIEF, LOSS OF COMPANIONSHIP, PAIN AND SUFFERING, INCONVENIENCE, 
EMOTIONAL STRESS, IMPAIRrvtENT OF QUALITY OF LIFE, PHYSICAL IMPAIRrvtENT, DISFIGURErvtENT, AND 
DAMAGES FOR ANY OTHER NONPECUNIARY HARM AWARDED IN A rvtEDiCAL MALPRACTICE ACTION, SHALL NOT 
EXCEED THE LItvlIT ATIONS ON NONECONOtvlIC LOSS OR INJURY SPECIFIED IN SECTION 13-64-302. 
SECTION 4. l3-64-302 (1), Colorado Revised Statutes, is amended to read: 
13-64-302. Limitation ofUability - interest on damages. (1) (a) As USED IN THIS SECTION: 
(I) "DERIVATIVE NONECONOtvlIC LOSS OR INJURY" rvtEANS NONECONOtvlIC LOSS OR INJURY TO PERSONS 
OTHER THAN THE PERSON SUFFERING THE DIRECT OR PRIMARY LOSS OR INJURY. 
(II) (A) "NONECONOMIC LOSS OR INJURY" rvtEANS NONPECUNIARY HARM FOR WHICH DAMAGES ARE 
RECOVERABLE BY THE PERSON SUFFERING THE DIRECT OR PRIMARY LOSS OR INJURY, INCLUDING PAIN AND 
SUFFERING, INCONVENIENCE, EMOTIONAL STRESS, PHYSICAL IMPAIRMENT OR DISFIGURErvtENT, AND 
IMPAIRMENT OF THE QUALITY OF LIFE. "NONECONOtvlIC LOSS OR INJURY" DOES NOT INCLUDE PUNITIVE OR 
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. 
(B) NOTHING IN THIS SECTION SHALL BE CONSTRUED TO PROHIBIT A RECOVERY FOR ECONOtvlIC DAMAGES, 
WHETHER PAST OR FUTURE, RESULTING FROM PHYSICAL IMPAIRMENT OR DISFIGURErvtENT. 
(b) The total amount recoverable for all damages for a course of care for all defendants in any civil action 
for damages in tort brought against a health care professional, as defmed in section l3-64-202, or a health 
care institution, as defmed in section 13-64-202, or as a result of binding arbitration, whether past damages, 
future damages, or a combination of both, shall not exceed one million dollars, present value per patient, 
including any derivati'le claim FOR DERIVATIVE NONECONOtvlIC LOSS OR INJURY by any other claimant, of 
which not more than two hundred fifty thousand dollars, present value per patient, includin~ anx derivative 
claim by any other claimant, shall be attributable to noneconomic loss or injury, as de-me-- in section 
13 21 102.5 (2) (a) and (2) (b), whether past damages, future damages, or a combination of both; except 
that if, upon good cause shown, the court determines that the present value of the amount of lost past 
earnings and the present value of lost future earnings, or the present value of the amount of past medical 
and other health care costs and the present value of the amount of future medical and other health care 
costs, or both, when added to the present value of other past damages and the present value of other future 
damages, would exceed such lirmtation and that the application of such lirmtation would be unfair, the 
court may award the present value of additional future damages only for loss of such excess future 
earnings, or such excess future medical and other health care costs, or both. The limitations of this section 
are not applicable to a health care professional who is a public employee under the "Colorado 
Governmental Immunity Act" and are not applicable to a certified health care institution which is a public 
entity under the "Colorado Governmental Immunity Act". For purposes of this section, "present value" has 
the same meaning as that set forth in section l3-64-202 (7). The existence of the limitations and exceptions 
thereto provided m this section shall not be disclosed to ajury. 
(c) EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 2003, THE DAMAGES LItvlITATION OF TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND DOLLARS 
DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH (b) OF THIS SUBSECTION (1) SHALL BE INCREASED TO THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND 
DOLLARS WHICH INCREASED AMOUNT SHALL APPLY TO ACTS OR OtvlISSIONS OCCURRING ON OR AFTER SAID 
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DATE. IT IS THE INTENT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY THAT THE INCREASE REFLECT AN ADJUSTMENT FOR 
INFLATION TO THE DAMAGES LIMITATION. 
SECTION 5. Effective date - applicability. This act shall take effect July 1, 2003, and shan apply to 
acts or omissions occurring on or after said date. 
SECTION 6. Safety clause. The general assembly hereby fmds, determines, and declares that this act is 
necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety. 
Approved: May 20, 2003 
Capital letters indicate new material added to existing statutes; dashes through words indicate deletions from existing statutes 
and such material not part of act. 
Session Laws of Colorado Digest of Bills General Assembly 
Office of Legislative Legal Services, State Capitol Building, Room 091, Denver, Colorado 80203-1782 
Telephone: 303-866-20451 Facsimile: 303-866-4157 
Send comments about this web page to: olls.ga@state.co.us 
State of Colorado 
The information on this page is presented as an informational service only and should not be relied upon as an official record of action or legal poSition of the 
State of Colorado, the Colorado General Assembly, or the Office of Legislative Legal Services. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
This report assesses the present value of economic loss resulting from the death of Maria A. 
Aguilar on June 4, 2003. The economic loss calculated in this analysis consists oflost financial 
support and lost non-financial support. 
II. SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS 
What follows is a summary of the economic loss to be associated with the death of Mrs. 
Aguilar. 
The past economic loss period for financial support is 5.9 years (June 4,2003 to April 27, 
2009) and past lost financial support totals $83,492 (Table 1). 
The future economic loss period for financial support is 16.13 years. The present value of 
future lost financial support ranges from $153,345 to $165,772 (Table 1). 
Assuming 30.6 hours of lost services per week, and after a 20 percent reduction to allow for 
Mrs. Aguilar's terminated consumption of her own services, the present value oflost non-
financial support (household services) ranges from $415,922 to $455,153 
The total present value of economic loss to be associated with the death of Mrs. Aguilar ranges 
from $652,759 to $704,417 (Table 1). 
III. SOCIOECONOMIC DATA 
Age 
Maria A. Aguilar was born o nd was 41 years old at the time of her 
death. 
Education 
Mrs. Aguilar attended school through the seventh grade in Mexico. 
Life Expectancy 
In determining Mrs. Aguilar's life expectancy, this analysis relies on the life tables assembled 
by the U.S. National Center for Health Statistics [1]. These tables show the normal life 
expectancy for women who are Mrs. Aguilar's age. 
As of the date of her death, Mrs. Aguilar was 41.47 years old and had a life expectancy of 
40.51 more years (i.e., to age 81 in the year 2043). 
Maria A. Aguilar: Page 1 
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Furthennore, according to the mortality and morbidity data of the United States Department of 
Health and Human Services [2], as of June 4, 2003 at age 41.47, Mrs. Aguilarhad a healthy life 
expectancy of 35.98 more years. 
Household Data 
Mrs. Aguilar was married to Jose Aguilar. Mr. Aguilar was born on and at the 
anticipated trial date (April 27, 2009), he will be 54 years old. 
At the anticipated trial date (April 27, 2009), Mr. Aguilar will have a life expectancy of24.46 
more years (Le., to age 78 in the year 2033) [1]. 
At the time of Mrs. Aguilar's death, Mr. and Mrs. Aguilar had four minor children who were 17 
years old, 11 years old, 10 years old and 7 years old. 
Occupation and Earnings 
Mrs. Aguilar worked as a meat cutter for Simplot Meats at the time of her death. She began 
working for Simplot Meats in 2000. 
Simplot Meat employees also receive non-money wages or fringe benefits including paid 
medical care insurance, a vision plan and a dental plan. 
Wage Base for Lost Financial Support 
This report assumes the base for Mrs. Aguilar's wages to be $23,819 (Table 2). 
Earnings estimates are adjusted each year in line with the earnings life cycle or individual 
productivity of the average female butcher and other meat, poultry, and fish processing worker 
who is Mrs. Aguilar's age (Table 3). 
Future lost financial support has been reduced to present value according to the methodology 
described in Section IV. 
Wage Growth 
Table 4 presents some empirical evidence showing that workers may expect their wages to 
grow over time in line with the growing economy. 
There are three key economic factors that drive wage growth: (1) inflation, (2) macroeconomic 
productivity, and (3) individual productivity. 
If the prices of goods increase while wages remain fixed, the purchasing power of workers 
decreases (i.e., workers get poorer). Hence if inflation is 3.0 percent, wages must also increase 
by 3.0 percent in order for workers to remain as well off. 
Maria A. Aguilar: Page 2 
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Another reason for wage growth is increased macroeconomic productivity. In other words, 
when workers have better capital goods to work with (e.g., computers instead of typewriters or 
bulldozers instead of shovels), productivity and wages increase. 
Thus as technology and the efficiency of capital goods increase, the economy grows and wages 
increase. {[IO], [II]} 
The third key economic factor that drives wage growth is the productivity of individual 
workers. Workers with more human capital (e.g., informal and formal training, general and 
specific work experience, education, etc.) tend to be more productive. 
Wage differentials due to differences in individual productivity levels are captured through an 
analysis of the age-earnings profiles (or earnings life cycles) of different age-education peer 
groups. {[IO], [11], [12], [I3]} 
The annual earnings estimates in this analysis are adjusted each year in line with the earnings 
life cycle of the average worker in Mrs. Aguilar's peer group. 
For further discussion regarding wage growth due to individual productivity (level of human 
capital) vis-a.-vis economy-wide productivity (efficiency of capital goods) see Economics [10] 
or Modern Labor Economics [11]. 
Retirement and Worklife Expectancy 
While the average retirement age is 63.7 for males and 63.5 for females [14], there are periods 
in the average worker's life during which he/she is not working (e.g., due to illness, job loss, 
voluntary retirement, etc.). 
Given a person's gender, age and education level, worklife expectancy tables calculate the 
probabilities that periods of labor force separation will exist during the working life of an 
individual. 
The expected working life is an estimate of the number of years, expressed as a function of 
constant employment, that the average person in a gender and age-education peer group is 
expected to continue to participate in the labor force. 
Chart 1 of this report illustrates the process by which the worklife expectancy tables calculate 
and express an individual's normal expected working life. 
According to the 1986 U.S. Department of Labor worklife tables (which rely on employment 
data from 1979 to 1980) [15], as of June 4, 2003 at age 41.47, Mrs. Aguilar had a normal 
expected working life of 12.07 more years. 
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To reflect the socioeconomic changes that have occurred over the last several decades, Cieka, 
Epstein and Goldman [16] and Richards and Abele [17] used the U.S. Department of Labor's 
methodologies to calculate updated worklife estimates using more current employment data. 
More specifically, the Cieka, Epstein and Goldman updates are based on 1994 labor data while 
the Richards and Abele updates are based on labor data from 1996, 1997 and 1998. 
These updated calculations of the U.S. Department of Labor worklife tables indicate that given 
her gender, her education, and her age as of June 4,2003, Mrs. Aguilar had a normal expected 
working life of 14.82 more years (Cieka, Epstein and Goldman) and 11.57 more years 
(Richards and Abele). 
In addition to the updated worklife tables discussed above, worklife tables based on 1990 U.S. 
census data provide further insights regarding the impact certain occupations have on a 
worker's expected normal working life. [17] 
In particular, these industry specific worklife tables indicate that the average 41 year-old female 
who has less than a high school education and who is employed in a precision production 
occupation has a normal worklife expectancy greater than the average of all 41 year-old 
females with less than a high school education. 
However, it is also important to note that according to employment data collected as a part of 
the 2000 U.S. Census, the employment longevity offemale butchers and other meat, poultry, 
and fish processing workers appears to be less than the employment longevity of other workers. 
Chart 2 illustrates this point by plotting the employment pattern of all female workers versus 
the employment pattern of all female butchers and other meat, poultry, and fish processing 
workers. All else being equal, the difference between these worker populations across age 
translates into a lower expected worklife for female butchers and other meat, poultry, and fish 
processing workers when compared with all other female workers. [3] 
The calculations of work life expectancy explained above summarize the total number of years 
Mrs. Aguilar is expected to participate in the labor force over the remainder of her lifetime. It 
should also be noted that the median years to retirement is another measure of the time period 
over which a person would have been expected to work. 
The median retirement age is defined as the age at which 50 percent of the workers in a base 
age group would have permanently separated from the labor force [18]. For example, if there 
are 20,000 females in the labor force who are age 50, then the median retirement age is the age 
when only 10,000 of the original 20,000 workers remain in the labor force. 
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According to the life expectancy data of the U.S. National Center for Health Statistics and to 
the labor data from the U.S. Department of Labor's Current Population Survey from 1992 and 
1993, as of June 4, 2003 at age 41.47, Mrs. Aguilar had 19.78 years to her median retirement 
age. {[ 17], [18]} 
Summary of Work life Expectancy Calculations 
BLS 
Cieka. Epstein and Goldman (1994) 
Richards and Abele Median Years to Retirement 
(1979·80) (1996-98) (1992-93) 
12.07 14.82 11.57 19.78 
In relation to her lost employment, this analysis assumes that Mrs. Aguilar would have retired 
at age 63.5, the average retirement age of all females, and that as of June 4, 2003 at age 41.47, 
she had a normal working life of 15 more years (see Chart 1). 
Fringe Benefits 
An important aspect ofa worker's compensation is the value of fringe benefits (e.g., insurance 
coverage, retirement benefits, and other forms of non-monetary compensation). 
Recognition must be given to the value of an employer's outlays to buy these benefits for a 
worker if a realistic evaluation of a worker's earnings is to emerge from this analysis. 
The U.S. Department of Labor publishes an annual study [20] detailing the value of employer 
outlays for various types of fringe benefits provided to workers in the United States. 
The table below provides a summary of the U.S. Department of Labor data and expresses the 
value of employer outlays for fringe benefits as a percentage of wages and other money 
earnings. 
Management. Natural resources, Production. 
Compensation Component All Worker. professional and Sales and office Service construction and transportation. &. 
related maintenance material moving 
Wages and Other Money Earnings 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Insurance Programs 10.5% 9.3% 11.0% 10.8% 11.2% 13.6% 
Retirement and Savings 5.6% 6.3% 4.1% 4.7% 6.6% 5.2% 
Legally Required 10.0% 8.2% 9.8% 11.9% 13.3% 12.7% 
Total Benefits 26.1% 23.8% 24.9"10 27.4% 31.1% 31.5% 
Maria A. Aguilar: Page 5 
3442 
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce publication, Employee Benefits Study [21] reports that a 
survey study of 453 companies employing 389,180 full-time workers revealed that fringe 
benefits average in excess of30 percent of payroll wages and other money earnings. 
Mrs. Aguilar's fringe benefits were reviewed in the Occupation and Earnings section of this 
report. 
For benefits associated with lost financial support, this analysis uses 29.4 percent of the present 
value of money earnings to reflect the value of employer provided fringe benefits. 
All future financial support were reduced to present value according to the methodology 
described in Section IV. 
Household Services or Non-Financial Support 
In the United States, time devoted to work is usually compensated in dollars and cents. A 
major exception is the household work performed by women, children and men in our society 
that is not sold in formal markets. 
While household services may frequently be performed outside formal labor markets, it is clear 
these services do have a monetary value. {[10], [11], [22], [23], [24], [25], [26], [27], [28], 
[29], [30], [3l]} 
This analysis calculates the present value of household services on a one hour per week basis. 
This analysis values household services using market alternative costs, or the market wage 
rates actually paid to workers for performing household services in the marketplace. 
The premise of this method is that household work should be valued at the rate one would have 
to pay someone to do that work, and as such, it is an accounting based measure rather than an 
opportunity cost based measure. 
Furthermore, as this is an economic analysis, no attempt has been made to quantifY the 
individualistic value associated with lost household services. In other words, while one person 
may value doing yard work more than another, while a person may value a spouse's or a 
parent's cooking more than a stranger's, or while the time a parent spends caring for a child may 
be priceless, this analysis limits the valuation of household service time to market alternative 
costs. 
Using the hourly compensation actually paid to females whose employment involves the same 
activities that people with Mrs. Aguilar's socioeconomic charateristics typically provide to their 
own household, the national average household service replacement cost is $12.67 per hour. 
[31] 
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In this analysis, household service time is valued using a market alternative cost based on 
actual household service wage rates in Idaho. More specifically, this analysis values household 
service tIme at a 2009 base replacement cost of $11.75 per hour. 
Future household services were projected through age 71.82 and reduced to present value 
according to the methodology described in Section IV. 
Personal Consumption and Financial Support Factor 
If a realistic estimate of lost financial support is to emerge from this analysis, consideration 
must be given to the portion of Mrs. Aguilar's earnings that would have been used for purchases 
exclusively for her own personal benefit if not for her premature death. The financial support 
factor necessary to maintain the living standard for surviving family members is a function of 
the deceased person's personal consumption. [32] 
This analysis accounts for Mrs. Aguilar's personal consumption, and the estimates of economic 
loss in this analysis have been reduced by the portion of Mrs. Aguilar's earnings that she would 
have incurred for her own personal maintenance. 
Each year since 1980, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) has conducted a survey study [33] 
of consumer expenditures by querying independent samples of thousands of households in 
areas representative of the total U.S. civilian population. 
The BLS survey study (Consumer Expenditure Survey) is designed to obtain details regarding 
the spending patterns of individuals and households with varying characteristics. 
An analysis ofthe BLS consumption data reveals that the financial support factor is highly 
correlated with income and household structure (Le., age and number of members). [33] 
This analysis uses data from the U.S. Department of Labor's annual survey studies of consumer 
expenditures to estimate Mrs. Aguilar's personal consumption and corresponding financial 
support factor based on her age, level of income and household size. [33] 
For Mrs. Aguilar, personal consumption as a percentage of earnings ranges from 23 to 55.4 
percent with a weighted average of 41.6 percent. These consumption percentages have been 
applied to expected earnings and fringe benefits. 
The present value estimate of Mrs. Aguilar's personal consumption of her wages ranges from 
$128,617 (lower bound) to $138,598 (upper bound). 
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IV. PRESENT VALUE ANALYSIS 
Present Value of Pecuniary Loss 
The easiest and perhaps the best way to estimate the lost future financial support would be to 
wait and see what the average worker with Mrs. Aguilar's socio-economic characteristics earns 
each year in the future. Unfortunately, this cannot be dOl'le. 
Pecuniary damages must be estimated as of today. This means that the expected future 
earnings of Mrs. Aguilar must be estimated in a reasonable way and then expressed in 2009 
dollars or present value. 
Empirical evidence from the past 52 years indicates that the time value of money and the 
workers' wage growth rate covary so as to establish a differential (discount rate minus wage 
growth rate) of zero to one percent. 
More specifically, since 1956 the compound annual interest received from investments in U.S. 
Treasury securities with I-month, 5-year and 20-year maturities has exceeded the annual 
increase in wages on a year-by-year basis at a median rate of 0.7, 1.1 and 1.6 percent per year, 
respectively. {[7], [34]} 
Furthermore, since 1956 the average annual growth in total compensation (i.e., wages and 
benefits) has been almost one percent higher than the average annual increase in wages alone 
{[7], [35], [36], [37]}. Thus a comparison between the growth in total compensation and the 
interest received on investments in U.S. Treasury securities with I-month, 5-year and 20-year 
maturities indicates that the annual increase in total compensation has actually exceeded the 
interest received from these investments on a year-by-year basis at a median rate of 0.7, 0.1 and 
-0.5 percent per year respectively. {[34], [35], [36], [37]} 
Further insights regarding future expected wage-interest differentials can be gleaned through an 
examination of the interest rate and wage rate expectations of some of the largest U.S. 
companies. 
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For the past twenty years, Hewitt Associates, a prominent national actuarial and benefit 
consulting firm, has conducted an annual survey study [38] of the postretirement benefit 
liabilities of the Fortune 500 companies. This study analyzes disclosures under the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board's (FASB) Statement 87 (accounting for pensions) and Statement 
106 (accounting for postretirement benefits other than pensions). The key economic 
assumptions that determine a firm's obligation for pension benefits to its employees are the 
wage growth rate and the expected long-term rate of return on plan assets. Each year this study 
includes approximately 400 companies that have reported information on defined benefit 
pension plans in their financial statements (F AS 87). The historical average wage growth rate 
used by these companies has been 4.9 percent and the average long-term rate of return on plan 
assets used has been 9.0 percent. 
For the past thirty-eight years, Watson Wyatt Worldwide, another prominent national actuarial 
and benefit consulting firm, has conducted an annual survey study of pension plans in the 
United States covering 1,000 or more active participants. The 2006 survey study [39] looks at 
the actuarial assumptions of 478 large pension plans covering 1,000 or more active participants. 
For the 220 pension plans in this study that base retirement benefits on final average pay, the 
average wage growth rate used was 4.6 percent and the average rate of return on plan assets 
used was 8.0 percent. This Watson Wyatt publication also provides historical survey data. 
From 1990 to 2006, the average wage growth rate used for pension plans that base retirement 
benefits on final average pay is 5.2 percent and the average long-term rate of return on plan 
assets for the same plans is 8.2 percent. 
In another study [40], Watson Wyatt analyzes the financial disclosures of 641 companies on the 
2007 Fortune list of 1,000 companies. The report summarizes the assumptions used by these 
companies in the calculation of pension expense and obligations. This summary report is the 
twentieth in a series of annual analyses of F AS 87 by Watson Wyatt. The average wage growth 
rate used by the companies in the 2007 study is 4.2 percent and the average long-term rate of 
return on plan assets is 8.2 percent. From 1990 to 2006, the wage growth rate used by 
companies has averaged 4.7 percent and the long-term rate of return on plan assets for the same 
period has averaged 9.0 percent. 
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The expected long-term rate of return on plan assets is the actuarial discount rate used to 
estimate the amount of money that must be invested to meet the future benefit obligations of a 
defined benefit pension plan. Thus the 8.0 to 9.0 percent expected rates of return on plan assets 
noted in the Hewitt Associates and the Watson Wyatt studies are the discount rates used to 
reflect the earnings anticipated on the investments made by the fund in order to provide the 
projected benefit obligations. As such, these rates represent the average expected return on 
investments in a variety of risky assets. When adjusted for risk, the three-to-four percent 
differential (used by corporate defined benefit pension plans) which is based on the expected 
return from investments in risky assets and expected wage growth rates is equivalent to a zero 
percent differential which is based on the yields of U.S. Treasury securities and expected wage 
growth rates. 
This risk adjusted equivalence can be easily demonstrated in either one of two ways: (1) by 
plotting the long-term expected rate of return on plan assets against the contemporaneous long-
term risk-free rate (Le., the current yield on 20-year U.S. Treasury bonds adjusted for expected 
horizon premium); or (2) by calculating the expected risk premium that corporate defined 
benefit pension plans anticipate from their risky investment portfolio (E[portfolio risk 
premium] = 2: [E(return on assetj) - E(risk free rate)] * [portfolio weight of assetil). Chart 9 
illustrates the first method and suggests that corporate defined benefit plan sponsors would use 
a differential rate (interest rate minus wage growth rate) of approximately zero if pension assets 
were restricted to U.S. Treasury securities. Table 5 illustrates the second method and also 
suggests that corporate defined benefit plan sponsors would use a differential rate (interest rate 
minus wage growth rate) of approximately zero if pension assets were restricted to U.S. 
Treasury securities. 
The annual report of the board of trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and 
Disability Insurance Trust Funds [42] reports the financial and actuarial status of the Old-Age 
and Survivors Insurance (OASI) and Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Funds. The Old-Age, 
Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program in the United States provides protection 
against the loss of earnings due to retirement, death or disability. The total assets of the OASI 
and DI Trust Funds at the beginning of the calendar year 2008 amounted to $2.24 trillion. 
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Unlike the investment portfolios of corporate pension plans, by law the investments of the 
OASI and 01 Trust Funds must be made in interest-bearing securities of the U.S. Government 
or in securities guaranteed by the United States. Because of this, the invested assets of the trust 
funds are backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. Government in the same way as other 
public-debt obligations ofthe United States. The OASI and OJ Trust Funds employ a long-
term expected annual return on assets (Le., a U.S. Treasury bond yield assumption) ranging 
from 5.4 to 5.9 percent and a long-term annual wage growth assumption ranging from 3.4 to 4.4 
percent. The maturity premium implicit in the yield curve of U.S. Treasury bonds has averaged 
0.9 percent for intermediate-term bonds and 1.6 percent for long-term bonds during the 1926-
2007 period [34]. Therefore, the wage-interest differential used by the OASOJ program is 
equivalent to a net discount rate ranging from -0.1 to 2.0 percent. 
Given the initial level of income ( earnings base) and the length of the time period (expected 
working life), all that is necessary in order to estimate the present value of a worker's 
anticipated future income stream is knowledge of the wage-interest differential. In other words, 
it is the size of the differential, not the expected levels of wage rates or interest rates, that 
determines the present value of a future stream of earnings. Table 6 illustrates this point. The 
data in the table make it clear that regardless of what the actual interest rates and wage growth 
rates are in the future, the present values for a given differential are identical. 
Hence while economists cannot predict what actual interest (discount) rates and actual wage 
growth rates will be over an extended period in the future, the present value of future economic 
losses can be bounded with a reasonable degree of economic certainty when a zero to one 
percent real differential (discount rate minus the wage growth rate) is utilized to convert 
expected future amounts to their present values. 
It should be noted that sometimes the net discount rate is confused with the gross discount rate. 
This mistake leads to the erroneous conclusion that the net discount rate method assumes a 
severely limited ability, or no ability at all, to earn interest in the future. For example, with this 
misunderstanding, it is often argued that a net discount rate of zero percent means that x dollars 
is required today to cover x dollars oflost wages in the future. Obviously this is not the case. 
Chart 5 through Chart 8 illustrate the proper interpretation of the net discount rate method. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The total present value of economic loss to be associated with the death of Mrs. Aguilar ranges 
from $652,759 to $704,417 (see Table 1). 






Table 1: Present Value of Pecuniary Loss to be 




Past Money Earnings (net of consumption) $64,523 
Past Fringe Benefits (net of consumption) 18,969 
Past Financial Support $83,492 
Future Money Earnings (net of consumption) $118,506 
Future Fringe Benefits (net of consumption) 34,839 
Future Financial Support $153,345 
Total Lost Financial Support $236,837 
NON-FINANCIAL SUPPORT 
(HOUSEHOLD SERVICES) 
Total Present Value per Hour of Service 
Time That Has Been Lost per Week $13,592 
(net of consumption) 
Assumed Hours Lost per Week 
30.6 (average for females) 
Total Household Services 
(net of consumption) $415,922 
TOTAL $652,759 


























Inflation Factor to 
Increase Money Earnings 
to 2009 Dollars 
1.25653 
1.23698 
Sources: U.S. Department of Labor. Bureau of Labor Statistics. [9] 
Mrs. Aguilars Income Tax Returns and Tax Statements. 
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Table 3: Life Cycle Index for Lost Financial Support 





























Table 4: U.S. Economic Growth and the Growth in Wages of U.S. Workers 
Average Annual 
Gross Domestic Hourly Wage of Hourly Wage of Hourly Wage of Hourly Wage of Income of All U.S. Compensation 
Product (GDP) All Private Mining Construction Manufacturing Financial Activity Workers 15 Years Index for All 
Year per Capital Workers2 Workerl Workers2 Workers2 Workers2 Old and Over3 Workers4 
1955 $2,500 $1.83 $2.03 $1.74 $2,916 10.6 
1958 2,672 2.09 $2.42 2.40 1.99 3,186 12.6 
1960 2,913 2.24 2.54 2.65 2.15 3,496 13.9 
1964 3,458 2.53 2.75 3.08 2.41 $2.29 3,996 16.2 
1965 3,701 2.63 2.86 3.23 2.49 2.38 4,232 16.8 
1970 5,065 3.40 3.76 4.74 3.23 3.07 5,589 23.6 
1975 7,586 4.73 5.73 6.78 4.71 4.08 7,705 34.9 
1980 12,249 6.85 9.01 9.37 7.15 5.82 10,997 54.1 
1985 17,695 8.74 11.96 11.75 9.40 7.97 15,323 72.5 
1990 23,195 10.20 13.66 13.42 10.78 9.99 19,842 90.6 
W 1991 23,650 10.52 14.13 13.65 11.13 10.42 20,280 95.1 
~ 1992 24,668 10.77 
14.46 13.81 11.40 10.86 20,758 100.0 
U1 1993 25,578 11.05 14.49 14.Q4 11.70 11.36 22,199 102.2 
I""\) 1994 
26,844 11.34 14.81 14.38 12.04 11.82 23,278 103.6 
1995 27,749 11.65 15.21 14.73 12.34 12.28 24,211 105.8 
1996 28,982 12.04 15.53 15.11 12.75 12.71 25,466 109.5 
1997 30,424 12.51 16.00 15.67 13.14 13.22 27,022 113.0 
1998 31,674 13.01 16.66 16.23 13.45 13.93 28,236 119.9 
1999 33,181 13.49 16.76 16.80 13.85 14.47 29,677 125.8 
2000 34,769 14.02 16.94 17.48 14.32 14.98 31,199 134.7 
2001 35,491 14.54 17.33 18.00 14.76 15.59 32,099 140.4 
2002 36,311 14.97 17.53 18.52 15.29 16.17 32,222 145.3 
2003 37,641 15.37 17.90 18.95 15.74 17.14 32,976 151.2 
2004 39,841 15.69 18.44 19.23 16.14 17.52 33,859 156.9 
2005 41,960 16.13 19.04 19.46 16.56 17.95 35,499 163.2 
2006 44,197 16.76 20.28 20.02 16.81 18.80 37,517 169.6 
2007 17.42 21.43 20.95 17.26 19.64 
Average Annual 
5.8% 4.4% 4.6% 4.6% 4.5% 5.1% 5.2% 5.5% 
Rate of Growth 
Sources: I. U.S. Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis and Bureau of the Census. {[4], [5J and [6]} 
2. Wage Data from the U.S. Department of Labor. Bureau of Labor Statistics. [7] 
3. Current Population Reports: Series P60. U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. [8] 
4. Economic Report of the President {[35], [36] and [37]} 
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I. Greenwich Associates [41] 
2. The Federal Reserve Board [42] 
2004 Average 
Yield: 5-Year 
Expected Return U.S. Treasury 
on Asse!j Over Constant 


















3. Expected Risk Premiumj = [Expected Return on Asse~ - Yield on 5-Year U.S. Treasury] x Percent of Portfolio 











The 3.9% risk premium of the average corporate pension plan portfolio is just 0.1% less than the average interest-wage 
differentials used by the pension plans included in the Hewitt Associates study [38) and the Watson Wyatt studies {[39), 
[40)}, suggesting that corporate defined benefit pension plans would use a differential (discount rate minus wage growth 
rate) of zero if pension assets were restricted to U.S. Treasury securities. Details regarding the Hewitt and Watson Wyatt 
studies are discussed in the Present Value Analysis section of this report. 
The Greenwich Associates survey study [41) is based on the review of 1,022 corporate pension plans and in-person 
interviews with 610 corporate fund officials between August and October of 2004. 
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If the annual earnings 
0.0% 
growth is ... 
... the initial earnings of 
$23,000 grows to this $23,000 
amount in year 22: 

















Table 6A: Future Value of Earnings per $23,000 of Initial Earnings 
. Period = 22 Years of Earnings 
Assuming Alternative Earnings Growth Rates 
1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 
$28,660 $35,712 $44,500 $55,451 $69,096 $86,099 
$568,811 $641,991 $727,478 $827,601 $945,156 $1,083,510 
Table 6B: Present Value of Earnings per $23,000 of Initial Earnings 
Period = 22 Years of Earnings 
Assuming Alternative Earnings Growth Rates and Discount Rates 
1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 
$506,000 
451,940 $506,000 
405,278 451,940 $506,000 
364,886 405,278 451,940 $506,000 
329,815 364,886 405,278 451,940 $506,000 
299,271 329,815 364,886 405,278 451,940 $506,000 
272,588 299,271 329,815 364,886 405,278 451,940 







The data in the table make it clear that the present values for a given differential are identical even though the total earnings over the 22 years vary 
from $506,000 for a zero percent wage growth rate up to $1,439,657 for an eight percent growth rate. If, for example, a 1.0 percent differential (discount 
rate minus growth rate) were appropriate, it makes no difference whether the actual discount-growth combination is 1.0 percent versus 0.0 percent, 
or 8.0 percent versus 7.0 percent. Furthermore, it makes no difference whether the differential is created by a constant discount-growth combination 
through time (e.g., the discount rate is always 3.0 percent and the growth rate is always 2.0 percent), or whether the differential emerges by virtue 
ofa succession of different discount-growth combinations (e.g., the discount rate changes from 3.0 percent to 4.0 percent to 5.0 percent and the 
wage growth rate changes from 2.0 percent to 3.0 percent to 4.0 percent). 















Table 7: Mrs. Aguilar's Past Money Earnings from Lost Employment 
(June 04, 2003 to April 27, 2009) 
Life-Cycle 
Percent Earnings Adjusted Worklife 
To of Earnings Life Cycle Money Adjustment Unemploy-
Age Year Base Factor Earnings Factor mentFactor 
42.1 58% $23,819 1.00000 $23,819 0.68089 0.90093 
43.1 100% 23,819 1.00073 23,836 0.68089 0.90093 
44.1 100% 23,819 1.00164 23,858 0.68089 0.90093 
45.1 100% 23,819 1.00256 23,880 0.68089 0.92114 
46.1 100% 23,819 1.00348 23,902 0.68089 0.92114 
47.1 100% 23,819 1.00440 23,923 0.68089 0.92114 
47.4 32% 23,819 1.00500 23,938 0.68089 0.92114 













Table 8: Mrs. Aguilar's Future Money Earnings from Lost Employment 
(from April 27, 2009 througb expected retirement) 
Present Value Present Value 
Life-Cycle of Lost of Lost 
Percent Earnings Adjusted Worklife Money Money 
From To of Earnings Life Cycle Money Adjustment Unemploy- Earnings Earnings 
Year Age Age Year Base Factor Earnings Factor ment Factor (Lower Bound) (Upper Bound) 
2009 47.4 48.1 68% $23,819 1.00546 $23,949 0.68089 0.92114 $10,145 $10,214 
2010 48.1 49.1 100% 23,819 1.00623 23,967 0.68089 0.92114 14,783 15,032 
2011 49.1 50.1 100% 23,819 1.00715 23,989 0.68089 0.92114 14,650 15,046 
2012 50.1 51.1 100% 23,819 1.00834 24,017 0.68089 0.92114 14,522 15,064 
2013 51.1 52.1 100% 23,819 1.00975 24,051 0.68089 0.92114 14,398 15,085 
2014 52.1 53.1 100% 23,819 1.01116 24,084 0.68089 0.92114 14,276 15,106 
2015 53.1 54.1 100% 23,819 1.01257 24,118 0.68089 0.92114 14,154 15,127 
2016 54.1 55.1 100% 23,819 1.01397 24,151 0.68089 0.93471 14,240 15,371 
2017 55.1 56.1 100% 23,819 1.01538 24,185 0.68089 0.93471 14,119 15,392 
W 2018 56.1 57.1 100% 23,819 1.01679 24,219 0.68089 0.93471 13,998 15,414 
~ 2019 57.1 58.1 100% 23,819 1.01820 24,252 0.68089 0.93471 13,879 15,435 
CJ"1 2020 58.1 59.1 100% 23,819 1.01961 24,286 0.68089 0.93471 13,760 15,456 
0') 2021 59.1 60.1 100% 23,819 1.02102 24,319 0.68089 0.93471 13,643 15,478 
2022 60.1 61.1 100% 23,819 1.00430 23,921 0.68089 0.93471 13,287 15,224 
2023 61.1 62.1 100% 23,819 0.97275 23,170 0.68089 0.93471 12,742 14,746 
2024 62.1 63.1 100% 23,819 0.94120 22,418 0.68089 0.93471 12,207 14,268 
2025 63.1 63.5 45% 23,819 0.91817 21,869 0.68089 0.93471 5,335 6,263 
$224,138 $243,721 





Chart 1: Worklife Expectancy vis-a-vis Retirement 
Worklife tables isolate the probabilities that the boxed areas will exist. 
The time line below represents a person's age throughout her working life. 
From Age 41.47 
on Jun 4, 2003 
I working not working not 
I working .. working __ 
Worklife tables remove the boxed areas and express worklife expectancy as a function of constant employment. 
The time line below represents the number of years a person is expected to work without interruption. 
From Age 41.47 Person Works for 
on Jun 4, 2003 15 Years I woffiing I 
This analysis assumes that Mrs. Aguilar would have retired at age 63.5, the average retirement age of all females [14]. 
As of June 4,2003, Mrs. Aguilar had a normal worklife expectancy of 15 years [16]. 
The worklife adjustment factor applied to each year of projected earnings is 0.68089. 
[(15 year worklife expectancy) = (0.68089) x (22.03 year period from Mrs. Aguilar's age as of June 4,2003 to age 63.5)] 
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Chart 2: All Female Workers vs. All Female Butchers and Other Meat, Poultry, and Fish Processing Workers 
(cohorts of 1,000 workers) 
35-44 45-54 
Age of Workers 
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0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 
Salary Growth 
Note: Ifwages increase 5 percent each year, the annual salary at the end of22 years is $69,096. 



































Now 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 
Years from Now 
Note: Ifwages increase 5 percent each year, the annual salary at the end of22 years is $69,096. 
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Chart 5: A Demonstration of Present Value 
Increased for Wage Growth at 5% and Decreased for Interest at 6% 
$80,000...,.-----------------------------------, 
$69,096 
$70,000 +1----------------------- - --------1 
$60,000 
$50,000 I A 
$40,000 
$30,000 I 




Now 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 
Years from Now 
Note: Ifwages increase 5 percent each year, an annual salary of$23,000 today will be $69,096 in 22 years. However, with 6 percent annual 
interest, it only takes $18,458 today to exactly cover the $69,096 of annual wages 22 years from now. 
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Chart 6: Present Value Using the Net Discount Rate Method 










Now 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 
Years from Now 
Note: The present value is the same whether you calculate it in two steps (add growth and subtract interest) or in one step (subtract the net interest). 
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$20,000 n m,,, $18,458 
$0 +I-~---' 
Interest Rate = 3 % 
Growth Rate = 2% 




Interest Rate = 6% 
Growth Rate = 5% 
Net Discount Rate = 1 % 
$133,686 
~228 
Interest Rate = 9% 
Growth Rate = 8% 
Net Discount Rate = 1 % 
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o What a $23,000 Salary Today Will Be 
22 Years from Now 
• 22 Years ofInterest 
• The Annual Salary 22 Years from Now 



















Growth Rate = 3% 
Interest Rate = 3 % 
Net Discount Rate = 0% 
$10,000 
$5,488 
Growth Rate = 6% 
Interest Rate = 6% 
Net Discount Rate = 0% 
$10,000 
$5,934 
Growth Rate = 9% 
Interest Rate = 9% 
Net Discount Rate = 0% 
Maria A. Aguilar: Page 27 
o The Money You Need 10 Years From 
Now 
• lOY ears of Interest 
• The Money It Takes Today to Make 
















Chart 9: Expected Risk Premium of Corporate Pension Plans 
Expected Return on Plan Assets 
(Hewitt Associates [38]) ~ 
Long-Term Risk Free Rate 
(Ibbotson Associates [34]) 
The premium (shaded area) has an average of 3.8% and suggests that 
corporate defined benefit pension plans would use a differential (discount 
rate minus wage growth rate) of zero if pension assets were restricted to 
U.S. Treasury securities. 
The 3.8% historical average risk premium is just 0.0% less than the 
historical interest-wage differentials used by the corporate pension plans 
included in the Hewitt Associates study (38) and the Watson Wyatt 
studies ([39), [40j}. 
0.00% I ·1 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
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per week and the hourly market value of those services. Data is extracted from 83 tables 
(Tables 1-14, 16-37,39-51,55-66 and 69-90) to run a multiple linear regression analysis 
predicting total weekly household service hours based on gender, marital status, 
employment status, age of person, and the number of children in the household, where total 
weekly household service hours are defined as the sum of weekly household production 
hours and weekly caring and helping hours provided to the household. Dummy variables 
are used to indicate gender (male = 0, female = 1), marital status (single = 0, married = 1, 
both = 2) and employment status (all = 0, part-time = 1, full-time = 2, inactive = 3). 
Transfonnations on the other variables in the analysis were performed to make the data 
more linear. 
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of household services was run on gender (Gender), marital status (MS), employment status 
(ES), the natural log of the age (lnAge), square root of the number of children (srChildren) 
and the natural log of the household service hourly value (lnHHSHV). 
The resulting regression equation for weekly household service time is InHHS = - 0.388 + 
0.453 Gender + 0.148 MS + 0.107 ES + 0.6781nAge + 0.402 srChildren, with an R-squared 
value of79.6 percent. All predictor coefficients for the independent variables are 
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the overall fit of the regression model or a test of the hypothesis that all regression 
coefficients, excepting that of the constant, are zero) is also significant at less than the 1 
percent level. The resulting regression equation for the hourly market value of household 
services is InHHSHV = 2.51 - 0.0428 Gender - 0.00073 MS - 0.00134 ES - 0.00403 lnAge-
0.00996 srChildren, with an R-squared value of78.8 percent and with the F-test, once again, 
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These surveys are used to calculate the personal consumption associated with lost earnings. 
Consumption data for households with over $10,000 in annual income was extracted from 
Tables 25-44, 3600,3610,3620,3630,3640 and 3650 in each of the seven surveys to run a 
multiple linear regression analysis predicting the personal consumption of an individual's 
earnings based on age, income and the number of household members. Transformations of 
the data were performed to make the data more linear. In particular, the regression analysis 
was run on 1,214 sets of consumption data each including the natural log of household 
income (lnHHI), the natural log of household members (lnHHM), the square root of age 
(srAge) and the natural log of personal consumption (lnPC), where personal consumption is 
defined as (a) + (b), where (a) is defined as the sum of the expenditures allocated to 
household members 18 and older (Le., persons less children under 18) divided by household 
members 18 and older and where (b) is defined as the sum of all other household personal 
consumption expenditures divided by the number of household members. 
The expenditures allocated to household members 18 and older under (a) include (alcoholic 
beverages), (transportation:other vehicle expenses:vehicle insurance), (transportation:other 
vehicle expenses:vehicle rental, leases, licenses, other charges), (tobacco products and 
smoking supplies) and (personal insurance and pensions:life and other personal insurance). 
The expenditures allocated to all household members under (b) include (food), 
(housing:shelter:other lodging), (housing:utilities, fuels, and public services), 
(housing:household operations), (housing:housekeeping supplies), (housing:household 
furnishings and equipment), (apparel and services), (transportation:vehicle purchases net 
outlay), (transportation:gasoline and motor oil), (transportation:other vehicle 
expenses:vehicle finance charges), (transportation:other vehicle expenses:maintenance and 
repairs), (transportation:public transportation), (health care), (entertainment), (personal care 
products and services), (reading), (education), (miscellaneous) and (cash contributions). 
The income and expenditures in each survey were adjusted to equivalent dollars based on 
the actual inflation (as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in its CPI-U index) that 
has ocurred since the upper year of each survey. For example, the 1997-98 survey data was 
increased to current dollars based upon actual inflation since 1998. The CPI-U inflation 
index as used in this analysis is as follows: 1998 = 163, 1999 = 166.6, 2000 = 172.2, 2001 
= 177.1, 2002 = 179.9,2003 = 184, 2004 = 188.9,2005 = 195.3, and 2006 = 201.6. 
After the data was converted to current dollars and transformed for linearity as noted above, 
the regression analysis was run. The resulting regression equation is InPC = 4.68 + 0.484 
InHHI - 0.705 InHHM + 0.0406 srAge, with an R-squared value of95.8 percent. All 
predictor coefficients for the independent variables are significant at less than the 1 percent 
level, and, furthermore, the F-test (a measurement of the overall fit of the regression model 
or a test of the hypothesis that all regression coefficients, excepting that of the constant, are 
zero) is also significant at less than the 1 percent level. 
[34] Ibbotson Associates. Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation: 2008 Yearbook. Chicago: 
Ibbotson Associates, 2008. 
[35] U.S. Department of Labor. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Table B-47 (Productivity and 
Related Data, Business Sector, 1947-93) in the Economic Report o/the President, 1994. 
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[36] U.S. Department of Labor. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Table B-47 (Productivity and 
Related Data, Business Sector, 1950-94) in the Economic Report of the President, 1995. 
[37] U.S. Department of Labor. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Table B-49 (Productivity and 
Related Data, Business Sector, 1959-2007) in the Economic Report of the President, 2008. 
[38] Hewitt Associates. Pension Plan Disclosure Under FASB Statement Number 87 (1987-
1992); Benefit Plan Disclosure Under SFAS 87, SFAS 106, and SFAS 112 (1993); Benefit 
Plan Disclosure Under SFAS 87 and SFAS 106 (1994-2006). 
[39] Watson Wyatt Worldwide. 2006 Survey of Actuarial Assumptions & Funding: Pension 
Plans with 1,000 or More Active Participants. Watson Wyatt Worldwide, 2007. 
[40] Watson Wyatt Worldwide. Accountingfor Pensions and Other Postretirement Benefits 
2007: Reporting under FAS 87 and FAS 106 among the Nation's Largest Companies. 
Watson Wyatt Worldwide, 2007. 
[41J Greenwich Associates. Fund Size, Plan Use, Asset Mix, and Opinions on Pension 
Accounting - United States. Greenwich, CT: Greenwich Associates, 2005. 
[42] Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Federal Reserve Statistical Release: 
Selected Interest Rates. "Treasury constant maturities: 5-year." Published at 
http://www federalreserve.gov. 
[43] 2008 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors 
Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds. Published at 
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TRlTR08! 
[44] Complaint and Demand For Jury Trial. In the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State ofIdaho for the County of Canyon County. 
[45] U. S. Individual Income Tax Returns. 1991 and 1997 - 2005. 
[46] Deposition of Jose Aguilar. November 28,2006. District Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, In And For the County of Canyon. 
[47] J.R. Simplot Employee Records. 
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Syron V. Foster 
Attorney At Law 
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste 500 
P.O. Box 1584 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 336-4440 
Facsimile: (208) 344-7721 
ISS #: 2760 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
JOSE AGUILAR, individually, as the Personal ) 
Representative of the Estate of Maria A. Aguilar, ) 
deceased, and as the natural father and ) 
guardian of GUADALUPE MARIA AGUILAR, ) 
ALEJANDRO AGUILAR, and LORENA ) Case No. CV 05-5781 
AGUILAR, minors, and JOSE AGUILAR, JR., ) 
heirs of Maria A. Aguilar, deceased, ) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF CORNELIUS 




STEVEN R. NEWMAN, M.D., NATHAN ) 
COONROD, M.D., and PRIMARY HEALTH ) 
CARE CENTER, an Idaho corporation, JOHN ) 
and JANE DOES I through X, employees of one ) 
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STATE OF IDAHO) 
: ss. 
County of Ada ) 
I, Cornelius Hofman, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and say: 
1. I am an economist employed at The GEC Group, Inc. (GEe). I received 
an MBA in Economics and Finance from the University of Chicago and I have worked in 
the field of economics for approximately 15 years. I worked for a national consulting 
firm in South Bend, Indiana for two years and then joined G'EC in 1995. GEC has 
offices in Idaho and Chicago and provides economic and financial consulting to 
businesses and individuals throughout the United States. I am the president and owner 
of GEC. I am an active member in multiple professional economic associations and 
have conducted and published research in the field of economics and finance. I have 
conducted hundreds of economic analyses relating. to the monetary valuation of lost 
wages and household services. A more detailed summary of my background and 
qualifications as an economist is included in my curriculum vitae attached hereto as 
Exhibit A I hereby incorporate my curriculum vitae in to this affidavit. 
2. . I have been retained by attorneys representing Plaintiffs Aguilar regarding 
a lawsuit they have filed against Steven Newman, M.D., Nathan Coonrod, M.D. and 
Primary Health Care Center. I wrote an economic report in this litigation and it is 
attached hereto as Exhibit B. I hereby incorporate my report in to this affidavit. 
3. Economics deals with objective and verifiable data. 
4. Economics can be used to determine what things are worth and how 
much it costs to replace them, as long as there are markets or reasonable market 
equivalents available. 
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5. My analysis and calculation of the monetary value associated with 
household services in this litigation is entirely consistent with both the definition of 
"economic damages" and "non-economic damages" in Idaho Code § 6-1601. 
6. Idaho Code § 6-1601 states: "Economic damages" mean objectively 
verifiable monetary loss, including but not limited to out-at-pocket expenses , loss at 
earnings, loss of use of property, cost of replacement or repair, cost of obtaining 
substitute domestic services, loss of employment, medical expenses, or loss of 
business or employment opportunities. 
7. Household services are "objectively verifiable" and were valued in my 
analysis based on the "cost of replacement" and on the "cost of obtaining substitute 
domestic services". The following text comes from page 6 of my report in this matter 
and illustrates this point. 
This analysis values household senices using l11arket alternative casts, or the tTh.'U'ket "vage 
rates actually paid to workers for performing household service:; in the marketplace. 
Furthermore, on page 7 of my report it reads: 
In ihisanaly.sis, household service time is valued using a market :alternative cost based on 
actual household service '\"age rates in Idaho. 
8. In their motion for a new trial and/or their motion to amend judgment, 
defendants in this litigation fail to understand and recognize that when valued using 
market-based, replacement cost data, household services have monetary value. The 
following text comes from page 6 of my report in this matter. 
V,lhile household senires may frequently be performed outside fonnallabor markets, it is deal 
these services do have a mooetu)' value. (flO]. [11), 122], [23], [24], [25], [26]. [27], [28], 
[29], (30J. [3 rn 
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This is a basic economic concept, and the bracketed numbers in the 
above quote are just a few economic sources that support this economic fact. While 
these sources are cited in my report I list them below for the court's convenience. 
Samuelson, Paul A. and William D. Nordhaus. Economics. Fifteenth 
Edition. New York: McGraw-Hili, 1995. 
Ehrenberg, Ronald G. and Robert S. Smith. Modem Labor Economics. 
Fifth Edition. New York: Harper Collins, 1994. 
Bryant, W. Keith and Cathleen D. lick. "Income Distribution Implications 
of Rural Household Production." American Joumal of Agricultural 
Economics. Vol 67 (5). 1985 
Gauger, William H. and Kathryn E. Walker. The Dollar Value of 
Household Work. New York State College of Human Ecology Information 
Bulletin 60 (revised). Ithaca: Cornell University Media, 1980. 
Murphy, M. "Comparative Estimates of the Value of Household Work in 
the United States for 1976." Review of Income and Wealth. Vol 28. 
1982. 
Peskin, Janice. "Measuring Household Production for the GNP." Family 
Economics Review. Vol 3. 1982. U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
Zick, Cathleen D. and W. Keith Bryant. "Alternative Strategies for Pricing 
Home Work Time." Home Economics Research Joumal. Vol 12 (2). 
1983. 
lick, Cathleen D. and W. Keith Bryant. "Shadow Wage Assessments of 
the Value of Home Production: Patterns from the 1970s." Ufestyles: 
Family and Economic Issues. Vol 11 (2). 1990. 
Gronau, Reuben. "Home Production - A Forgotten Industry." Review of 
Economics and Statistics. Vol 62. August 1980. 
Chiswick, Carmel Ullman. "The Value of a Housewife's Time." Joumalof 
Human Resources. Vol 16. Summer 1982. 
Bryant, W. Keith, Cathleen D. Zick and Hyoshin Kim. The Dollar Value of 
Household Work, Revised Edition. Ithaca: Cornell University Media, 
1993. 
Expectancy Data. The Dollar Value of a Day: 2006 Dollar Valuation. 
Shawnee Mission, Kansas, 2007. 
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9. Idaho Code § 6-1601 also states: "Noneconomic damages" mean 
subjective, nonmonetary losses including,. but not limited to, pain, suffering, 
inconvenience, mental anguish, disability or disfigurement incurred by the injured party; 
emotional distress; loss of society and companionship; loss of consortium; or 
destruction or impairment of the parent-child relationship. 
10. When household services are valued and measured using market 
replacement cost data (as they are in my analysis in this litigation), they are not 
"subjective", they are not "nonmonetary", and they are not related to "loss of society and 
companionship" or the "destruction of impairment of the parent-child relationship." The 
monetary valuation of household services in my analysis in this litigation was limited to a 
pure economic valuation based on market-based replacement costs for substitute 
domestic services. To be sure, the following text comes from page 6 of my report in this 
matter. 
Furthermore, as this is an economic analysis, no attempt has been made to quantify the 
individualistic value associated with lo:st household senrices. fn other words, while one person 
may value doing yard work more than another, while a person may valu.e a spouse's or a . 
parent's cooking more thana strangers, or while the time a parent spends caring for a child may 
be priceless, this analysis limits the valuation ofhol1sehold sendee time to market alteImltive 
costs.. 
Household services are non-economic damages only when one attempts 
to ascribe an "individualistic value" to them. And, once again, my economic analysis of 
household services does not do this. 
11. Economics deals with objective and verifiable data. My analysis of 
household services in this litigation uses objective and verifiable data. 
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12. Economics can be used to determine what things are worth and how 
much it costs to replace them, as long as there are markets or reasonable market 
equivalents available. My analysis of household services in this litigation uses Idaho 
labor market data and this data are the replacement costs for lost domestic services. 
13. There are no markets or reasonable market equivalents for the 
individualistic value of how much a person enjoys mowing their own lawn, or how much 
a person enjoys a spouse's cooking, or how much a person enjoys studying with a 
parent. And my analysis is limited to an economic valuation and it does not ascribe a 
value to any loss of enjoyment. 
14. When valued as they were in my analysis and report using (a) objectively 
verifiable data, (b) the cost of replacement, and (c) the cost of obtaining substitute 
services, lost household services are categorically economic damages as defined in 
Idaho Code§ 6-1601. 
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FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAITH NAUGHT. 
Cornelius Hofman 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this J:l day of June, 2009. 
NOTARY PUBtlC FOR IdahO 
Residing at: Boise, 10 
My Commission Expires: 10· 2.. ~ • "Z..o \ ':t. 
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THE GEC GROUP 
SELECTED EXPERIENCE: 
THE GEe GROUP 
Cornelius A. Hofman 
Economics and Finance 
University of Chicago 
MBA, Economics and Finance 
Chicago,IL 
1994 
University of Pennsylvania 
MA, Japanese Studies 
Philadelphia, P A 
1992 
Cornell University 




Business Valuation - Breach o/Contract Litigation: Calculated 
the fair market value of the division of a shipping logistics 
company in order to determine a bonus alleged to be owed to a 
broker stemming from the successful divestiture of the business. 
Business Valuation - Marital Dissolution: Assessed the value of 
two service companies primarily engaged in insulation 
installation and asbestos removal. 
Business Valuation - Gift Tax Assessment: Determined the fair 
market value of a large construction equipment part 
manufacturer. 
The GEC Group I 12000 New Hope Road I Star, ID 83669 
Tel: 208-286-0166 I Fax: 208-286-0167 I www.thegecgroup.com 
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THE GEe GROUP 
SELECTED EXPERIENCE: 
(continued) 
Business Valuation - Personal Injury Litigation: Valued a 
furniture manufacturing and distribution company that failed due 
to an injury to the owner and key employee of the business. 
Business Valuation - Wrongful Death Litigation: Valued a 
minority interest in a civil engineering and consulting firm 
owned by the survivor of a decedent who was an owner and key 
employee of the business. 
Business Valuation - Subsidiary Spin-off: Valued a retail 
company that sells domestic and industrial fuel oils. 
Business and Stock Option Valuation - Minority Shareholder 
Buyout: Performed a business valuation of a national 
manufacturer and distributor. Assessed the value of minority 
shareholders' stock options to determine the amount that the 
majority shareholders would have to pay the minority 
shareholders for their option to buy stock in the company for a 
set price at a specified date in the future. 
Preferred Stock Valuation - Gift Tax Assessment: Calculated the 
value of an issue of junior preferred stock of a national pet 
supply company. Through the purchase agreement associated 
with the divestiture of his company, the seller acquired a 
preferred equity interest in the same company and then gifted a 
portion of this preferred interest. 
Economic Damages: Proving or Disproving 
Causation and Lost Profits - Business Interruption Lawsuit: 
Performed a forensic event study analysis showing statistical 
legitimacy of plaintiffs allegations regarding causation and 
liability. Determined the level of lost profits associated with the 
business interruption stemming from damage to and subsequent 
reconstruction of a portion of plaintiff s property. 
Causation and Lost Profits - Personal Injury Litigation: 
Performed a forensic event study analysis and determined the 
falloff of plaintiff s construction business to be unrelated to the 
alleged wrongdoing by defendant. 
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THE GEe GROUP 
SELECTED EXPERIENCE: 
(continued) 
Causation and Lost Profits - Product Liability/Contract Dispute: 
Evaluated causation by applying business economic theory to 
predict economic outcomes given defendant's actions. 
Determined the level of lost profits of a national wholesaler of 
sports accessories due to an alleged breach of contract. 
Reconstructed the company's past financial statements and 
projected future financial performance assuming the alleged 
breach had not occurred. 
Causation and Lost Profits - Malicious Prosecution: Evaluated 
causation and liability by way of a forensic event study analysis. 
Calculated lost profits due to business interruption and 
interference stemming from a malicious law suit filed by 
defendant. 
Economic Damages: Quantifying 
Lost Asset Value - Securities Litigation: Performed and 
analyzed business valuations to determine the fair market value 
for the common stock interest in a telecommunications company 
before and after an initial public offering. Traced numerous 
financial transactions and determined the impact on value. 
Calculated the value of the preferred equity, a subsidiary's 
common equity, and the parent's common equity. 
Lost Profits - Insurance Bad Faith Lawsuit: Performed a 
business valuation and determined the lost profits resulting from 
alleged delinquent insurance coverage of operating equipment 
that was damaged in a fire. 
Lost Profits and Business Valuation - Professional 
Liability/Contract Dispute: Calculated lost profits of a snack 
food export company associated with the alleged wrongful 
packaging, handling and shipping ofplaintiffs product. 
Lost Profits - Breach of Contract Litigation: Calculated lost 
profits of seven concept shoe retail stores stemming from 
inventory shortages due to the alleged breach of contract by the 
show manufacturer/supplier. 
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THE GEC GROUP 
SELECTED EXPERIENCE; 
( continued) 
Crop Loss Litigation 
Lost Profits - Crop Loss Litigation: Analyzed the productivity 
and profitability of plaintiff s farming operation. Calculated lost 
profits due to business interruption associated with allegations of 
lender liability. 
Lost Profits - Crop Loss Litigation: Analyzed the productivity 
and profitability of the farming operations of a large group of 
plaintiffs due to alleged damage associated with a chemical drift. 
Analyzed over a hundred farming entities and a wide variety of 
crops. Collected, managed and analyzed over 1.5 million 
documents. Determined economic damages. 
Lost Profits - Crop Loss Litigation: Analyzed plaintiff s claim 
of economic loss due to alleged wrongful application of 
chemicals. Analyzed the market demand for plaintiffs crop 
within and beyond plaintiffs agricultural market. Analyzed 
plaintiffs expected yield claims vis-a-vis market conditions and 
historical market performance. Determined that alleged 
economic damages were grossly overstated. 
Lost Profits - Crop Loss Litigation: Analyzed plaintiffs claim 
of economic loss due to a broken irrigation ditch. Analyzed 
plaintiff's expected yield claims vis-a-vis market conditions and 
historical market performance. Determined that alleged crop 
yield and quality losses were largely due to growing and market 
conditions and that damages from flooding were nominal. 
Wage Loss Litigation 
International Wrongful Death Lawsuit: Calculated the 
economic loss associated with the death of 27 passengers killed 
in a plane crash in Indonesia. Passengers were from Indonesia, 
Germany, Italy, Great Britain and the United States. Conducted 
labor market research and determined the economic loss 
associated with the death of each decedent based on the 
economic and financial factors, statistics, and conditions of his 
or her country. 
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THE GEe GROUP 
SELECTED EXPERIENCE: 
( continued) 
International Wrongful Death Lawsuit: Calculated the 
economic loss associated with the death of a Japanese executive 
of an international company who was killed in a plane crash in 
the United States. Determined the economic loss based on 
Japanese economic and financial factors, statistics, and 
conditions, including: vital statistics, wage structure, 
government bond data, individual consumption patterns, fringe 
benefits, worklife expectancy, etc. 
Wrongful Death Lawsuit: Valued the economic loss associated 
with the death of a nurse who was killed in a plane crash. 
Calculated lost earnings, fringe benefits and household services. 
Personal Injury Lawsuit: Determined the economic loss to 11 
factory workers who were injured from a chemical leak at a 
factory. 
Personal Injury Lawsuit: Calculated the economic loss to a 
truck driver who was injured in an automobile crash. 
Medical Malpractice Lawsuit: Determined the economic loss to 
a construction worker associated with alleged medical 
malpractice. 
Age Discrimination Lawsuit: Calculated the lost wages and 
fringe benefits associated with the employment termination of 
four elderly workers. 
Gender Discrimination Lawsuit: Calculated the lost wages and 
fringe benefits associated with the employment termination of 
three female workers. 
Breach o/Contract Lawsuit: Calculated the lost wages and 
fringe benefits associated with the alleged breach of an 
employment contract between a teacher and a school district. 
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American Academy of Economic and Financial Experts 
Illinois Economics Association 
International Atlantic Economic Society 
Midwest Economics Association 
National Association of Forensic Economics 
National Social Science Association 
Western Economic Association 
Director of Litigation Case Studies 
Stanford Journal of Law, Business & Finance 
1994 to 2000 
Conference Discussant, "Issues in Forensic Economics" 
National Association of Forensic EconomicslMidwest 
Economics Association 
1995 
Conference Discussant, "Forecasting Wages" 
National Social Science Association 
1995 
Conference Discussant, "Firm and Organizational Behavior" 
Western Economic Association 
1996 
Conference Chairperson, "Macroeconomic Theory" 
International Atlantic Economic Society 
1997 
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Conference Chairperson, "Career Development and Labor-
Management Relations" 
International Atlantic Economic Society 
1998 
Conference Discussant, "Topics in Labor: Employment 
Discrimination Against Disabled Workers" 
Midwest Economics Association 
2000 
Conference Chairperson, "Productivity" 
Midwest Economics Association 
2000 
Conference Discussant, "Economics of Immigration" 
Illinois Economics Association 
2005 
Conference Chairperson, "Current Economic Conditions" 
Illinois Economics Association 
2005 
Conference Discussant, "Household Economics" 
Illinois Economics Association 
2008 
with Cornelius A. Hofman and Gary R. Wells, "The Impact of 
Education on the Value of Human Capital" Social Science 
Perspectives Journal April, 1994. 
"Risk Free Rates" in Litigation Services Handbook, 2nd edition, 
edited by Roman L. Wei!, Michael J. Wagner, and Peter B. 
Frank (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1995). 
"Treasury Yields, Maturity Premiums and Inflation: Valuing 
Future Cash Flows" Social Science Perspectives Journal April, 
1995. 
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with Charles M. Linke, "Estimating Personal Consumption: A 
Regression Analysis of BLS Consumer Expenditure Data" 
Western Economic Association Annual Convention in San 
Francisco, CA (1996). 
with Cornelius A. Hofman, "The Variation in Effective Tax 
Rates Across Household Income and Household Size" 
American Economic Association Annual Convention in New 
Orleans, LA (1997). 
"Interest Rates on Government Bonds of Different 
Denominations" Western Economic Association Annual 
Convention in Seattle, W A (1997). 
"Volume Discounted Yield Curves" The Valuation Examiner 
June/July 1997. 
"Measuring Beta and Risk Premium in CAPM: Selecting a 
Financial Market" International Atlantic Economic Conference 
in Philadelphia, PA (1997). 
"Market Portfolio Selection when Using the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model: A Summary" International Advances in 
Economic Research Vol 4, No.2 (May 1998). 
"Risk Adjusted Cost of Capital in a Non-Diversified Portfolio: 
Quantifying the Key Person Risk Premium" International 
Atlantic Economic Conference in Boston, MA (1998). 
"Forensic Economics" Fall Conference of the American Board 
of Vocational Experts in Chicago, IL (1998). 
"Interpreting Fluctuations in Worker Populations Across Age 
and Occupation" Midwest Economics Association Conference 
in Chicago, IL (2000). 
"Economic Analysis: Causation and Economic Damages" 
Difficult Issues for Business Lawyers - Business & Corporate 
Law Section of the Idaho State Bar Association in Boise, ID 
(2002). 
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with Cache Miller and Craig Clarke, "Interstate Earnings: An 
Analysis of Earnings from Idaho to Illinois" Illinois Economics 
Association Annual Meeting in Chicago, IL (2005). 
with Cache Miller and Craig Clarke, "Productivity and Expected 
Yields: A Look at the Midwest Farmer." Illinois Economics 
Association Annual Meeting in Chicag9, IL (2005). 
"Trends in Household Service Production: Evidence from the 
American Time Use Survey" Illinois Economics Association 
Annual Meeting in Chicago, IL (2008). 
"Calculating Economic Loss in the Legal Context: A 
Comparison Between Japan and the United States" 
University of Chicago 
Graduate School of Business. 
Chicago,IL 
"Tort Law and the Recoverability of Economic Damages" 
University of Notre Dame 
The Law School 
Notre Dame, IN 
"Forensic Economics: The Role of the Economic Expert" 
University of San Diego 
School of Law 
San Diego, CA 
"The Present Value of Projected Economic Losses: What 
Attorneys Should Know About Growing and Discounting" 
Arizona State University 
College of Law 
Tempe, AZ 
"Valuing Household Services" 
University of Utah 
College of Social and Behavioral Sciences 
Salt Lake City, UT 
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Contemporary Issues in Labor Economics 
Idaho State University 




Department of Economics 
Rexburg,ID 
Principles in Economics 
Idaho State University 
Department of Economics 
Pocatello, ID 
"Feasibility Analysis: A Multidiscipline Process" 
Gigot Center for Entrepreneurial Studies 
University of Notre Dame 
College of Business 
Notre Dame, IN 
"Contract Valuation Analysis" 
Idaho State University 
Economics Club 
Pocatello, ID 
"Entrepreneurial Management: Growing a Multigenerational 
Family Business" 
Yale University 
Yale Entrepreneurial Society 
New Haven, CT 
"Expanding a Company Through a Small Business Initial Public 
Offering" 
Cornell University 
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Idaho State University 
Department of Economics 
Pocatello, ID 
Game Theory 
Idaho State University 
Department of Economics 
Pocatello, ID 
Economic Issues 
Idaho State University 
Department of Economics 
Pocatello, ID 
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I. BACKGROUND 
This report assesses the present value of economic loss resulting from the death of Maria A. 
Aguilar on June 4, 2003. The economic loss calculated in this analysis consists of lost financial 
support and lost non-financial support. 
II. SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS 
What follows is a summary of the economic loss to be associated with the death of Mrs. 
Aguilar. 
The past economic loss period for financial support is 5.9 years (June 4,2003 to April 27, 
2009) and past lost financial support totals $83,492 (Table 1). 
The future economic loss period for financial support is 16.13 years. The present value of 
future lost financial support ranges from $153,345 to $165,772 (Table 1). 
Assuming 30.6 hours of lost services per week, and after a 20 percent reduction to allow for 
Mrs. Aguilar's terminated consumption of her own services, the present value oflost non-
financial support (household services) ranges from $415,922 to $455,153 
The total present value of economic loss to be associated with the death of Mrs. Aguilar ranges 
from $652,759 to $704,417 (Table 1). 
III. SOCIOECONOMIC DATA 
Age 
Maria A. Aguilar was born on and was 41 years old at the time of her 
death. 
Education 
Mrs. Aguilar attended school through the seventh grade in Mexico. 
Life Expectancy 
In determining Mrs. Aguilar's life expectancy, this analysis relies on the life tables assembled 
by the U.S. National Center for Health Statistics [1]. These tables show the normal life 
expectancy for women who are Mrs. Aguilar's age. 
As of the date of her death, Mrs. Aguilar was 41.47 years old and had a life expectancy of 
40.51 more years (i.e., to age 81 in the year 2043). 
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Furthermore, according to the mortality and morbidity data of the United States Department of 
Health and Human Services [2], as of June 4,2003 at age 41.47, Mrs. Aguilar had a healthy life 
expectancy of 35.98 more years. 
Household Data 
Mrs. Aguilar was married to Jose Aguilar. Mr. Aguilar was born on and at the 
anticipated trial date (April 27, 2009), he will be 54 years old. 
At the anticipated trial date (April 27, 2009), Mr. Aguilar will have a life expectancy of 24.46 
more years (i.e., to age 78 in the year 2033) [1]. 
At the time of Mrs. Aguilar's death, Mr. and Mrs. Aguilar had four minor children who were 17 
years old, 11 years old, 10 years old and 7 years old. 
Occupation and Earnings 
Mrs. Aguilar worked as a meat cutter for Simplot Meats at the time of her death. She began 
working for Simplot Meats in 2000. 
Simp lot Meat employees also receive non-money wages or fringe benefits including paid 
medical care insurance, a vision plan and a dental plan. 
Wage Base for Lost Financial Support 
This report assumes the base for Mrs. Aguilar's wages to be $23,819 (Table 2). 
Earnings estimates are adjusted each year in line with the earnings life cycle or individual 
productivity of the average female butcher and other meat, poultry, and fish processing worker 
who is Mrs. Aguilar's age (Table 3). 
Future lost financial support has been reduced to present value according to the methodology 
described in Section IV. 
Wage Growth 
Table 4 presents some empirical evidence showing that workers may expect their wages to 
grow over time in line with the growing economy. 
There are three key economic factors that drive wage growth: (1) inflation, (2) macroeconomic 
productivity, and (3) individual productivity. 
If the prices of goods increase while wages remain fixed, the purchasing power of workers 
decreases (i.e., workers get poorer). Hence if inflation is 3.0 percent, wages must also increase 
by 3.0 percent in order for workers to remain as well off. 
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Another reason for wage growth is increased macroeconomic productivity. In other words, 
when workers have better capital goods to work with (e.g., computers instead of typewriters or 
bulldozers instead of shovels), productivity and wages increase. 
Thus as technology and the efficiency of capital goods increase, the economy grows and wages 
increase. {[ 1 0], [II]} 
The third key economic factor that drives wage growth is the productivity of individual 
workers. Workers with more human capital (e.g., informal and formal training, general and 
specific work experience, education, etc.) tend to be more productive. 
Wage differentials due to differences in individual productivity levels are captured through an 
analysis of the age-earnings profiles (or earnings life cycles) of different age-education peer 
groups. {[IO], [11], [12], [13]} 
The annual earnings estimates in this analysis are adjusted each year in line with the earnings 
life cycle of the average worker in Mrs. Aguilar's peer group. 
For further discussion regarding wage growth due to individual productivity (level of human 
capital) vis-a.-vis economy-wide productivity (efficiency of capital goods) see Economics [10] 
or Modern Labor Economics [11]. 
Retirement and Worklife Expectancy 
While the average retirement age is 63.7 for males and 63.5 for females [14], there are periods 
in the average worker's life during which he/she is not working (e.g., due to illness, job loss, 
voluntary retirement, etc.). 
Given a person's gender, age and education level, worklife expectancy tables calculate the 
probabilities that periods of labor force separation will exist during the working life of an 
individual. 
The expected working life is an estimate of the number of years, expressed as a function of 
constant employment, that the average person in a gender and age-education peer group is 
expected to continue to participate in the labor force. 
Chart 1 of this report illustrates the process by which the worklife expectancy tables calculate 
and express an individual's normal expected working life. 
According to the 1986 U.S. Department of Labor worklife tables (which rely on employment 
data from 1979 to 1980) [15], as of June 4, 2003 at age 41.47, Mrs. Aguilar had a normal 
expected working life of 12.07 more years. 
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To reflect the socioeconomic changes that have occurred over the last several decades, Cieka, 
Epstein and Goldman [16] and Richards and Abele [17] used the U.S. Department of Labor's 
methodologies to calculate updated worklife estimates using more current employment data. 
More specifically, the Cieka, Epstein and Goldman updates are based on 1994 labor data while 
the Richards and Abele updates are based on labor data from 1996, 1997 and 1998. 
These updated calculations of the U.S. Department of Labor worklife tables indicate that given 
her gender, her education, and her age as of June 4, 2003, Mrs. Aguilar had a normal expected 
working life of 14.82 more years (Cieka, Epstein and Goldman) and 11.57 more years 
(Richards and Abele). 
In addition to the updated worklife tables discussed above, worklife tables based on 1990 U.S. 
census data provide further insights regarding the impact certain occupations have on a 
worker's expected normal working life. [17] 
In particular, these industry specific worklife tables indicate that the average 41 year-old female 
who has less than a high school education and who is employed in a precision production 
occupation has a normal worklife expectancy greater than the average of all 41 year-old 
females with less than a high school education. 
However, it is also important to note that according to employment data collected as a part of 
the 2000 U.S. Census, the employment longevity offemale butchers and other meat, poultry, 
and fish processing workers appears to be less than the employment longevity of other workers. 
Chart 2 illustrates this point by plotting the employment pattern of all female workers versus 
the employment pattern of all female butchers and other meat, poultry, and fish processing 
workers. All else being equal, the difference between these worker populations across age 
translates into a lower expected worklife for female butchers and other meat, poultry, and fish 
processing workers when compared with all other female workers. [3] 
The calculations of work life expectancy explained above summarize the total number of years 
Mrs. Aguilar is expected to participate in the labor force over the remainder of her lifetime. It 
should also be noted that the median years to retirement is another measure of the time period 
over which a person would have been expected to work. 
The median retirement age is defined as the age at which 50 percent of the workers in a base 
age group would have permanently separated from the labor force [18]. For example, if there 
are 20,000 females in the labor force who are age 50, then the median retirement age is the age 
when only 10,000 ofthe original 20,000 workers remain in the labor force. 
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According to the life expectancy data of the U.S. National Center for Health Statistics and to 
the labor data from the U.S. Department of Labor's Current Population Survey from 1992 and 
1993, as of June 4, 2003 at age 41.47, Mrs. Aguilar had 19.78 years to her median retirement 
age. {[17], [I8]} 
Summary of Work life Expectancy Calculations 
BLS 
Cieka, Epstein and Goldman (1994) 
Richards and Abele Median Years to Retirement 
(1979·80) (1996-98) (1992-93) 
12.07 14.82 11.57 19.78 
In relation to her lost employment, this analysis assumes that Mrs. Aguilar would have retired 
at age 63.5, the average retirement age of all females, and that as of June 4, 2003 at age 41.47, 
she had a normal working life of 15 more years (see Chart 1). 
Fringe Benefits 
An important aspect of a worker's compensation is the value of fringe benefits (e.g., insurance 
coverage, retirement benefits, and other forms of non-monetary compensation). 
Recognition must be given to the value of an employer's outlays to buy these benefits for a 
worker if a realistic evaluation of a worker's earnings is to emerge from this analysis. 
The U.S. Department of Labor publishes an armual study [20] detailing the value of employer 
outlays for various types of fringe benefits provided to workers in the United States. 
The table below provides a summary of the U.S. Department of Labor data and expresses the 
value of employer outlays for fringe benefits as a percentage of wages and other money 
earnings. 
Management. Natural resources, Production, 
Compensation Component All Workers professional and Sales and office Service construction and transportation, & 
related maintenance materiaJ moving 
Wages and Other Money Earnings 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Insurance Programs 10.5% 9.3% 11.0% 10.8% 11.2% 13.6% 
Retirement and Savings 5.6% 6.3% 4.1% 4.7% 6.6% 5.2% 
Legally Required 10.0% 8.2% 9.8% 11.9% 13.3% 12.7% 
Total Benefits 26.1% 23.8% 24.9"10 27.4% 31.1% 31.5% 
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The U.S. Chamber of Commerce publication, Employee Benefits Study [21] reports that a 
survey study of 453 companies employing 3&9,1&0 full-time workers revealed that fringe 
benefits average in excess of 30 percent of payroll wages and other money earnings. 
Mrs. Aguilar's fringe benefits were reviewed in the Occupation and Earnings section of this 
report. 
For benefits associated with lost financial support, this analysis uses 29.4 percent of the present 
value of money earnings to reflect the value of employer provided fringe benefits. 
All future financial support were reduced to present value according to the methodology 
described in Section IV. 
Household Services or Non-Financial Support 
In the United States, time devoted to work is usually compensated in dollars and cents. A 
major exception is the household work performed by women, children and men in our society 
that is not sold in formal markets. 
While household services may frequently be performed outside formal labor markets, it is clear 
these services do have a monetary value. {[!O], [II], [22], [23], [24], [25], [26], [27], [28], 
[29], [30], [31]} 
This analysis calculates the present value of household services on a one hour per week basis. 
This analysis values household services using market alternative costs, or the market wage 
rates actually paid to workers for performing household services in the marketplace. 
The premise of this method is that household work should be valued at the rate one would have 
to pay someone to do that work, and as such, it is an accounting based measure rather than an 
opportunity cost based measure. 
Furthermore, as this is an economic analysis, no attempt has been made to quantify the 
individualistic value associated with lost household services. In other words, while one person 
may value doing yard work more than another, while a person may value a spouse's or a 
parent's cooking more than a stranger's, or while the time a parent spends caring for a child may 
be priceless, this analysis limits the valuation of household service time to market alternative 
costs. 
Using the hourly compensation actually paid to females whose employment involves the same 
activities that people with Mrs. Aguilar's socioeconomic charateristics typically provide to their 
own household, the national average household service replacement cost is $12.67 per hour. 
[31] 
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In this analysis, household service time is valued using a market alternative cost based on 
actual household service wage rates in Idaho. More specifically, this analysis values household 
service time at a 2009 base replacement cost of $11. 7 5 per hour. 
Future household services were projected through age 71.82 and reduced to present value 
according to the methodology described in Section IV. 
Personal Consumption and Financial Support Factor 
If a realistic estimate of lost financial support is to emerge from this analysis, consideration 
must be given to the portion of Mrs. Aguilar's earnings that would have been used for purchases 
exclusively for her own personal benefit if not for her premature death. The financial support 
factor necessary to maintain the living standard for surviving family members is a function of 
the deceased person's personal consumption. [32] 
This analysis accounts for Mrs. Aguilar's personal consumption, and the estimates of economic 
loss in this analysis have been reduced by the portion of Mrs. Aguilar's earnings that she would 
have incurred for her own personal maintenance. 
Each year since 1980, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) has conducted a survey study [33] 
of consumer expenditures by querying independent samples of thousands of households in 
areas representative of the total U.S. civilian population. 
The BLS survey study (Consumer Expenditure Survey) is designed to obtain details regarding 
the spending patterns of individuals and households with varying characteristics. 
An analysis of the BLS consumption data reveals that the financial support factor is highly 
correlated with income and household structure (Le., age and number of members). [33] 
This analysis uses data from the U.S. Department of Labor's annual survey studies of consumer 
expenditures to estimate Mrs. Aguilar's personal consumption and corresponding financial 
support factor based on her age, level of income and household size. [33] 
For Mrs. Aguilar, personal consumption as a percentage of earnings ranges from 23 to 55.4 
percent with a weighted average of 41.6 percent. These consumption percentages have been 
applied to expected earnings and fringe benefits. 
The present value estimate of Mrs. Aguilar's personal consumption of her wages ranges from 
$128,617 (lower bound) to $138,598 (upper bound). 
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IV. PRESENT VALUE ANALYSIS 
Present Value of Pecuniary Loss 
The easiest and perhaps the best way to estimate the lost future financial support would be to 
wait and see what the average worker with Mrs. Aguilar's socio-economic characteristics earns 
each year in the future. Unfortunately, this cannot be done. 
Pecuniary damages must be estimated as of today. This means that the expected future 
earnings of Mrs. Aguilar must be estimated in a reasonable way and then expressed in 2009 
dollars or present value. 
Empirical evidence from the past 52 years indicates that the time value of money and the 
workers' wage growth rate covary so as to establish a differential (discount rate minus wage 
growth rate) of zero to one percent. 
More specifically, since 1956 the compound annual interest received from investments in U.S. 
Treasury securities with I-month, 5-year and 20-year maturities has exceeded the annual 
increase in wages on a year-by-year basis at a median rate of 0.7, 1.1 and 1.6 percent per year, 
respectively. {[7], [34]} 
Furthermore, since 1956 the average annual growth in total compensation (i.e., wages and 
benefits) has been almost one percent higher than the average annual increase in wages alone 
{[7], [35], [36], [37]}. Thus a comparison between the growth in total compensation and the 
interest received on investments in U.S. Treasury securities with I -month, 5-year and 20-year 
maturities indicates that the annual increase in total compensation has actually exceeded the 
interest received from these investments on a year-by-year basis at a median rate of 0.7, 0.1 and 
-0.5 percent per year respectively. {[34], [35], [36], [37]} 
Further insights regarding future expected wage-interest differentials can be gleaned through an 
examination of the interest rate and wage rate expectations of some of the largest U.S. 
companies. 
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For the past twenty years, Hewitt Associates, a prominent national actuarial and benefit 
consulting firm, has conducted an annual survey study [38] of the postretirement benefit 
liabilities of the Fortune 500 companies. This study analyzes disclosures under the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board's (FASB) Statement 87 (accounting for pensions) and Statement 
106 (accounting for postretirement benefits other than pensions). The key economic 
assumptions that determine a firm's obligation for pension benefits to its employees are the 
wage growth rate and the expected long-term rate of return on plan assets. Each year this study 
includes approximately 400 companies that have reported information on defined benefit 
pension plans in their.financial statements (F AS 87). The historical average wage growth rate 
used by these companies has been 4.9 percent and the average long-term rate of return on plan 
assets used has been 9.0 percent. 
For the past thirty-eight years, Watson Wyatt Worldwide, another prominent national actuarial 
and benefit consulting firm, has conducted an annual survey study of pension plans in the 
United States covering 1,000 or more active participants. The 2006 survey study [39] looks at 
the actuarial assumptions of 478 large pension plans covering 1,000 or more active participants. 
For the 220 pension plans in this study that base retirement benefits on final average pay, the 
average wage growth rate used was 4.6 percent and the average rate of return on plan assets 
used was 8.0 percent. This Watson Wyatt publication also provides historical survey data. 
From 1990 to 2006, the average wage growth rate used for pension plans that base retirement 
benefits on final average pay is 5.2 percent and the average long-term rate of return on plan 
assets for the same plans is 8.2 percent. 
In another study [40], Watson Wyatt analyzes the financial disclosures of 641 companies on the 
2007 Fortune list of 1,000 companies. The report summarizes the assumptions used by these 
companies in the calculation of pension expense and obligations. This summary report is the 
twentieth in a series of annual analyses ofFAS 87 by Watson Wyatt. The average wage growth 
rate used by the companies in the 2007 study is 4.2 percent and the average long-term rate of 
return on plan assets is 8.2 percent. From 1990 to 2006, the wage growth rate used by 
companies has averaged 4.7 percent and the long-term rate of return on plan assets for the same 
period has averaged 9.0 percent. 
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The expected long-tenn rate of return on plan assets is the actuarial discount rate used to 
estimate the amount of money that must be invested to meet the future benefit obligations of a . 
defined benefit pension plan. Thus the 8.0 to 9.0 percent expected rates of return on plan assets 
noted in the Hewitt Associates and the Watson Wyatt studies are the discount rates used to 
reflect the earnings anticipated on the investments made by the fund in order to provide the 
projected benefit obligations. As such, these rates represent the average expected return on 
investments in a variety of risky assets. When adjusted for risk, the three-to-four percent 
differential (used by corporate defined benefit pension plans) which is based on the expected 
return from investments in risky assets and expected wage growth rates is equivalent to a zero 
percent differential which is based on the yields of U.S. Treasury securities and expected wage 
growth rates. 
This risk adjusted equivalence can be easily demonstrated in either one of two ways: (1) by 
plotting toe long-term expected rate of return on plan assets against the contemporaneous long-
tenn risk-free rate (i.e., the current yield on 20-year U.S. Treasury bonds adjusted for expected 
horizon premium); or (2) by calculating the expected risk premium that corporate defined 
benefit pension plans anticipate from their risky investment portfolio (E[portfolio risk 
premium] = I [E(return on asset j) - E(risk free rate)] * [portfolio weight of assetil). Chart 9 
illustrates the first method and suggests that corporate defined benefit plan sponsors would use 
a differential rate (interest rate minus wage growth rate) of approximately zero if pension assets 
were restricted to U.S. Treasury securities. Table 5 illustrates the second method and also 
suggests that corporate defined benefit plan sponsors would use a differential rate (interest rate 
minus wage growth rate) of approximately zero if pension assets were restricted to U.S. 
Treasury securities. 
The annual report of the board of trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and 
Disability Insurance Trust Funds [42] reports the financial and actuarial status of the Old-Age 
and Survivors Insurance (OASI) and Disability Insurance (01) Trust Funds. The Old-Age, 
Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASOI) program in the United States provides protection 
against the loss of earnings due to retirement, death or disability. The total assets of the OASI 
and 01 Trust Funds at the beginning of the calendar year 2008 amounted to $2.24 trillion. 
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Unlike the investment portfolios of corporate pension plans, by law the investments of the 
OASI and DI Trust Funds must be made in interest-bearing securities of the U.S. Government 
or in securities guaranteed by the United States. Because of this, the invested assets of the trust 
funds are backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. Government in the same way as other 
public-debt obligations of the United States. The OASI and DI Trust Funds employ a long-
term expected annual return on assets (Le., a U.S. Treasury bond yield assumption) ranging 
from 5.4 to 5.9 percent and a long-term annual wage growth assumption ranging from 3.4 to 4.4 
percent. The maturity premium implicit in the yield curve of U.S. Treasury bonds has averaged 
0.9 percent for intermediate-term bonds and 1.6 percent for long-term bonds during the 1926-
2007 period [34]. Therefore, the wage-interest differential used by the OASDI program is 
equivalent to a net discount rate ranging from -0.1 to 2.0 percent. 
Given the initial level of income (earnings base) and the length of the time period (expected 
working life), all that is necessary in order to estimate the present value of a worker's 
anticipated future income stream is knowledge of the wage-interest differential. In other words, 
it is the size of the differential, not the expected levels of wage rates or interest rates, that 
determines the present value of a future stream of earnings. Table 6 illustrates this point. The 
data in the table make it clear that regardless of what the actual interest rates and wage growth 
rates are in the future, the present values for a given differential are identical. 
Hence while economists cannot predict what actual interest (discount) rates and actual wage 
growth rates will be over an extended period in the future, the present value of future economic 
losses can be bounded with a reasonable degree of economic certainty when a zero to one 
percent real differential (discount rate minus the wage growth rate) is utilized to convert 
expected future amounts to their present values. 
It should be noted that sometimes the net discount rate is confused with the gross discount rate. 
This mistake leads to the erroneous conclusion that the net discount rate method assumes a 
severely limited ability, or no ability at all, to earn interest in the future. For example, with this 
misunderstanding, it is often argued that a net discount rate of zero percent means that x dollars 
is required today to cover x dollars of lost wages in the future. Obviously this is not the case. 
Chart 5 through Chart 8 illustrate the proper interpretation of the net discount rate method. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The total present value of economic loss to be associated with the death of Mrs. Aguilar ranges 
from $652,759 to $704,417 (see Table I). 






Table 1: Present Value of Pecuniary Loss to be 




Past Money Earnings (net of consumption) $64,523 
Past Fringe Benefits (net of consumption) 18,969 
Past Financial Support $83,492 
Future Money Earnings (net of consumption) $118,506 
Future Fringe Benefits (net of consumption) 34,839 
Future Financial Support $153,345 
Total Lost Financial Support $236,837 
NON·FINANCIAL SUPPORT 
(HOUSEHOLD SERVICES) 
Total Present Value per Hour of Service 
Time That Has Been Lost per Week $13,592 
(net of consumption) 
Assumed Hours Lost per Week 
30.6 (average for females) 
Total Household Services 
(net of consumption) $415,922 
TOTAL $652,759 


























Inflation Factor to 
Increase Money Earnings 
to 2009 Dollars 
1.25653 
1.23698 
Sources: u.S. Department of Labor. Bureau of Labor Statistics. [9] 
Mrs. Aguilar's Income Tax Returns and Tax Statements. 
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Table 3: Life Cycle Index for Lost Financial Support 





























Table 4: U.S. Economic Growth and the Growth in Wages of U.S. Workers 
Average Annual 
Gross Domestic Hourly Wage of Hourly Wage of Hourly Wage of Hourly Wage of Income of All U.S. Compensation 
Product (GDP) All Private Mining Construction Manufacturing Financial Activity Workers 15 Years Index for All 
Year perCapitai Workers2 Workers2 Workers2 Workers2 Workers2 Old and Over3 Workers4 
1955 $2,500 $1.83 $2.03 $1.74 $2,916 10.6 
1958 2,672 2.09 $2.42 2.40 1.99 3,186 12.6 
1960 2,913 2.24 2.54 2.65 2.15 3,496 13.9 
1964 3,458 2.53 2.75 3.08 2.41 $2.29 3,996 16.2 
1965 3,701 2.63 2.86 3.23 2.49 2.38 4,232 16.8 
1970 5,065 3.40 3.76 4.74 3.23 3.07 5,589 23.6 
1975 7,586 4.73 5.73 6.78 4.71 4.08 7,705 34.9 
1980 12,249 6.85 9.01 9.37 7.15 5.82 10,997 54.1 
1985 17,695 8.74 11.96 11.75 9.40 7.97 15,323 72.5 
1990 23,195 10.20 13.66 13.42 10.78 9.99 19,842 90.6 
~ 1991 23,650 10.52 14.13 13.65 11.13 10.42 20,280 95.1 
:.n 1992 24,668 10.77 14.46 13.81 11.40 10.86 20,758 100.0 
...a. 1993 25,578 11.05 14.49 14.04 11.70 11.36 22,199 102.2 
...a. 1994 26,844 11.34 14.81 14.38 12.04 11.82 23,278 103.6 
1995 27,749 11.65 15.21 14.73 12.34 12.28 24,211 105.8 
1996 28,982 12.04 15.53 15.11 12.75 12.71 25,466 109.5 
1997 30,424 12.51 16.00 15.67 13.14 13.22 27,022 113.0 
1998 31,674 13.01 16.66 16.23 13.45 13.93 28,236 119.9 
1999 33,181 13.49 16.76 16.80 13.85 14.47 29,677 125.8 
2000 34,769 14.02 16.94 17.48 14.32 14.98 31,199 134.7 
2001 35,491 14.54 17.33 18.00 14.76 15.59 32,099 140.4 
2002 36,311 14.97 17.53 18.52 15.29 16.17 32,222 145.3 
2003 37,641 15.37 17.90 18.95 15.74 17.14 32,976 151.2 
2004 39,841 15.69 18.44 19.23 16.14 17.52 33,859 156.9 
2005 41,960 16.13 19.04 19.46 16.56 17.95 35,499 163.2 
2006 44,197 16.76 20.28 20.02 16.81 18.80 37,517 169.6 
2007 17.42 21.43 20.95 17.26 19.64 
Average Annual 
5.8% 4.4% 4.6% 
Rate of Growth 
4.6% 4.5% 5.1% 5.2% 5.5% 
Sources: 1. U.S. Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis and Bureau of the Census. {[4), [5) and [6)) 
2. Wage Data from the U.s. Department of Labor. Bureau of Labor Statistics. [7] 
3. Current Population Reports: Series P60. U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. [8] 
4. Economic Report of the President {[35], [36] and [37]} 
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3. Expected Risk Prerniurnj = [Expected Return on Asset; - Yield on 5-YearU.S. Treasury] x Percent of Portfolio 











The 3.9% risk premium of the average corporate pension plan portfolio is just 0.1 % less than the average interest-wage 
differentials used by the pension plans included in the Hewitt Associates study [38] and the Watson Wyatt studies {[39], 
[40]}, suggesting that corporate defined benefit pension plans would use a differential (discount rate minus wage growth 
rate) of zero if pension assets were restricted to U.S. Treasury securities. Details regarding the Hewitt and Watson Wyatt 
studies are discussed in the Present Value Analysis section of this report. 
The Greenwich Associates survey study [41] is based on the review of 1,022 corporate pension plans and in-person 
interviews with 610 corporate fund officials between August and October of2004. 
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Table 6A: Future Value of Earnings per $23,000 of Initial Earnings 
Period = 22 Years of Earnings 
Assuming Alternative Earnings Growth Rates 
1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 
$28,660 $35,712 $44,500 $55,451 $69,096 $86,099 
$568,81 I $641,991 $727,478 $827,601 $945,156 $1,083,510 
Table 6B: Present Value of Earnings per $23,000 of Initial Earnings 
Period = 22 Years ofEamings 
Assuming Alternative Earnings Growth Rates and Discount Rates 
1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 
$506,000 
451,940 $506,000 
405,278 451,940 $506,000 
364,886 405,278 451,940 $506,000 
329,815 364,886 405,278 451,940 $506,000 
299,271 329,815 364,886 405,278 451,940 $506,000 
272,588 299,271 329,815 364,886 405,278 451,940 







The data in the table make it clear that the present values for a given differential are identical even though the total earnings over the 22 years vary 
from $506,000 for a zero percent wage growth rate up to $1,439,657 for an eight percent growth rate. If, for example, a 1.0 percent differential (discount 
rate minus growth rate) were appropriate, it makes no difference whether the actual discount-growth combination is 1.0 percent versus 0.0 percent, 
or 8.0 percent versus 7.0 percent. Furthermore, it makes no difference whether the differential is created by a constant discount-growth combination 
through time (e.g., the discount rate is always 3.0 percent and the growth rate is always 2.0 percent), or whether the differential emerges by virtue 
of a succession of different discount-growth combinations (e.g., the discount rate changes from 3.0 percent to 4.0 percent to 5.0 percent and the 
wage growth rate changes from 2.0 percent to 3.0 percent to 4.0 percent). 















Table 7: Mrs. Aguilar's Past Money Earnings from Lost Employment 
(June 04, 2003 to April 27, 2009) 
Life-Cycle 
Percent Earnings Adjusted Worklife 
To of Earnings Life Cycle Money Adjustment Unemploy-
Age Year Base Factor Earnings Factor mentFactor 
42.1 58% $23,819 1.00000 $23,819 0.68089 0.90093 
43.1 100% 23,819 1.00073 23,836 0.68089 0.90093 
44.1 100% 23,819 1.00164 23,858 0.68089 0.90093 
45.1 100% 23,819 1.00256 23,880 0.68089 0.92114 
46.1 100% 23,819 1.00348 23,902 0.68089 0.92114 
47.1 100% 23,819 1.00440 23,923 0.68089 0.92114 
47.4 32% 23,819 1.00500 23,938 0.68089 0.92114 













Table 8: Mrs. Aguilar's Future Money Earnings from Lost Employment 
(from April 27, 2009 through expected retirement) 
Present Value Present Value 
Life-Cycle of Lost of Lost 
Percent Earnings Adjusted Worklife Money Money 
From To of Earnings Life Cycle Money Adjustment Unemploy- Earnings Earnings 
Year Age Age Year Base Factor Earnings Factor mentFactor (Lower Bound) (Upper Bound) 
2009 47.4 48.1 68% $23,819 1.00546 $23,949 0.68089 0.92114 $10,145 $10,214 
2010 48.1 49.1 100% 23,819 1.00623 23,967 0.68089 0.92114 14,783 15,032 
2011 49.1 50.1 100% 23,819 1.00715 23,989 0.68089 0.92114 14,650 15,046 
2012 50.1 51.1 100% 23,819 1.00834 24,017 0.68089 0.92114 14,522 15,064 
2013 51.1 52.1 100% 23,819 1.00975 24,051 0.68089 0.92114 14,398 15,085 
2014 52.1 53.1 100% 23,819 1.01116 24,084 0.68089 0.92114 14,276 15,106 
2015 53.1 54.1 100% 23,819 1.01257 24,118 0.68089 0.92114 14,154 15,127 
2016 54.1 55.1 100% 23,819 1.01397 24,151 0.68089 0.93471 14,240 15,371 
W 2017 55.1 56.1 
100% 23,819 1.01538 24,185 0.68089 0.93471 14,119 15,392 
c.n 2018 56.1 57.1 100% 23,819 1.01679 24,219 0.68089 0.93471 13,998 15,414 
--a. 2019 57.1 58.1 100% 23,819 1.01820 24,252 0.68089 0.93471 13,879 15,435 
c.n 2020 58.1 59.1 100% 23,819 1.01961 24,286 0.68089 0.93471 13,760 15,456 
2021 59.1 60.1 100% 23,819 1.02102 24,319 0.68089 0.93471 13,643 15,478 
2022 60.1 61.1 100% 23,819 1.00430 23,921 0.68089 0.93471 13,287 15,224 
2023 61.1 62.1 100% 23,819 0.97275 23,170 0.68089 0.93471 12,742 14,746 
2024 62.1 63.1 100% 23,819 0.94120 22,418 0.68089 0.93471 12,207 14,268 
2025 63.1 63.5 45% 23,819 0.91817 21,869 0.68089 0.93471 5,335 6,263 
$224,138 $243,721 




Chart 1: Worklife Expectancy vis-A-vis Retirement 
Worklife tables isolate the probabilities that the boxed areas will exist. 
The time line below represents a person's age throughout her working life. 
From Age 41.47 





C') Worklife tables remove the boxed areas and express worklife expectancy as a function of constant employment. 
The time line below represents the number of years a person is expected to work without interruption. 
From Age 41.47 Person Works for 
on Jun 4, 2003 15 Years 
I -~ I 
This analysis assumes that Mrs. Aguilar would have retired at age 63.5, the average retirement age of all females [14]. 
As of June 4, 2003, Mrs. Aguilar had a nonnal worklife expectancy of 15 years [16], 
The worklife adjustment factor applied to each year of projected earnings is 0.68089. 
[(15 year worklife expectancy) = (0.68089) x (22.03 year period from Mrs. Aguilar's age as of June 4, 2003 to age 63.5)] 
Maria A. Aguilar: Page 20 
Person Retires 







U1 ...... <Il .... 600 u 
-.J ~ 0 
~ 








Chart 2: All Female Workers vs. All Female Butchers and Other Meat, Poultry, and Fish Processing Workers 
(cohorts of 1,000 workers) 
879 
35-44 45-54 
Age of Workers 
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0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 
Salary Growth 
Note: Ifwages increase 5 percent each year, the annual salary at the end of22 years is $69,096. 

































Now 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 
Years from Now 
Note: Ifwages increase 5 percent each year, the annual salary at the end of22 years is $69,096. 
Maria A. Aguilar: Page 23 
o Future Annual 
Salary If Wage 
Growth Is 5 





Chart 5: A Demonstration of Present Value 





$50,000 I A 
$40,000 
$30,000 I 




Now 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 
Years from Now 
Note: Ifwages increase 5 percent each year, an annual salary of$23,000 today will be $69,096 in 22 years. However, with 6 percent annual 
interest, it only takes $18,458 today to exactly cover the $69,096 of annual wages 22 years from now. 
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Chart 6: Present Value Using the Net Discount Rate Method 
Decreased for Net Interest at 1 % 
$80,000 ~--------------------------------, 
$70,000 +I------------------------- -----l 
$60,000 +1------ ----------------- ---------1 
$50,000 +1------------------- ------------1 
$40,000 tl---------------------- ----- --I 




Now 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 
Years from Now 
Note: The present value is the same whether you calculate it in two steps (add growth and subtract interest) or in one step (subtrac~ the net interest). 
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$20,000 n """ $18,458 
$0 +1-............ ---' 
Interest Rate = 3 % 
Growth Rate == 2% 




Interest Rate == 6% 
Growth Rate == 5% 
Net Discount Rate == 1 % 
SI33,686 
~228 
Interest Rate = 9% 
Growth Rate = 8% 
Net Discount Rate = 1 % 
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Growth Rate = 3 % 
Interest Rate ::= 3 % 
Net Discount Rate = 0% 
S10,OOO 
$5,488 
Growth Rate = 6% 
Interest Rate = 6% 
Net Discount Rate = 0% 
SIO,OOO 
S5,934 
Growth Rate = 9% 
Interest Rate = 9% 
Net Discount Rate = 0% 
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Chart 9: Expected Risk Premium of Corporate Pension Plans 
Expected Return on Plan Assets 
(Hewitt Associates [38]) ~ 
Long-Telll1 Risk Free Rate 
(Ibbotson Associates [34]) 
The premiwn (shaded area) has an average of 3.8% and suggests that 
corporate defined benefit pension plans would use a differential (discount 
rate minus wage growth rate) of zero if pension assets were restricted to 
U.S. TreasUIY securities. 
The 3.8% historical average risk premiwn is just 0.0% less than the 
historical interest-wage differentials used by the corporate pension plans 
included in the Hewitt Associates study [38) and the Watson Wyatt 
studies ([39], [40)} . 
0.00%~1-----4~----~----+-----~-----+-----4------~----+-----~-----+-----4------~----+-----~-----+-----4 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
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